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ABSTRACT 
By applying learned rules, humans are able to accurately solve many problems with 
minimal cognitive effort; yet, this sort of habit-based problem solving may readily foster a type 
of cognitive inflexibility termed ‘cognitive set’.  Cognitive set occurs when an alternative – even 
more efficient – strategy is masked by a known, familiar solution.  In this research, I explored 
how cognitive set differs between primate species and across human cultures, using a nonverbal 
computerized ‘LS-DS’ task, which measures subjects’ ability to depart from a three-step, learned 
strategy (LS) in order to adopt a more efficient, one-step, direct strategy (DS or ‘the shortcut’).  
First, I compared baboons’, chimpanzees’, and humans’ abilities to break cognitive set and found 
that all baboon and chimpanzee subjects used the DS shortcut when it became available; yet, 
humans exhibited a remarkable preference for the LS.  Next, in an effort to elucidate how 
cognitive set occludes alternative strategies, I tracked human participants’ eye movements to 
identify whether better solutions are a) visually overlooked or b) seen but disregarded.  Although 
human subjects saw the shortcut, they did not use it until their conceptualization of the problem 
constraints were altered.  Lastly, to further distinguish between perceptual and conceptual 
influences on cognitive set, I compared shortcut-use between Westerners and the semi-nomadic 
Himba of northern Namibia.  This study found that susceptibility to cognitive set varied across 
human cultures and presented further evidence that problem conceptualization, and not 
perceptual processing, influences individuals’ ability to break set and use the alternative.  
Overall, this research provides a novel comparison of cognitive flexibility within the primate 
lineage and across human cultures.  The implications for set-promoting influences, including the 
potentially mechanizing problem-solving methods typical of Western education, are discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY IN PRIMATES AND ACROSS 
HUMAN CULTURES 
 
1.1 Introduction to Cognitive Flexibility 
1.1.1 Adaptive Significance of Flexible Behavior  
Flexible strategy-use is the foundation of adaptive problem solving.  Situations requiring 
decisive action emerge almost continuously when navigating dynamic environments and an 
individual’s response to such shifting social and ecological inputs can be profoundly 
consequential.  Fitness, and even survival, often hinge upon adaptive problem solving in which a 
response is not only determined by variable stimuli but also by shifting contexts (Potts, 2012; 
Reader, Morand-Ferron, & Flynn, 2016; Tebbich, Griffin, Peschl, & Sterelny, 2016).  
Accordingly, cognitive flexibility is considered a nontrivial component of intelligent behavior 
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Ionescu, 2012; Rosati, 2017; Stoet & 
Snyder, 2008).   
Here, I will broadly define cognitive flexibility as the ability to incorporate both known 
solutions and innovated or acquired novel solutions in a contextually appropriate manner 
(modified from Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; and Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 2011).  Thus, 
flexible responses must integrate external environmental cues with internal inputs, such as past 
experience, and in the case that a previous strategy is no longer the most appropriate, flexible 
behavior requires inhibiting that previous response and switching to a more efficient strategy.   
During development, humans acquire and refine a suite of cognitive skills that eventually 
enable successful, and self-sufficient, navigation of their environment.  This suite of skills, 
termed executive functioning, or the processes underlying the conscious control of action 
2 
(Zelazo, 2008), are commonly identified as being comprised of three components: inhibition, 
working memory, and switching (Miyake & Friedman, 2012).  From early childhood to 
adolescence, executive functioning develops rapidly, which has been associated with 
developmental changes in the prefrontal cortex (reviewed in Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; 
Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009).  Accordingly, 
children, adolescents and adults exhibit differing degrees of cognitive flexibility across a range 
of tasks; yet both direct (increase in age = increase in flexibility; Cunningham, 1965; Zelazo, 
2008) and inverse (increase in age = decrease in flexibility; Ardiale & Lemaire, 2012; Defeyter 
& German, 2003; German & Defeyter, 2000; Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Lemaire & 
Leclere, 2014; Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014; Luchins, 1942) relationships between 
cognitive flexibility and age are observed (however, see:  Chelune & Baer, 1986; Diamond & 
Kirkham, 2005).  Furthermore, cognitive flexibility has been linked to academic achievement 
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Cole, Duncan, & Blaye, 2014; Titz & Karbach, 2014), social skill 
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017), health (Besnard & Cacitti, 2005; Masley, Roetzheim, & 
Gualtieri, 2009), and is found to differ between some clinical populations such as in alcoholism 
(Trick, Kempton, Williams, & Duka, 2014) and Autism Spectrum Disorder (Yeung, 2015).  Still, 
flexible behavior is not unequivocally beneficial.   
The interplay between flexible strategy updating and maintenance of extant solution 
strategies presents an interesting opposition.  On one hand, if an existing representation is too 
concrete and impervious to contextual inputs, then newly relevant information is ignored, 
resulting in a familiar but potentially inefficient response.  On the other hand, if the 
representation is too easily perforated, then response efficiency is impaired by distractibility 
(Cools, 2008; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Roberts, 2008).  For example, if a foraging animal is 
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unable to adapt flexibly to shifting environments, such as a new stream that must be crossed in 
order to reach food, they may starve.  Yet, if behavior is too flexible, the same animal may 
attempt to cross an insurmountable obstacle, with the same fatal result.  Thus, optimal behavior 
requires a balance between exploiting a known solution and exploring alternatives (Brosnan & 
Hopper, 2014; Chrysikou et al., 2013). 
 
1.1.2 Abstract Problem Solving  
Problems range wildly in complexity, as do possible solutions.  In simple cases, an 
appropriate response may be acquired through conditional associations or trial and error learning 
(Petrides, 2008).  This occurs when a stimulus and an action produce a reward with some 
consistency, thus favoring that specific response in the presence of that specific stimulus.  These 
Stimulus-Response (S-R) associations often require an extended learning period but, once 
developed, are characterized by faster, more consistent, responses and reduced distractibility 
(Smith & Graybiel, 2016).  However, such automaticity, although certainly beneficial in some 
situations (red traffic light → stop), cannot be generalized to instances in which that specific 
stimulus is not present (pedestrians crossing the road → stop).  Thus, countless S-R associations 
would be required to fully understand a problem space, placing an impractical load on one’s 
cognitive processing.   
Abstract response contingencies overcome this limitation by providing a response 
framework that can be generalized across situations (Miller & Buschman, 2008).  Derived from 
the Latin word abtrahere, which translates to “to drag away,” abstractions are not fixed to a 
specific stimulus (Christoff & Keramatian, 2008).  Thus, whereas S-R associations reduce 
cognitive load by automating behavior, abstract rules reduce cognitive load by applying a single 
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solution to multiple problems.  Yet, selecting an appropriate response strategy, in and of itself, 
leaves room for error.  Simply put, an action is only as effective as the strategy that guides it.   
 
“Decisions based on abstractions require a number of coordinated processes, including 
the top-down biasing of inputs to the prefrontal cortex; the categorization of contextual 
information, including sensory inputs, memories, and signals about internal states; the 
integration of contextual information with the actions and goals appropriate to that 
context; the choice among potential actions or goals, based on the predicted outcome of 
each possibility; and active maintenance of those choices or goals in memory, as a 
prospective code, without completely dispensing with the alternatives” (Genovesio & 
Wise, 2008, p. 101) 
 
1.2 Measuring Cognitive Flexibility 
1.2.1 Cognitive Flexibility as a Multifaceted Construct 
In accordance with its behavioral importance, cognitive flexibility has been measured in 
humans and other animals extensively (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Bonte, Kemp, & Fagot, 
2014; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Davis, Vale, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Whiten, 2016; Diamond 
& Kirkham, 2005; Duncker & Lees, 1945; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Ionescu, 2012; Kolodny, 
Edelman, & Lotem, 2015; Luchins, 1942; Meiran, 1996; Rumbaugh, 1971; Stoet & Snyder, 
2003); yet, each of these studies employed entirely different paradigms.  This is not to say that 
one task is better or more telling than the others; however, it is important to distinguish between 
the different types of cognitive flexibility that have (and are currently) being tested. 
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“And just as the sides of a cube are not cubes themselves but squares, it is hard to 
imagine that the sides of cognitive flexibility are cognitive flexibilities, too. Instead it 
might be more logical to consider these sides as essential mechanisms or processes (that 
can themselves be flexible) that contribute to the overall cognitive flexibility.” (Ionescu, 
2017, p. 6) 
 
1.2.2 Forced Switch Paradigms 
The vast majority of cognitive flexibility metrics require subjects to switch strategies and 
then measure the ensuing deficits, typically in accuracy or response times (RTs).  Among these 
forced switch tasks, the simplest paradigm is a reversal learning, where a previously valid 
strategy is no longer correct (Rosati, 2017).  When the strategies are simple S-R associations 
(e.g., first the red circle is correct but later the blue circle is correct), this is referred to as a 
discrimination reversal task.  Inflexibility or perseveration results when the subject continues to 
use their first-learned strategy after it is no longer correct and can be measured via a transfer 
index, calculated as performance on reversal trials divided by performance on the initial 
discrimination.  Presumably the ability to extinguish the learned response determines how 
readily it is replaced (Roberts, 2008).  In another forced switch paradigm, the A-not-B task, one 
of two targets is repeatedly baited and the subject is rewarded upon its selection.  After an initial 
learning phase, the other location is baited.  Subjects must switch from their learned response 
and instead select the newly baited location.  Indeed, human infants (~9 months old) and 
monkeys continue to reach for the first-learned location (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; 
Piaget, 1954; Zelazo, 2008).   
6 
Stroop tasks, in which subjects must ignore an attribute of a stimulus that conflicts with 
the correct response, are another measure of inhibitive ability and are also often reported 
alongside cognitive flexibility measures (Bunge & Wallis, 2008).  Although inhibition is clearly 
involved in switching away from a learned solution, Friedman et al. (2008) recently proposed 
that inhibition may be an emergent property of other aspects of task shifting, such as updating 
(keeping a rule on-line in working memory) and switching (switching between rules), rather than 
a separable entity in and of itself (see Hommel & Colzato, 2017 for review).   
Another commonly used forced switch measure of cognitive flexibility is the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (WCST), or its simpler derivative the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) 
task (Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Manrique & 
Call, 2015; Zelazo et al., 2003).  These measures require subjects to first sort a deck of multi-
dimensional cards based on one stimulus attribute.  For example, if the first rule is to sort based 
on color, cards with a red object would be placed in one pile and cards with a blue object would 
be placed in another, regardless of the objects’ shapes.  After this first sort, subjects are then 
asked to sort the cards based on the other dimension.  For example, now subjects would need to 
place all the cards with a circle in one pile and all the cards with a square in the other pile, 
regardless of the objects’ colors.  Human children tend to perseverate with the first-learned rule; 
however, inflexibility on this task seemingly decreases with age (Kirkham et al., 2003; Zelazo, 
2008).  By 10 years old, children can perform similarly to adults (Chelune & Baer, 1986).  
Perseveration in adulthood is associated with executive impairment typical of schizophrenia and 
alcoholism (Sullivan et al., 1993) but RT deficits have also been observed in a typical adult 
population, suggesting that the ‘attentional inertia’ which leads to perseverative behaviors may 
negatively impact new strategy adoption throughout development (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). 
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Deficits associated with switching response strategies, as opposed to repeating a strategy, 
are referred to as switch costs (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2008).  Measured in response 
time delays or accuracy drops following a strategy change, switch costs are evident across a wide 
range of tasks and are often attributed to the cognitive reconfiguration allowing the new strategy 
to guide behavior (Lemaire, Luwel, & Brun, 2017; Luwel, Schillemans, Onghena, & 
Verschaffel, 2009; Meiran, 1996).  Both children and adults exhibit switch costs (Ionescu, 2012; 
Zelazo, 2008) and they can be somewhat reduced if the subject knows that the switch is coming 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or if they have more time to prepare for the new strategy (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004).   
 
1.2.3 Optional Switch Paradigms 
Problem solving strategies, or procedures for performing a task (Ardiale & Lemaire, 
2012), generally fall into one of two categories.  History-cued strategies are motivated by 
previous experience, while means-end strategies identify a path from the current state to a 
desired state; they are inspired by a goal (Sweller, Mawer, & Howe, 1982).  Truly adaptive 
behavior goes beyond simply inhibiting and switching between known response contingencies.   
Often, one must engage in means-end problem analysis and actively select or even devise a 
solution strategy.   This type of cognitive flexibility can be measured via insight problem solving 
tasks, wherein the solution requires approaching the problem in some novel way (Defeyter & 
German, 2003; Ionescu, 2012). 
 In the classic functional fixedness paradigm, an object for which the normal function is 
known must be used in an abnormal way to complete the task (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001).  For example, when attempting to build a tower which needs to reach 
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a certain height, subjects are less likely to succeed, which requires using a large box as the base 
of the tower, if the other building materials are inside of the box when provided to the subject.  
This mental ‘block,’ attributed to their prior knowledge regarding the box’s function, results in 
an inability to re-conceptualize the problem space (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Knoblich et al., 
2001).  In fact, difficulty replacing a familiar concept frequently affects humans’ performance on 
optional switch tasks, resulting in a ‘cognitive set.’ 
 
1.3 Cognitive Set: When Sufficiency Blocks Efficienc 
1.3.1 What is Cognitive Set? 
A cognitive set occurs when prior knowledge or experience biases the interpretation of 
task-relevant information, thus blocking a novel or better solution strategy.  It has also been 
referred to as fixedness, einstellung, conservatism, proactive interference, negative transfer, 
entrenchment, satisficing, and task set (Badre, 2008; Bilalić et al., 2008; Bunge & Wallis, 2008; 
Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Duncker & Lees, 1945; Hrubesch, Preuschoft, 
& van Schaik, 2009; Kolodny et al., 2015; Luchins, 1942; Sweller et al., 1982).  Described as 
‘pernicious’ (Bilalić et al., 2008), cognitive set has been documented in thousands of subjects 
across variable task designs (Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Lemaire & 
Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950).  
In 1942, Abraham Luchins published a detailed account of cognitive set, referring to it as 
the ‘Einstellung effect’ (Luchins, 1942).  He used a ‘water jar’ task in which three jars were 
drawn and labeled with the quantity of water they contained.  Using these values, subjects were 
required to add/subtract in order to ‘obtain’ a target quantity.  The first five problems could all be 
solved via the same four-step strategy: Jar 2 - Jar 1 - Jar 3 - Jar 3 (see Figure 1.3-1).  
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Figure 1.1 Example water jar problem, solvable via the four-step, learned rule. 
 
However, the next two problems could be solved either by this four-step strategy or a 
simpler two-step strategy: Jar 1 - Jar 3 (see Figure 1.3-2). 
 
Figure 1.2 Example water jar problem, solvable via the learned rule or the better 
alternative 
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Luchins tested thousands of subjects of various ages and levels of education and found 
that the vast majority of subjects (70-100%, depending on the population sampled) continued to 
solve the problems using the more complicated, learned method rather than adopting a more 
efficient, but novel, two-step strategy.   In fact, even when subjects were given actual jars of 
water to manipulate (Luchins & Luchins, 1950), or the order of the jars was varied (Aftanas & 
Koppenaal, 1962), they persisted in their use of the learned strategy.  
Luchins described this phenomenon as a mechanization of problem-solving and suggested 
that it arises in certain situations when previous experience with a problem-solving method 
infringes on a subject’s ability to see the problem with an open state of mind (Luchins, 1942).  
For example, Bilalić et al. (2008) found that expert chess players, after finding one possible 
move, reported that they were looking for another.  However, their gaze indicated that they 
continued to look at the solution they had already found.  In another study, subjects were given a 
problematic example diagram of a bike rack and asked to redesign it such that these problems 
would be minimized; however subjects seemed unable to move past the examples and included 
even the problematic aspects in their designs (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  Lemaire and 
Leclere (2014) noted that, when given two strategies for solving multiplication problems, 
subjects were more likely to repeat a strategy even if the other was more appropriate.  Cognitive 
set emerges across a wide variety of tasks.  But why?  Why do subjects persistently use 
inefficient or problematic strategies when other, better strategies are available? 
 
1.3.2 The Up-Side of Inefficiency 
Cognitive set may not always be detrimental.  Chunking, an enhanced association of 
certain behaviors involved in a response (Gobet et al., 2001), is thought to decrease cognitive 
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load by automating certain behavioral responses (Kolodny et al., 2015; Smith & Graybiel, 2016).  
Further, while response-planning results in prolonged reaction times, especially at the beginning 
of a sequence (Rushworth, Croxson, Buckley, & Walton, 2008), routine behaviors can run on 
autopilot, they “require few of the processes needed for abstract response strategies” (Genovesio 
& Wise, 2008).  Notably, switch costs are even apparent when strategy switching is voluntary 
and subjects tend to repeat a previous strategy more often than if their strategy was randomly 
selected (Arrington & Logan, 2004).  In fact, increased speed, increased accuracy and decreased 
distractibility are some of the hallmarks of habit formation (Smith & Graybiel, 2016).  Another 
consideration is that humans tend to avoid ambiguity, even sometimes choosing a riskier option 
rather than attempting one with an unknown outcome (Camerer & Weber, 1991).  
Cognitive set affects a broad range of human problem solving conditions.  Following a 
learned rule offers outcome security and can support the development of task proficiency; 
however, this eventually comes at the cost of task optimization.  Mechanical solutions often 
occlude alternative, sometimes more efficient strategies, yet are seemingly pervasive in human 
problem solving.  
 
1.4 The Evolution of Cognitive Flexibility 
1.4.1 The Origins of Human Cognitive Flexibility 
Currently, human culture is inseparable from technology.  Over the past several 
millennia, humans have constructed an advanced assemblage of tools and techniques, a feat 
reliant upon the interplay between innovation and maintenance.  Without invention, there is no 
novel technique to adopt and without behavioral maintenance, there is nothing to upgrade upon.  
Termed ‘ratcheting’ this ability to invent-adopt-upgrade has allowed humans to progress from 
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basic stone tools to our current technological advancements (Davis et al., 2016; Hovers, 2012; 
Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) and yet, ‘ratcheting’ is 
conspicuously less apparent in other primate species (Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 2016; Davis et al., 
2016).  Thus, a perplexing contradiction arises: humans appear better equipped for cognitive 
flexibility than any other primate species; yet, when confronted with focused problem solving 
tasks, humans seem crippled by inflexibility.  Elucidating when and how flexible strategy-use 
evolved and why similarly proficient invent-adopt-upgrade behavior appears to be lacking in 
nonhuman primates seems crucial for understanding these complexities.  
Comparative cognitive research, especially across primate species, provides unique 
insights into the selection pressures potentially underlying the emergence of certain behaviors.  
Much of our evolutionary history has been shared with monkeys and, to an even greater extent, 
nonhuman apes (henceforth ‘apes’).  Thus, comparing behaviors between monkeys, apes, and 
humans provides insights into which traits may have been present prior to their evolutionary 
divergences and which may have been uniquely derived (Rosati, 2017).  
 
1.4.2 Cognitive Flexibility in Monkeys 
Old world monkey (Cercopithecoidea) and ape (Hominoidea) lineages diverged 
approximately 25 million years ago (Stevens et al., 2013).  Monkeys’ evolutionary proximity to 
humans and broadly similar neural organization has fueled numerous comparative studies aimed 
at identifying the origins and neural underpinnings of executive functions, including cognitive 
flexibility (Genovesio, Brasted, Mitz, & Wise, 2005; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Manrique & 
Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).   Within these comparisons, several basic 
differences between monkeys and humans are apparent.   First, monkeys often require extensive 
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training to grasp response contingencies and even their most advanced socio-cognitive and 
executive processes are basic components of human cognition (Beran, Pate, Washburn, & 
Rumbaugh, 2004; Dean et al., 2012; Gallup, 1976; Manrique & Call, 2015; Stoet & Snyder, 
2008; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002).  Second, monkeys’ response times are recurrently faster 
than humans,’ which may be attributable to faster neuronal conduction in smaller brains and/or 
some mechanical advantage (Ringo, Doty, Demeter, & Simard, 1994; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  
Despite these differences, monkeys and humans show similarly inflexible behaviors on some 
tasks.  
 
1.4.2.1 Evidence for Inflexibility in Monkeys 
In basic forced-switch tasks, such as transfer index, which rewards subjects for selecting 
a certain response and then switches to rewarding a different response (Berg, 1948; Rumbaugh, 
1971; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996), monkeys and humans exhibit similar difficulties adopting 
the new solution (Bonté, 2011; Bonte et al., 2014; Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012; 
Manrique & Call, 2015; Piaget, 1954; Rosati, 2017; Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo, 2008).  In fact, on 
the Conceptual Set Shifting Task (CSST), a WCST derivative developed for nonhuman primates, 
both rhesus macaques and baboons increasingly produced perseverative behaviors with age, 
which is consistent with the human developmental trajectory on similar tasks (Bonté, 2011; 
Manrique & Call, 2015).  Similarly, younger baboons outperformed older baboons on a transfer 
index task in both pre- and post-reversal sections (Bonte et al., 2014).  Thus, monkeys and 
humans have shown similar inadequacies when switching behaviors; yet, when required to select 
between more abstract responses, several differences emerge.  
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1.4.2.2 Evidence for Flexibility in Monkeys 
 Like humans, monkeys are capable of learning abstract rules.  In fact, rhesus macaques 
(Macaca mulatta) successfully enacted a conditional repeat-stay/change-shift strategy that 
requires completely ignoring S-R associations (Genovesio et al., 2005; Genovesio & Wise, 
2008).  In another study, a cue at the beginning of each trial signaled which of two strategies 
(e.g., judge color or judge orientation) rhesus monkeys and humans should apply to a stimulus 
(Stoet & Snyder, 2003).  In some trials, both strategies called for the same response (e.g., choose 
left) but in others, the strategies were in conflict with one another (e.g., color strategy = choose 
left, orientation strategy = choose right).  The monkeys successfully learned to adjust their 
strategies based on the cue and accurately responded to novel stimuli, confirming their grasp of 
the abstract contingencies (Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  However, this study also revealed a key 
difference between monkeys’ and humans’ abstract rule-use.  In stark contrast to humans, 
monkeys did not show slower response times when the strategy switched: in other words, they 
did not exhibit switch costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; however, see Huguet, Barbet, Belletier, 
Monteil, & Fagot, 2014 and Chapter 3 Footnote 1).  As mentioned previously, humans are 
plagued by switch costs, which are even apparent after 23,000 trials (Stoet & Snyder, 2007), yet 
these monkeys were seemingly unaffected.  Interestingly, the authors noted another difference 
between humans’ and monkeys’ task-switching abilities: unlike humans, monkeys showed lower 
accuracy and longer response times when facing the incongruent trials, those in which the two 
strategies signaled different responses (Stoet & Snyder, 2003).   Thus, monkeys but not humans 
were significantly affected by irrelevant stimulus information.   
“What humans are good at, compared with monkeys, is not switching between two tasks, 
but rather, locking on to a single task.”  (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, p. 228)   
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Thus, although there is limited evidence for both flexible and inflexible forced switch 
strategy switching in monkeys, their propensity to forsake a learned strategy in order to adopt a 
better alternative, when it is available, is unclear.   
 
1.4.3 Cognitive Flexibility in Apes 
Within the Hominoidea superfamily, Hominidae or apes emerged ~13-18mya, with the 
Pan-Homo divergence occurring ~6-7mya (Perelman et al., 2011).  As our closest extant 
relatives, apes provide an invaluable glimpse into the evolution of human cognitive processes.  
Apes possess relatively advanced cognitive abilities compared to monkeys and non-primate 
species (Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; de Waal & Ferrari, 2010; Gallup, 1970; Haun & Call, 2008; 
Moore, 2016) but are outperformed by humans in many domains, especially with regards to 
language and social learning (Conway & Christiansen, 2001; Corballis, 2010; Heyes, 1993; 
Huber et al., 2009).  It seems plausible that, given our shared ancestry, apes and humans might 
exhibit similar explorative/exploitative tendencies.  However, if we consider the evolution of 
human culture to be predicated upon flexible strategy updating, it is also possible that a 
fundamental difference in explorative/exploitative behaviors gave rise to our vastly different 
technological trajectories. 
To what extent apes are able to flexibly adopt new strategies is a topic of considerable 
debate and investigation (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Manrique, Völter, & Call, 2013; Marshall-
Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2009; Van Leeuwen, Cronin, 
Schutte, Call, & Haun, 2013).  In some measures, apes perseverate similarly to children (Beran, 
Washburn, & Rumbaugh, 2007; Rosati, 2017 for review; Rumbaugh, 1971; Vlamings, Hare, & 
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Call, 2010).  Additionally, inflexibility was observed in all ape species on a reversal task, in 
which subjects first learned (over 100 trials) to push a lever one direction but then were required 
to extinguish this learned response and switch directions (Manrique & Call, 2015).  Still other 
accounts state that, like humans, apes proficiently extinguish previous responses in A-not-B tasks 
(Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008; MacLean et al., 2014), even performing equivalently to human 
children (Barth & Call, 2006).  Yet the validity of these findings has recently been challenged.  
Recall that A-not-B tasks measure subjects’ ability to switch from their learned (A) response and 
select the actual location of the food (B) but, typically, only three A responses are required 
before this ‘strategy’ is considered learned (Amici et al., 2008; Barth & Call, 2006; MacLean et 
al., 2014).  Davis (2017) argued that three trials is not enough to make this claim and required 
subjects to utilize the A strategy a minimum of 20 times.  Under these methods, chimpanzees 
responded at chance on the critical B trials, suggesting that their abilities to extinguish a learned 
response were, in fact, impaired. 
Evidence regarding apes’ abilities to switch between abstract rules is limited.  One 
account suggested that on a DCCS task, chimpanzees’ use of the second rule was impaired by 
their knowledge of the first (Moriguchi, Tanaka, & Itakura, 2011).  However, the reported error 
rate post-switch was 52.9% and although the authors state that this was statistically different 
from chance, only 6 chimpanzees were tested and those only passed the pre-switch section in an 
average of 42.9% of sessions, shedding doubt on the extent to which even the first rule was 
adopted.  If the first strategy was not established, difficulty learning the second strategy cannot 
confidently be attributed to cognitive set.   
Importantly, chimpanzees are capable of abstract rule-use such as same/different 
judgments (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Nissen, Blum, & Blum, 1948; Oden, Thompson, & 
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Premack, 1988; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997), even using an exclusion tactic to group 
unknowns (Beran & Washburn, 2002).  Further, in computerized mazes, chimpanzees are 
unimpaired when the correct path requires moving away from the goal briefly (Dolins, 
Schweller, & Milne, 2017; Fragaszy et al., 2009; Menzel & Menzel, 2007), suggesting that 
chimpanzees are capable of reasoning between and selecting appropriate strategies. However, to 
my knowledge, there have been no published investigations evincing chimpanzees’ ability to 
switch between abstract solutions, prior to the current research. 
Many social learning studies, investigating apes’ ability to flexibly adjust their behavior 
after viewing a demonstration of an alternative method, have described both explorative and 
exploitative behaviors (Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & Bonnie, 2015; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 
2013).   As this clearly relates to cognitive flexibility, I will briefly review their findings; 
however, with two caveats in mind.  First, inflexibility in social learning contexts could also stem 
from an inability to extract the relevant information from a demonstration (for whatever reason), 
rather than from cognitive set (Dean et al., 2012).  Second, inflexibility might also be observed if 
apes cannot perform or do not grasp the physical affordances of the alternative strategy.  That 
being said, social learning paradigms are undoubtedly more representative of how group-specific 
behavioral repertoires (cultures) evolve or persist within ape populations. 
 
1.4.3.1 Evidence for Behavioral Inflexibility in Apes 
Several studies report that chimpanzees stick to a learned strategy, even after watching a 
demonstration of a more-rewarding alternative (Davis, 2017; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). 
Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) reported that among 5 chimpanzees, which were trained to 
use a dipping method to procure honey and then shown a more effective probing technique, all 
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but one failed to switch to the new strategy. This led to speculation that chimpanzees may use a 
copy-when-dissatisfied heuristic, such that, as long as they receive some reward they do not 
switch to an alternative (Davis, 2017; Laland, 2004).  Yet, without demonstrating that the probe 
technique would have been more readily adopted if they hadn’t first learned the dip method, 
inflexibility cannot be conclusively determined. A similar finding was observed in one 
population of wild chimpanzees, that were unable to use a stick to access honey, even when the 
stick was pre-placed inside of the honey-baited tube (Gruber, Muller, Reynolds, Wrangham, & 
Zuberbuhler, 2011). 
Recently, Davis (2017) presented chimpanzees with a ‘pitfalls’ box, in which a reward 
could be accessed via multiple portals however, if chimpanzees used their learned method (Door 
1), the best portion of the reward fell into a pit.  Thus, to access the reward in its entirety, 
subjects needed to use a demonstrated, novel method (Door 2).  The authors found that 
chimpanzees trained to use Door 1 adopted the Door 2 strategy after a median of 14 more 
attempts than naïve individuals, concluding that prior behavior credibly delayed but did not 
prevent use of the alternative.  
In fact, some chimpanzees are conservative even when the alternative solution is easier.  
For example, chimpanzees proficient in a raking technique to obtain food from a food board, did 
not switch to a more efficient rattle method after their group members invented it (Hrubesch et 
al., 2009).  In another example, after learning how to combine two components to construct a 
tool, chimpanzees continued to do so, even when the reward could easily be accessed via the 
individual components (i.e. did not require tool-construction; Price et al., 2009).  This finding 
was mirrored in (Davis et al., 2016) who demonstrated that, while naïve chimpanzees easily 
adopted the most efficient solution strategy to a puzzlebox, 9 out of 11 chimpanzees initially 
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trained to use a more complex strategy were not able to switch to the more efficient alternative 
following a demonstration.  It is worth noting that for some of the tasks labeling apes as 
conservative, the alternative strategy is ‘locked’ during training (Davis, 2017; Manrique & Call, 
2015).  Subsequently, avoidance of that solution is not necessarily a function of the learned 
response – it could also be that subjects’ own personal unrewarding experience with that option 
delays (or prevents) their using it – compared to naïve controls that have no positive/negative 
experience with either solution.  
Some of these findings are, indeed, reminiscent of the cognitive set literature in humans.  
If apes and humans similarly struggle to move past a known solution strategy to adopt a more 
efficient or more rewarding alternative, we might consider conservatism a homologous, ancestral 
trait.  However, this assertion would be, as yet, unjustified. 
 
1.4.3.2 Evidence for Behavioral Flexibility in Apes 
In fact, another narrative heralds apes’ robust behavioral flexibility.  This seems 
particularly evident when the alternative strategy yields a higher pay-off.  For instance, in token 
exchange paradigms, chimpanzees flexibly switched to exchanging an unfamiliar token, when it 
became more highly rewarded than the familiar token (Van Leeuwen et al., 2013).  Additionally, 
(Hopper et al., 2015) found that chimpanzees would flexibly travel to a more distant token-
exchange location for a better payoff; echoing the potential foraging benefits of explorative 
behavior.   Further, in a honey-baited tube experiment, a small subset of wild apes applied a 
familiar leaf-sponging technique to the novel task, suggesting a certain degree of innovation, 
marked by the ability to generalize a known strategy to a novel situation (Gruber, 2016). 
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 Recently, (Davis, 2017) proposed that variable findings regarding cognitive flexibility in 
chimpanzees may be linked to the relative differences in strategy complexity between the learned 
solution and the alternative, such that relatively simple alternatives or modifications promote 
flexibility.  This was supported by three lines of evidence (Davis, 2017).  First, after learning 
how to slide a lever to achieve a peanut, chimpanzees were able to switch to another, more 
efficient strategy after it was demonstrated; however, they only switched if the other strategy 
yielded an increase in the reward value.  Second, the authors introduced another reward retrieval 
paradigm and found that subjects would flexibly add a step to their response techniques, again, to 
attain a better reward.  Third, when the difficulty of the first technique was increased, subjects 
readily switched to an easier alternative.  These findings are in line with others demonstrating 
that simple strategy modifications are well within apes’ capabilities (Lehner et al., 2011; 
Yamamoto et al., 2013).   
Additionally, apes are certainly able to switch strategies when their learned method no 
longer works.  For example, Manrique et al. (2013) showed that apes could readily master a 
puzzle box requiring consecutively more advanced solutions.  Once a solution technique was 
learned, it subsequently became ineffective; thus, subjects were required to consecutively 
innovate other strategies.  Further, disabled apes are certainly able to adapt familiar behaviors to 
deal with handicaps (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2010; Hockings et al., 2015), which means that, at least 
when it is required, apes are capable of flexibly modifying a strategy.   
Further complicating the picture, chimpanzees have even exhibited flexible behavior 
above and beyond that of humans’.  After being shown how to extract a reward from an opaque 
box, children and chimpanzees copied all demonstrated actions to achieve the reward.  However, 
when the opaque box was replaced with a transparent one, children persisted in their use of all 
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demonstrated actions, even the obviously unnecessary ones, such as tapping the outside of the 
box (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007).  Furthermore, this 
‘overimitation’ was amplified in adults, who reproduced the unnecessary actions with even  
higher fidelity than children (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011).  Yet, on the same task, 
chimpanzees discarded the causally irrelevant portions of the demonstration and accessed the 
reward with greater efficiency than either children or adults (Horner & Whiten, 2005).   In fact, 
like humans, functional fixedness has even been suggested to afflict apes: presented with the 
floating peanut task, chimpanzees were unable to use water from their drinking source to float 
the peanut to an accessible height; however, when an alternate water source was provided, a 
small subset (5 out of 24) did succeed in procuring the peanut (Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 
2011).   
 
1.4.4 Evolutionary Implications 
Both flexible and inflexible behavior is observed in nonhuman primates.  Seemingly, 
response style (exploitative vs explorative) can be influenced by a range of factors including the 
strength of the learned solution, the relative difficulty of enacting the alternative, and the reward 
difference between the two (Davis, 2017; Hopper et al., 2015; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; 
Van Leeuwen et al., 2013).  
Flexibility offers numerous advantages in terms of potential outcomes (Brosnan & 
Hopper, 2014; Sweller & Levine, 1982).  More productive alternatives might be discovered or 
adopted.  Novel resources might be exploited.  In an ever-changing environment, it is nontrivial 
to navigate a novel situation successfully and this often requires innovative or explorative 
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behavior (Holmes & Cohen, 2014).  Adaptation is predicated upon flexible strategy use (Crone, 
Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, & Bunge, 2006; Lemaire & Leclere, 2014).   
Yet, there are also potential disadvantages to flexibility.  Explorative tendencies may 
predispose an individual towards distractibility (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 
2008).  Effort spent developing a new technique or even the cognitive processes associated with 
switching between techniques, might be costly (Holmes & Cohen, 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).  
Moreover, environmental change could be fleeting, rendering an adaptation useless (Brosnan & 
Hopper, 2014) or at the very least, a waste of time.  Further, an innovated strategy is untested, 
whilst the pre-existing behavior sufficiently supported survival thus far (van Schaik et al., 2016). 
In other words, if the current solution elicits some reward, the relative benefit of exploring 
alternatives might be negligible or even detrimental.  Hence the colloquialism: “If it ain’t broken, 
don’t fix it.”  
Yet, conservatism, especially in regards to abstract rule-use, is restricting.  It impedes 
innovatory behavior thereby lowering the probability of discovering adaptive solutions or niches 
(Brosnan & Hopper, 2014).  Moreover, without the flexibility to choose between alternatives, 
optimization is unlikely. 
 
1.5 Cross-Cultural Influences on Cognitive Flexibility 
 
Thus far, I have compared humans’ cognitive flexibility with monkeys’ and apes,’ without 
fully acknowledging that there is much evidence showing inter-individual variability in humans’ 
explorative/exploitative tendencies.  Here, I will introduce potentially mediating factors, 
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specifically focusing on cross-cultural influences, which might affect humans’ propensities to 
break cognitive set. 
 
1.5.1 Humans and Rule-Use 
Human problem solving is unequivocally advanced.  To a large extent, this dexterity is 
facilitated by codified rules-of-thumb and equations, which enable us to accurately solve many 
problems, even without necessarily understanding why a solution strategy is effective.  For 
example, one can successfully calculate the circumference of a circle without ever grasping the 
intricacies of pi. Undoubtedly, codified solution strategies offer a tremendous advantage when 
solving many, similar problems.  For this reason, repetitive rule-use is a staple of Western 
education, yet the real-world applications of this approach are dubious.  First, how often do every 
day problems require identical solution strategies?  Simply determining when and where to cross 
the road affords infinite solutions and reproducing the actions that allowed you to safely cross 
previously could be morbidly ineffective under the current conditions.  Second, might rote 
learning reasonably lead to cognitive inflexibility (Star & Seifert, 2006)?  In a novel problem 
space, the search for a solution takes precedence but if a solution is provided and subsequently 
memorized, search might never truly occur.  With regards to cognitive set, perhaps alternative 
solutions are not found because they are not sought. In fact, stoked by partial differences in 
alternative strategy-use between publicly and privately schooled children, Luchins (1942) 
repeatedly professed that typical Western educational practices might be largely accountable for 
the observed conservatism. 
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1.5.2 Purported Universality of Cognition 
Thousands of subject have been tested on Luchins' water jar task (see Section 1.3.1) 
under various manipulations and a consistent majority persist in their use of the learned rule. 
This has led to a conclusion that, within human problem solving, cognitive set is universal 
(Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; McKelvie, 1984).  Yet, 
despite attempts to account for subjects' age, occupation, and education, only Western 
(American, British, and Canadian) subjects were tested, leaving the potential for cross-cultural 
differences in susceptibility to cognitive set completely unexplored. Recently, investigators have 
rightfully called into question the ‘universality’ of many cognitive processes, of which our 
understanding is predominantly derived from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
Democratic (WEIRD) subjects’ data (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010; Legare & Nielsen, 2015).  One particularly concerning assessment found that in 2007, 
67% of studies in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, solely collected data from 
undergraduate psychology students (Arnett, 2008; Jahoda, 2016).  In fact, studies that defy this 
trend often find that WEIRD data are at the extremes of more globally diverse samples.  Which 
is not surprising, given Westerners’ highly unusual social and ecological environments compared 
to those of the vast majority of humans currently, and those in which all humans belonged to 
very recently in our evolutionary past (see Henrich et al., 2010 for review).  The comparatively 
few studies investigating cross-cultural cognition have identified differences in both perceptual 
and conceptual domains.  
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1.5.3 Westerners’ Global Perceptual Bias 
Visual assessment of one’s surroundings is crucial to survival; yet the specific demands 
are necessarily different in different environments.  What may be visually important to a hunter 
(e.g., judging the speed and directionality of movement) will not be the same as what is 
important to an artist (e.g., attending to the minute details within a visual scene).  Thus, 
unsurprisingly, humans have been shown to exhibit differences in visual perceptual processing.   
Westerners have been found to 1) make more accurate judgments regarding a global 
figure comprised of conflicting local figures than vice versa and b) preferentially group figures 
based on global rather than local features (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; Davidoff, Fonteneau, & 
Fagot, 2008; Navon, 1977).  In the visual system, the lateral geniculate nucleus, which receives 
visual input directly from the retina and projects to the primary visual cortex, is comprised of six 
laminae: four layers of cells with small receptive fields (parvocellular) and two layers of cells 
with large receptive fields (magnocelullar).  Indeed, the interplay between magno- and 
parvocellular inputs appears to be the source of humans’ observed global bias, evidenced by the 
ability to attenuate it by suppressing a portion of the cells in the magnocellular pathway 
(Michimata, Okubo, & Mugishima, 1999).   Thus, one might expect global/local perceptual 
biases to vary consistently between individuals. 
 
1.5.4 Cross-Cultural Differences in Perceptual Biases 
Differences in local/global perceptual biases have been reported across cultural, ethnic, 
and even religious groups (see Hommel & Colzato, 2017 for review).  For example, in a task 
which requires subjects to judge the verticality of a line (rod) within a frame, East Asian 
participants were more affected by the orientation of the frame than Americans (Ji, Peng, & 
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Nisbett, 2000).  In a similar task, Japanese participants more accurately reproduced a line that 
was proportional to the frame, compared to Americans who were better able to ignore the frame 
and reproduce the absolute size of the line; this was also true for Americans living in Japan and 
Japanese living in America (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003).   Eye tracking 
analyses showed that, when viewing a picture, American participants fixated more on the focal 
object, but Chinese participants tended to look at the background (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 
2005).  Additionally, this attentional selectivity seemed to impact information processing: when 
describing a scene, Japanese participants mentioned the background first, but Americans 
mentioned foreground objects first (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), which influenced their ability to 
recognize the scenes after changes to either the foreground or background were made (Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2006).   However, similar to Americans, on the hierarchical figures task (Navon, 1977), 
Japanese and British participants’ exhibited equivalently global biases (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 
2012).  
Humans have also been shown to possess local perceptual biases.  In direct comparisons, 
the seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited a ‘dramatic’ local bias on hierarchical 
figure tasks compared to Western participants (Davidoff et al., 2008), and remarkably, this bias 
decreased as the number of exposures to an urban environment increased (Caparos, Ahmed, et 
al., 2012).  Further, compared to British participants, Himba were significantly less affected by 
the Ebbinghaus illusion, in which the size of an inner object appears to change depending on the 
composition of surrounding objects (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, 
Parron, & Goldstein, 2007).  Likewise, in a categorization task, the Himba grouped shapes with 
local similarities even when they fell into different Western shape categories (i.e. triangles, 
circles, and squares; Roberson, Davidoff, & Shapiro, 2002).  Lastly, the Himba seem to possess 
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greater attentional control than Westerners, as evidenced by their enhanced performance on an 
Eriksen-type flanker task compared to British participants (de Fockert, Caparos, Linnell, & 
Davidoff, 2011).  Thus, there is clear evidence that visual perception differs between cultures.  
However, if and to what extent this interacts with environmental factors to affect problem 
solving is less clear. 
 
1.5.5 Cross Cultural Differences in Problem Conceptualization  
The ways in which humans conceptualize problems and their solutions, differ 
substantially across human populations.  Many environmental factors may contribute to humans’ 
performance on cognitive tasks.  For one, cross-cultural differences in linguistic encoding might 
lead to variation in subjects’ abilities to remember and discriminate between stimuli, especially 
those which fall along a continuum such as color (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999; 
Davidoff & Fagot, 2010; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005) or quantity (Frank, 
Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008).  That said, Ji, Zhang, and Nisbett (2004) found that culture 
but not language influenced subjects’ categorization: when provided with three words and 
instructed to select the two most related, Americans preferred to group the words based on 
categorizations (e.g., monkey and panda) whereas Chinese participants preferred relationship-
based categorizations (e.g., monkey and banana), regardless of testing language.  Similarly, 
Chinese children grouped items based on functionality while American children utilized more 
categorical groupings (Chiu, 1972; Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001) and Asian adults 
were more likely to interpret events as stemming from environmental causes, compared to 
Americans who more often attributed them to internal causes (Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000).  
There is even some evidence that problem-solving approach might differ across cultures. 
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Chinese and Korean subjects evoked more intuitive (or holistic) reasoning styles, while 
Americans (even Asian Americans) relied on more analytic problem solving approaches 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002).   
However, some studies have noted similarly inflexible problem solving approaches 
between cultures.  For example, overimitation, wherein subjects copy even irrelevant portions of 
a demonstration, has been observed across Western and remote cultures alike (Horner & Whiten, 
2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014; Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010; however, see Berl, 2015).  Yet, another set of studies revealed that 
overimitation varied within individuals across cultures, depending on context: Clegg and Legare 
(2016) found that both American and Vanuatuan children more closely imitated instrumental 
(i.e., object-related) compared to conventional (i.e., socially determined) demonstrations (see 
Legare & Nielsen, 2015 for review of cultural influences on learning).  Additionally, similar to 
Westerners, adolescent Shuar of Equadorian Amazonia were shown to be affected by functional 
fixedness during problem solving (German & Barrett, 2005).  However, in typical measures of 
cognitive flexibility such as the WCST, some cross-cultural differences have been found (Avila, 
2013; Shan, Chen, Lee, & Su, 2008), yet in one case, these were attributed to flaws in the task 
itself rather than potential variation in cognitive processes across cultures (Coffey, Marmol, 
Schock, & Adams, 2005).  
 
1.5.6 Impact of Cultural Differences on Problem Solving 
Several hypotheses have emerged, which attempt to assimilate the observed cross-
cultural differences in perceptual bias (global/local), attentional bias (context/focal), and 
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response style (flexible/persistent) in both perceptual processing and problem conceptualization 
across cultures.  
For instance, the social structure hypothesis heralds the impact of subjects’ cultural 
interdependency on cognition.  Under this hypothesis, societies that revere the collective (the 
common example is East Asian) rather than the individual (the common example is American) 
are predicted to exhibit global rather than local perceptual biases, which in turn are predicted to 
support holistic rather than analytic response styles (Nisbett et al., 2001).  Although one study 
found that priming subjects with more interdependent pronouns (e.g., we, our, us) elicited 
enhanced performance on global responses and vice versa for independent pronouns (e.g., I, me, 
mine) and local responses. (Kuhnen & Oyserman, 2002), there is substantial evidence to 
discredit this hypothesis.   
First, not all interdependent peoples exhibit global perceptual biases.  As mentioned in 
Section 1.5.4, Himba people, who live in extremely interdependent groups, exhibit profoundly 
local perceptual biases (Davidoff et al., 2008; Roberson et al., 2002).  Second, some of these 
findings are not reproducible.  A recent study (N = 363) showed that Japanese participants were 
instead less globally oriented than American or Argentinian participants and this was 
reconfirmed (N = 1,843) with a representative sample of Japanese and American participants 
aged 20-69 (Oishi et al., 2014).   
Under the visual clutter hypothesis, the characteristics of a culture’s typical visual 
environment are said to contribute to local/global perceptual biases.  In other words, global 
perceptual bias is thought to develop from regularly encountering cluttered visual scenes; 
whereas local perceptual biases might result from sparse visual scenes (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 
2012; de Fockert et al., 2011).  Both Japanese and American participants, primed with Japanese 
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scenes (which were found to be more ambiguous and contain more elements than American 
scenes) attended more to context than those primed with American scenes (Miyamoto, Nisbett, 
& Masuda, 2006); however, this seems to suggest instead that attentional biases shift based on 
recent contextual information.  In fact, Linnell, Caparos, de Fockert, and Davidoff (2013) 
demonstrated that attentional focus was suppressed in urban compared to traditionally-living 
Himba and de Fockert et al. (2011) showed that, in stark contrast to Westerners, Himba 
participants were not even distracted by a moving singleton.  Thus, there is a potential link 
between visual clutter and attentional selectivity.  However to what extent attentional selectivity 
and global/local perceptual biases are conflated is unclear (Caparos, Linnell, Bremner, de 
Fockert, & Davidoff, 2012).  Moreover, how visual clutter may influence problem solving 
approach (Hommel & Colzato, 2017), is entirely speculative. When placing Kitayama et al.’s 
(2003) rod and frame study into context with other cross-cultural perceptual findings, Hommel 
and Colzato (2017, p. 5) wrote: 
“With respect to control styles, this can be taken to imply that US-Americans have a 
stronger bias towards persistence (the control style inducing an analytic processing 
mode) than Japanese have and/or Japanese participants have a stronger bias towards 
flexibility (the control style inducing a holistic processing mode) than US-Americans 
have.” 
 Given the diversity of visual environments and doctrine to which individuals within many 
of the tested communities are exposed, I would interpret such group differences as evidence that 
these are not influential predictors of cognitive flexibility.  Furthermore, when the same 
individuals (N = 70) completed two different metrics of wholistic/analytic response style, the two 
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scores did not significantly correlate, indicating that response style cannot be simplified into 
binary wholistic/analytic mindsets (Peterson & Deary, 2006).  
 In summary, even a rudimentary understanding of the impacts of culture on cognitive 
flexibility is currently lacking.  The existing hypotheses are confounded with differences in 
perceptual biases and interpersonal belief systems, which appear related to problem solving 
approach, at best, tangentially (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett & 
Miyamoto, 2005).   
 
 
1.6 Current Research Aims and General Approach 
1.6.1 Specific Aims 
In an effort to explore how and why susceptibility to cognitive set might differ between 
primate species and across human cultures the following experiments aimed to: 
1) Identify baboons’, chimpanzees’, and humans’ relative propensities toward 
cognitive set during abstract problem solving and, by comparing alternative 
strategy use across these species, provide a putative evolutionary trajectory 
for how it may have evolved within the primate lineage. 
2) Identify the relative impacts of perceptual and conceptual influences on 
humans’ propensity toward cognitive set by determining: 
i. Whether or not humans a) do not see alternative strategies or b) do not 
understand that they can use them. 
ii. The relative impacts of a) global/local perceptual biases and b) cross-
cultural differences on alternative strategy-use. 
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1.6.2 General Approach 
For these experiments, I devised and used a nonverbal, non-arithmetic, computerized 
measure of susceptibility to cognitive set: the Learned Strategy – Direct Strategy (LS-DS) task.   
For each LS-DS trial, a demonstration reveals which of the four locations constitutes 
Square1 (flashes red first) and which constitutes Square2 (flashes red second).  Throughout 
several levels of training, subjects learn to utilize a three-step sequence, in which they first copy 
the demonstration by selecting Square1 and Square2, and then select a Triangle which appears in 
one of the two remaining locations.  This three-step sequence, (Square1→Square2→Triangle) 
constitutes the learned strategy (LS; see Figure 1.6-1a).  After training, once subjects 
consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are presented, in which baseline (BASE) and 
probe (PROBE) trials are interspersed.  For BASE trials, the Triangle is hidden (not visible) until 
Square1 and Square2 have been accurately selected.  For PROBE trials, importantly, the Triangle 
is present from the beginning of the demonstration and remains on the screen throughout 
subjects’ response.  Thus, subjects can use the LS (See Figure 1.6-1b) or they can use a direct 
strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1 + Square2 and simply selecting the Triangle 
immediately (See Figure 1.6-1d).  Additionally, the task permits a third strategy, termed the 
switch strategy (SS), wherein subjects initially select Square1 but then skip Square2 and select 
the Triangle; however this was not a common approach (Figure 1.6-1c).   
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Figure 1.3   An exemplar LS-DS trial depicting the Top left → Bottom right → Top right 
configuration. a) On BASE trials, only the LS can be successfully employed because the Triangle 
is ‘hidden’ until Square1 and Square2 are correctly selected.  On PROBE trials, subjects may 
utilize any of three response strategies to be correct: b) the learned strategy (LS), c) the switch 
strategy, (SS), or d) the direct strategy (DS).  Numbers indicate the correct Response 1, 
Response 2, and Response 3, for this configuration. 
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1.6.3 Overview of Research Chapters 
In Chapter 2, baboons’ and humans’ ability to forego the LS and adopt the DS is 
compared.  This chapter is presented as it was originally published (Pope, Meguerditchian, 
Hopkins, & Fagot, 2015); however small changes were made regarding the way in which DS-use 
was calculated between this and all subsequent chapters (See Chapter 3 Footnote 2).  In Chapter 
3, chimpanzees’ DS-use is investigated and compared with baboons’ and humans’ data from 
Chapter 2; the evolutionary implications for cognitive set are then discussed.  Chapter 4 presents 
data regarding humans’ ability to see the alternative and how demonstrating the shortcut affects 
its use.  In Chapter 5, Americans’ DS-use is compared to that of the semi-nomadic Himba of 
northern Namibia, to investigate the relative influences of global/local perceptual biases and 
culture on cognitive set. 
 
1.6.4 Overarching Hypotheses 
I hypothesize that: 
I) Cognitive set differentially affects humans, chimpanzees, and baboons.   
II) Conceptual understanding of the alternative strategy as a viable option, 
rather than the ability to perceive the alternative, determines subjects’ 
susceptibility to cognitive set. 
 
Evidence supporting Hypothesis I is presented in Chapters 2 and 3, which report that, 
compared to baboons and chimpanzees, humans were significantly better able to learn the LS, 
were more affected by switch costs when shifting between the LS and DS, and were more 
susceptible to cognitive set on the LS-DS task.  I posit that the ability to verbally encode abstract 
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rules results in their being more firmly represented (i.e., less easily replaced), which contributes 
to humans’ elevated susceptibility to cognitive set.  However, alternative interpretations are 
discussed in Chapters 2, 3 & 6.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provide support for Hypothesis II.  In Chapter 4, subjects’ gaze 
indicated that they did, in fact, see the alternative strategy but did not use it.  Further, their ability 
to use the shortcut was, not surprisingly, enhanced after viewing a video demonstrating the DS 
(compared to controls who watched a video demonstrating the LS).  In Chapter 5, Himba 
subjects were shown to be less susceptible to cognitive set, compared to Americans; however, 
this did not co-vary with known group differences in global/local perceptual processing.  Further, 
only American subjects benefitted from a prompt aimed at emboldening subjects to try new 
things.  I posit that cultural differences in educational background might contribute to the 
observed differences in flexible strategy-use.  Specifically, I suggest that the mechanized rule-
use typical of Western education might promote cognitive set, by predisposing subjects to 
respond by using learned strategy. 
 
1.6.5 Summary and Significance 
Appropriately replacing sufficiency with efficiency seems crucial to adaptive behavior.  
Likely, as with many cognitive processes, individuals are capable of operating within a range of 
cognitive flexibility, such that the persistence of any given behavior is context dependent.  The 
LS-DS measures a single context:  when multiple abstract solutions (LS, SS, and DS) are 
present, which vary only in efficiency. Thus, although I will sometimes refer to cognitive 
flexibility and shortcut-use synonymously, to be clear, I consider cognitive set as merely one 
facet of cognitive flexibility.  
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The results of this research discern between whether set arises from a difficulty in 
recognizing alternative strategies or a difficulty in executing them.  Additionally, it identifies 
when human-like propensity toward cognitive set might have arisen within the primate lineage.  
It is clear that mechanized rule-use can be beneficial and is often adaptive in problem solving 
(Langer & Lois, 1979; Sweller & Gee, 1978).  However, understanding the mechanisms and 
evolution of alternative strategy use on the LS-DS task may provide a foundation for future 
studies aimed at enabling participants to consciously break set, when it is beneficial.   
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2 BABOONS (PAPIO PAPIO), BUT NOT HUMANS, BREAK COGNITIVE SET IN A 
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Abstract 
 
Through codified rule-use humans are able to accurately solve many problems; however, 
mechanized strategy-use can also be costly.  Cognitive set occurs when a familiar solution 
strategy blocks a better alternative.  Despite half a century of research on cognitive set in 
humans, there have been no attempts to investigate whether it impacts nonhuman species’ 
abilities to solve abstract problems.  The current study utilized a non-verbal, computer task to 
compare cognitive set between 104 humans and 15 baboons (Papio papio).   A remarkable 
difference was found between humans’ and baboons’ abilities to break cognitive set.  Consistent 
with previous studies, the majority of humans were highly impaired by set, yet baboons were 
almost completely unaffected.  Analysis of the human data revealed that children (ages 7-10) 
were significantly better able to break set than adolescents (11-18) and adults (19-68).  Both the 
evolutionary and developmental implications of these findings are discussed. 
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2.1 Introduction  
As problems increase in complexity, so too do their solutions.  To mediate the difficulties 
of solving these complex problems, rules may be established which give the correct answer yet 
bypass problem reanalysis.  Rules allow many similar problems to be solved efficiently and are 
often used to teach problem-solving skills (Henderson & Pingry, 1953; Rohrer & Taylor, 2006). 
However, problem solving by rule-use is not solely beneficial, as is the case when a learned 
strategy is less efficient than an alternative.  Cognitive set, also termed ‘einstellung’ or ‘mental 
set,’ occurs when a subject successfully learns a rule to solve several problems but is unable to 
switch to a more efficient method when it becomes available (Luchins, 1942; Ruscio & Amabile, 
1999).  Thus, an inability to break cognitive set occurs when that learned solution occludes other 
problem-solving methods.  In other words, once a rule is adopted, other options are not explored.  
An inability to break cognitive set leads to inefficient problem solving by preventing the use of 
alternative, sometimes better, problem-solving methods.   
In 1942, Abraham Luchins showed that thousands of humans struggled to break cognitive 
set in order to use a more efficient solution.  Luchins’ (1942) task required participants to obtain 
a target quantity by adding and subtracting three given values.  The first five of these problems 
could be solved by a single, somewhat complex, rule.  However, these were followed by two 
hybrid problems, solvable both by the learned rule and a more efficient, direct method.  Luchins 
(1942) found that 70-100% of subjects persisted in using the learned rule rather than switching to 
the direct method.  However, despite its pervasiveness, the underlying causes of humans’ 
susceptibility to cognitive set and potential methods to combat it are opaque.   
Several factors influence, to varying degrees, subjects’ abilities to break a mental set 
including instruction (Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962; Luchins & Luchins, 1950), working memory 
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availability (Beilock & Decaro, 2007), speed requirements (Luchins, 1942), amount of training 
(Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Luchins, 1942), and similarity between problems (Sweller et al., 
1982).  Further, although Luchins (1942) reported no substantial age effects on cognitive set, age 
has been shown to affect other similar types of problem solving.   ‘Functional fixedness’ is 
described as occurring when an object’s use as a tool is dramatically hindered by a subject’s 
experience with it in another functional role (Duncker & Lees, 1945).  In a tool-use task, 
Defeyter and German (2003) reported that five-year-old children were unaffected by their 
previous experience with a tool, yet seven-year-olds and adults easily fell victim to functional 
fixedness.  Despite these accounts, little is known of the differences in cognitive set between 
children, adolescents, and adults.   
Understanding the evolutionary origins of cognitive set may aid in understanding it’s 
pervasiveness in human problem solving.  However, previous research on how the 
mechanization of set might have evolved is nonexistent.  This is likely due to the impossibility of 
a comparative analysis using Luchins’ task, which used an arithmetic problem.  Studies 
comparing adults and nonhuman primates using computer paradigms have noted differences in 
problem-solving performance that may be relevant to set-breaking behavior.  First, differences in 
sequential processing have been reported between nonhuman primates and adults.  Ohshiba 
(1997) noted that macaques’ response times to a simultaneous chaining task increased as they 
progress through the sequence, indicating that they are using a ‘serial search strategy.’  
Conversely, human adults’ responded slowly to the first item in the sequence but quickly to the 
rest of the items, indicating that they were using a ‘collective search strategy’ and were mentally 
identifying the entire sequence before reproducing it (Conway & Christiansen, 2001; however, 
see Fagot & De Lillo, 2011 and Beran et al. 2004).  These results may be applicable to problem-
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solving in general, with macaques operating in a more local manner (each step is independent) 
and humans in a more global one (each step is part of the sequence).  This is in line with findings 
comparing perceptual biases between humans and baboons (Papio papio), another old world 
monkey species.  Baboons were found to respond more quickly to local stimuli while human 
adults responded more quickly to global stimuli (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998).  If we consider that 
the key to avoiding cognitive set is likely rooted in an ability to see and utilize the individual 
steps within a rule, humans’ collective approach may be what is driving their inability to break 
set.  Further, Stoet and Snyder found that macaques’ problem solving was more affected by 
distractions than human adults’ (2003), suggesting that they may be less focused on the problem-
solving rule and more attentive to individual variation between problems.  Indeed, this may 
provide old world monkeys with an increased awareness of the alternative method in a cognitive 
set task. 
The current research has two main goals.  First, it investigated the evolutionary origins of 
cognitive set by comparing humans to baboons in a computerized, nonmathematical cognitive set 
task. We hypothesized that the ability to break set would be different between the two species 
due to the differences in perceptual and sequential processing between old world monkeys and 
humans.  Indeed, extreme differences were found between the two species.  Baboons were 
almost entirely immune to the effects of set, while the majority of humans did not break away 
from the learned rule.  Second, the developmental trajectory of cognitive set in humans was 
analyzed by comparing children, adolescents, and adults.  Children were significantly more 
likely to break cognitive set than either adolescents or adults.  These findings are discussed from 
both evolutionary and developmental perspectives. 
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Subjects and Materials 
Baboon data were collected from 15 subjects (ages 1.8-9.3 years), including six males 
(Mean age = 5.3, SD = 2.68 ) and nine females (Mean age = 5.1, SD = 2.36), living in a larger 
social group of 24 individuals located at the CNRS “Station de Primatologie”, Rousset-sur-Arc,  
France.  Baboons were tested via 10 automated learning devices for monkeys (ALDMs; Fagot & 
Bonte, 2010; Fagot & Paleressompoulle, 2009), which were directly attached to an outside 700 
m2 enclosure.  Subjects had unrestricted access to the ALDMs which consisted of a 70 cm × 70 
cm × 80 cm testing chamber with a view port and two hand ports.  The view port allowed 
subjects to see the 19-inch LCD touchscreen monitor (1939L Open-Frame Touchmonitor, Elo 
Touch Solutions).  As subjects reached through the hand ports, a microchip was read for subject 
identification, which prompted the program to resume the trial list at the appropriate place for 
that subject.  For correct responses, the ALDMs automatically dispensed several grains of dry 
wheat.  The experiment was programmed using EPrime (Version 2.0, Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh).  The local “Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur” ethic committee for experimental 
animal research approved the use of the ALDM procedure.   
Human data were collected from 104 subjects (ages 7-68), including 40 males (Mean age 
= 26.85, SD = 17.7) and 64 females (Mean age = 25, SD = 17.7). Subjects were recruited via a 
sign which read “Would you like to be a part of a scientific study?” and tested at Zoo Atlanta, in 
Georgia, USA.  Humans were tested behind a curtain in a ‘booth’ along a main path at Zoo 
Atlanta on a 19-inch LCD touchscreen monitor (1915L Desktop Touchmonitor, Elo Touch 
Solutions).  The experimenter was nearby, but separated from the subject by a curtain and 
remained inattentive. Additionally, family members often remained in the general vicinity but 
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were asked to remain inattentive and out of sight of the participant.  Participants were given 
headphones (Koss On-Ear KPH Headphones, KPH7W) to hear sounds elicited by incorrect or 
correct responses.  Correct responses were followed by a cartoon of a present, which increased in 
size with each correct response.  After the fourth correct response, subjects were allowed to 
choose a sticker and the present size was reset.  The same instructions were given to both 
children and adults explaining the correct/incorrect response screens and stated that they “would 
need to touch the shapes to figure out the right answer.”  Subjects could choose to stop testing at 
any point and 27 (6 adults, 6 adolescents, and 15 children; 20.6% of total attempts) either 
stopped of their own volition or were casually stopped (by displaying the end screen) if they had 
not passed the training within 15 minutes.  All human methods were approved by the Zoo 
Atlanta Research Committee and the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board prior 
to testing. 
 
2.2.2 Testing 
The testing phase consisted of two conditions, baseline (BASE) and probe (PROBE). 
Trials began after the subject touched a fixation cross.  First, two demonstration slides (150 ms 
each) displayed a 300 x 300 pixels red square in one location and then again in another location 
(out of four possible locations) on a light blue background (Fig 2.2-1).  Subjects were then given 
a response screen, consisting of four white squares in the four available locations on a dark blue 
background.   For correct responses, subjects were required to reproduce the demonstration by 
touching the two white squares located where the red squares had been in the demonstration, in 
the correct order.  If subjects touched an incorrect square they were shown a 3 second ‘time-out’ 
screen before the next trial was cued. In the BASE condition, if subjects accurately reproduced 
44 
the demonstration, they were presented with a blue triangle in place of one of the two remaining 
white squares (Fig 2.2-1a).  To answer correctly, subjects needed to touch the blue Triangle.  
This sequence (touch Square1, touch Square2, touch Triangle) constituted the learned strategy 
(LS).  However, in the PROBE condition, the blue Triangle was shown throughout the two 
demonstration squares and remained visible in the same location on the response screen (Fig 2.2-
1b).  Therefore, subjects could continue to use the LS, but were also able to touch the Triangle 
directly and receive a more immediate reward.  This more efficient response (touch Triangle) 
constituted the direct strategy (DS).  Importantly, in BASE trials, the Triangle was revealed after 
the first two correct responses. However, if subjects happened to touch where the Triangle was 
located during any of the response screens, they were rewarded, thereby enabling us to measure 
the number of times subjects might accidentally touch the Triangle’s location regardless of it 
being visible. 
Baboons were given 720 testing trials (576 BASE and 144 PROBE), humans 11 years 
and older were given 96 testing trials (48 BASE and 48 PROBE) and humans under 11 were 
given 48 testing trials (24 BASE and 24 PROBE).  The number of trials presented to humans was 
reduced to minimize fatigue (as they had to complete the experiment in one sitting).  It should be 
recognized that for baboons, the ratio of BASE to PROBE was 4:1, while for humans it was 1:1.  
The 4:1 ratio promotes the use of the LS in baboons.  This is due to BASE trials not being 
readily solvable with the DS method, as the Triangle is hidden.  Therefore, more BASE trials 
means more LS use. After collecting pilot data indicating that humans preferred the LS even with 
the 1:1 ratio, we opted to collect an even number of PROBE and BASE trials for humans to 
minimize the duration of the test sessions, while keeping the number of test trials large enough 
for statistical analyses and cross-species comparison.  
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2.2.3 Training 
The three training procedures were carried out over the course of 14 days for baboons 
and immediately preceding the testing phase for humans.  Baboons completed an average of 
12,945 training trials (SD = 4346), while humans completed an average of 35.2 trials (SD = 18). 
One of the baboons did not pass Training level 2 but successfully passed the more difficult 
Training level 3; thus, his data were included.   
For baboons, Training 1 consisted of 96-trial blocks. Trials were randomly selected from 
24 possible square/triangle configurations.  Each trial began with a fixation cross, followed by 
two demonstration slides (each 150 ms) showing a red square move from one location to another 
(out of four possible locations).  Next, a response screen was presented, consisting of two white 
squares in the same locations as the demonstrated squares.  The correct response was to touch the 
squares in the demonstrated order.  Baboons completed an average of 5545 (SD = 1947) Training 
1 trials. To pass Training 1, subjects needed to achieve 80% accuracy within a training block, 
two times (non-consecutively).   
   For humans, Training 1 consisted of 8-trial blocks and demonstration slides were 
350 ms each.  This is the same training procedure that was used for baboons and the 8 trials were 
randomly selected from the same 24 possible square/triangle configurations.  After each block, 
the subject’s accuracy was assessed.  If below 80%, the subject repeated the training level.  
Accuracy criteria were the same for all training levels.  Humans required an average of 13.06 
(SD = 7.68) trials to pass Training 1.  
 Training 2 was conducted immediately after Training 1.  Demonstration slides’ 
display times decreased to 250 ms for humans.  Trials and block composition were identical to 
Training 1 except that four white squares were given as options during the response phase 
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instead of two (See Fig 2.2-1 for example of four square setup).  Baboons and humans completed 
an average of 6095 (SD = 2141) and 10.42 (SD = 8.35) Training 2 trials, respectively.  
 Training 3 is identical to the BASE condition in the testing phase.  Demonstration 
slides’ display times were equivalent for baboons and humans at 150 ms (Fig 2.2-1a).  The 
experimental phase began immediately after subjects passed Training 3. Baboons and humans 
completed an average of 1,574 (SD = 1,000) and 11.70 (SD = 9.18) Training 3 trials, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 2.1  The demonstration (light blue) and response (dark blue) screens for a) BASE 
and b) PROBE conditions.  Black arrows indicate the LS.  Yellow arrows indicate where the 
subject could touch to use the DS.  Arrows were not visible during testing.  Upon touching the 
blue Triangle, the subject is rewarded. 
 
2.2.4 Data Analysis   
Trials were analyzed to determine whether the LS or the DS was used.  Trials in which 
the subject sequentially touched all three response stimuli (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle) to 
achieve the reward were classified as having been solved by the LS.  Trials in which the subject 
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touched only two (Square1 + Triangle) or one (Triangle) response stimuli to achieve the reward 
were classified as having been solved by the DS. The Square1 + Triangle response was included 
as a DS in an attempt to conservatively maintain the dichotomous LS vs DS paradigm.  For each 
subject, the number of trials in which the DS was used was divided by the number of correct 
trials completed.  This yielded a DS-use ratio for both BASE and PROBE trials.  Next, for each 
trial-type (BASE and PROBE) subjects were classified as preferring the DS (DSer) or the LS 
(LSer) based on this DS-use ratio. For percent DS use, the median was 0% for both BASE and 
PROBE conditions and the mean was 1.01% (SD = 2.16) for BASE and 8.01% (SD = 20.44) for 
PROBE trials.  Thus, subjects who used the DS in more than 5% of BASE trials were classified 
as DSers in the BASE condition.  Alternatively, subjects who used the DS in fewer than 5% of 
BASE trials were classified as LSers in the BASE condition.  The same highly conservative 
criteria were used to classify subjects as DSers and LSers in the PROBE condition.  
To look at the effects of age, humans were classified into three age groups: Children: 
ages 7-10 (N = 27, M = 8.44, SD = 1.15), Adolescents: ages 11-18 (N = 25, M = 13.52, SD =  
2.22), and Adults: ages 19-68 (N = 52, M = 40.48, SD= 13.18).  Age effects were not 
investigated in baboons, as there was extremely little response variation between subjects.   
 
2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Baboons 
Mean percentages correct for BASE and PROBE were 80.7% (SD = 4.5) and 82.9% (SD 
= 11.0), respectively.  Combined, subjects used the LS in only 3 (0.02 %) of the 1,790 PROBE 
trials compared to 6,898 (98.98%) of the 6,969 BASE trials.  Additionally, in 20 PROBE trials 
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(0.11 %), the baboons touched the correct first red square but then skipped the second and 
proceeded to touch the blue Triangle (Note: this is later referred to as the ‘switch strategy’; See 
Section 3.3.2).  Further, all baboons immediately switched to the DS on the first PROBE trial; 
the three times subjects failed to use the DS were trial numbers 22, 37, and 49.  All the tested 
baboons therefore showed a pronounced and immediate preference for the more efficient, DS 
method in the PROBE condition and were classified as DSers (see Fig 2.3-1).   
2.3.2 Humans 
Mean percentages correct for BASE and PROBE were 91.2% (SD = 10.1) and 89.5% (SD 
= 11.1) respectively.  Among the 104 subjects, only 21 (20.2%) used the DS in greater than 5% 
of PROBE trials.  Of these, only 7 (6.7%) used the DS in over 50% of trials, indicating that they 
were able to overcome cognitive set and use the more efficient alternative method consistently.  
Interestingly, 50 humans (48%) used the DS at least once.  Thus, even after discovering the more 
efficient alternative, their set was unbroken. 
A Yates’ continuity corrected chi-square (used due to an expected value smaller than 5) 
compared the frequencies of LSers vs DSers in the two species and confirmed that the number of 
DSers was greater in baboons than in humans [χ2 (1)= 35.88, p < .001; Figure 2.3-1].  
Additionally, another Yates’ continuity corrected chi-square, indicated that there was no 
significant association between BASE solution strategy classification and species [χ2 (1)= .105, p 
= .746; Figure 2.3-1]. 
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Figure 2.2 The percentage of subjects classified as DSers in the BASE and PROBE 
conditions across baboons and humans. ** p ≤.001. 
 
To investigate the impact of age on DS-use, human subjects were reclassified as DSers or 
LSers based on their first 48 trials (24 BASE, 24 PROBE).  This was done to eliminate the 
difference in trial number between children (who received 48 trials) and adolescents and adults 
(who received 96 trials).  A Pearson’s chi-square revealed that there was a significant association 
between age group and PROBE solution strategy classification in humans [χ2 (2)= 13.32, p = 
.001; Fig 2.3-2].  Further, the only category in which the standardized residual was significant 
(2.8) was Children DSers, indicating that they were driving the effect.  The association between 
BASE trials and age group was not significant χ2 (2)= 1.60, p = .923 (Fig 2.3-2).  
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Figure 2.3 The percentage of subjects classified as DSers in the BASE and PROBE 
conditions across human children, adolescents, and adults. ** p ≤.001 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In this study, the first main finding was that baboons and humans responded differently 
on a cognitive set task.  Baboons immediately broke set and adopted the more efficient DS when 
it became available, yet the majority of humans failed to deviate from the LS.  Our second 
finding was that humans’ ability to break cognitive set is associated with their age.  Children 
were 3 times more likely to be classified as DSers in the PROBE condition than adolescents and 
2.4 times more likely than adults.  As far as we know, this is the first study to investigate 
cognitive set in a nonhuman species and it is one of very few to look at developmental 
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differences in susceptibility to cognitive set in humans (Cunningham, 1965; Janzen, Maguire, & 
Boersma, 1976; Luchins, 1942).   
Previous findings regarding age effects and cognitive set are inconsistent.   Luchins  
(1942) found a trend (of unreported statistical significance) indicating that public school children 
(ages 9-14) were less able to recover from cognitive set compared to adults (ages 16-52). 
Cunningham (1965) tested children ages 7-12 on modified cognitive set tasks and found 
(minimally reported) trends indicating that older subjects were better able to overcome set.  
However, Janzen et al. (1976) tested children (ages 5-12) on visual set tasks and found no 
significant age effects.  We propose that the LS-DS task is better able to compare cognitive set 
across ages (and species) than previous methods.  While previous set tasks have involved 
arithmetic (Cunningham, 1965; Luchins, 1942) and alphabetic rules (Cunningham, 1965), the 
LS-DS required the use of a spatiotemporal rule: For the LS, identify the two demonstrated 
squares in their demonstrated order, then select the Triangle.  This metric allowed us to a) 
compare set between baboons and humans and b) compare across age groups where all subjects 
were naïve to the task and it’s rules prior to testing.  Thus, the LS-DS task may be a better test of 
cognitive set across age groups because it does not rely on math or language skills, which are 
very different between children, adolescents, and adults.   
Although the LS-DS task was extremely similar between humans and baboons, it was not 
identical.  That said, differences in methodology between species should have promoted the 
opposite of our observed effects and thereby strengthen our findings. Humans received longer 
display times during training, which could have conferred increased salience to the LS.  Yet, 
overall LS salience was heavily weighted towards baboons as they received an average of 12,915 
more training trials than humans.  Research suggests that increased training with a rule decreases 
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the likelihood of participants’ breaking set (Crooks & McNeil, 2009).  Thus, baboons should 
have been less able to break set than humans based on LS experience, which was not the case. 
The differential abilities of baboons and humans to break cognitive set are extreme and 
yet, an underlying cause is not immediately apparent.  Why did the baboons immediately 
consider the DS, whereas humans ignored it?  One hypothesis is that differences in visual and 
sequential processing may have conferred increased perceptual awareness of the DS to baboons.  
Indeed, the baboons used the DS the very first time it was available and then continued to use it 
in nearly every subsequent PROBE trial.  To do this, they must have (a) been aware of the 
Triangle’s premature presence in PROBE trials and (b) associated it, not the sequence as a 
whole, with the reward.  In line with Ohshiba’s (1997) findings illustrating the serial and 
collective search strategies of old world monkeys and humans respectively, baboons may have 
perceived the task’s solution as a series of individual stimuli [(Square1) + (Square2) + (Triangle) 
= Reward] and humans may have perceived it as a collective rule [i.e., (Square1 + Square2 + 
Triangle) = Reward ].  Thus, if baboons solved the LS-DS task with a serial search strategy, it 
might have allowed the DS [(Triangle) = reward] to be visually disentangled from within the LS 
and thus, used more effectively.  Humans, on the other hand, may have used a collective search 
strategy and been less attentive to the Triangle’s premature presence in PROBE trials.  Further, 
Bilalić et al. (2008) found that previous experience with a solution strategy biased visual 
attention towards that strategy in expert chess players.  However, the possible differences in 
visual and sequential processing of the LS-DS task between baboons and humans does not 
explain why only 14% of humans who used the DS at least once were able to break set.  Even if 
it was accidental, what prevented the majority of humans from switching to the DS after 
discovering it? 
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Another explanation for humans’ inability to break set is that they simply did not 
understand that they were allowed to.  Humans’ notions of how they should respond might block 
the use of alternative solutions.  Since the classic Milgram shock experiments (1974), obedience 
to authority has been known to affect human behavior and this has been extended to 
experimenter presence and the experimental environment in general (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 
2009 for discussion).  For the current study, humans’ responses may have been affected by the 
presence of the experimenter and/or the knowledge that the task was a scientific study.   It is 
possible that they saw the LS as the way they should solve the task based on their experience 
with the training and the experimental environment.  Baboons, on the other hand, had free access 
to the testing apparatuses, without the presence of an experimenter and are likely unaffected by 
the experimental environment.  This species difference in ‘obedient’ responses is supported by 
findings showing that following a live demonstration of how to access food from a box, humans 
but not chimpanzees imitated superfluous actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005).  Although the 
current study did not measure humans’ conceptual understanding of the task directly, pilot 
participants were asked if they had thought about touching the Triangle directly after task 
completion.  Responses varied from “I didn’t see a triangle” to “I thought it was a trap” to “Yes, 
and I tried it once” (See Supplementary Figure 2.2-2 in Appendix A for Pilot data).  However, 
even the pilot-subject who tried the DS continued to use the LS afterwards, which is consistent 
with the 43% of non-pilot participants who “discovered” the DS yet continued to use the LS.  
The question now becomes:  If a subject is able to see the early onset of the Triangle in PROBE 
trials and is willing to try touching it directly, what prevents the majority of them from adopting 
it as a consistent strategy? 
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We propose that working memory availability plays an important role in humans’ 
persistent use of the LS.  In 2007, Beilock and DeCaro found that, when under stress, humans 
with lower working memory availability used the direct response in Luchins’ (1942) task more 
than humans with higher working memory.  They posited that those with higher working 
memory were better able to remember and enact the learned rule, while those with lower 
working memory favored the less memory-intensive, direct response.  Although the current task 
did not appear to induce stress in subjects, if we consider that the same working memory 
constraints might also have driven the increased DS preference in children, who show lower 
working memory skills than adults (Miles, Morgan, Milne, & Morris, 1996; Thomason et al., 
2009), then our age effect becomes more coherent.  The LS requires subjects to remember the 
locations of Square1 and Square2, while the DS only requires the subject to touch the visible 
Triangle.  Simply stated, the LS requires working memory and the DS does not.   Thus when we 
consider their lower working memory availability, it seems logical that more children favored the 
DS than adults who are presumably better equipped to handle the working memory load 
necessitated by the LS.  This is corroborated by the comment of a 7-year-old pilot subject after 
he discovered the DS, “I like it when the triangle is already there because I don’t have to 
remember the squares!”  Further, baboons show overall lower working memory skills than 
humans (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011) suggesting that, while a serial search strategy may allow them 
to see the DS more readily than humans, their limited working memory could provide increased 
incentive to use the DS.  Adults’ and adolescents’ persistent use of the LS may simply be a 
combination of inherent cognitive set and a lack of working-memory based incentive to deviate 
from what they’ve learned.  This hypothesis should be explored in future studies. 
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In summary, the current study presents findings suggesting that baboons are less 
susceptible to the negative effects of cognitive set than humans.  This is, as far as we know, the 
first comparative cognitive set study.  It should be noted that in Luchins’ original cognitive set 
task, an ‘extinction problem,’ where the only possible solution was the direct one, was 
sometimes used to enhance subjects’ ability to break set.  The current study did not incorporate 
an extinction problem but this might have an interesting effect on the observed differences.  
While future studies are required to more fully understand these species and age differences in 
ability to break cognitive set, the current study proposes that: 
(1) Baboons’ immediate use of the DS is facilitated by an increased ability to see the 
difference between the PROBE and BASE trials, which is a result of independently processing 
the individual components of the task sequence.  Further, continued use of the DS is promoted by 
its minimal working memory requirements.  Free from experimenter effects, baboon responses 
were unaffected by the experimental environment and their training with the LS. 
(2) After extracting the collective LS from the training, humans’ persistent use of it may 
have been governed by a combination of a) difficulty visually differentiating between the 
PROBE and BASE trials, b) consideration of how they should respond as dictated by the 
experimental environment and their training, and c) differences in working memory availability, 
with lower working memory availability promoting DS-use and higher working memory 
enabling LS-use. 
Although nonhuman primates may encounter complex ecological, physical, or social 
problems, they are likely variable and not easily solvable by a single governing rule.  Humans, 
on the other hand, are regularly faced with complex similar problems, which readily lend 
themselves to rule-based solutions.  The adaptive benefits (or detriments) of cognitive set are not 
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fully understood but it seems logical that set facilitates humans’ ritualized problem solving.  It 
would be interesting to address the presence of cognitive set in non-traditionally educated human 
populations and/or other nonhuman primate species. 
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Abstract 
Within human problem solving, the propensity to persistently evoke a learned rule, rather 
than switch to a more efficient alternative is pervasive.  This susceptibility to ‘cognitive set’ 
prevents optimization by biasing response patterns toward habit-based solutions.  In a recent 
study, which utilized the nonverbal, spatiotemporal ‘Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy’ (LS-DS) 
touch screen task, baboons exhibited a striking ability to deviate from their learned strategy to 
utilize a more efficient shortcut.  Humans, on the other hand, displayed the opposite response 
pattern and almost exclusively employed the familiar response.  In the current study, we sought 
to explore the likely evolutionary trajectory of cognitive set within the primate lineage by 
conducting the LS-DS task with ten chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).  We found that, like 
baboons, chimpanzees used the shortcut significantly more often than humans.  However, unlike 
either baboons or humans, we observed pronounced inter- and intra-individual variability in 
chimpanzees’ shortcut-use.  Additionally, we found that chimpanzees did not exhibit switch 
costs when switching between the learned strategy and the shortcut.   Further, a subset of 
chimpanzees employed a unique solution, wherein they switched strategies mid-trial.  These data 
indicate that chimpanzees experience an intermediate susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-
DS task.  We propose that differences in abstract rule encoding may underlie differences in 
susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task within the primate lineage. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Primates occupy highly dynamic environments.  Decisive actions are demanded often, 
with outcomes that can greatly impact fitness.  Adaptive behavior is predicated upon flexible 
strategy-use, yet such plasticity is complex.  We define cognitive flexibility as the ability to 
incorporate both known solutions and innovated or acquired novel solutions in a contextually 
appropriate manner (Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Lehner et al., 2011).  Flexible responses must 
integrate external environmental cues with internal inputs, such as past experience, and in the 
case that a past strategy is no longer the most appropriate, flexible behavior requires inhibiting 
that previous response and switching to a more efficient strategy.  However, humans exhibit 
deficits in this regard.   
Numerous studies describe failures by humans to deviate from a learned or familiar 
method in order to adopt a better alternative (Adamson, 1952; Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962; 
Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Duncker & Lees, 
1945; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; Ruscio & Amabile, 1999; Sweller et al., 1982).   
Yet, this propensity toward mechanized problem solving or ‘cognitive set’, is less evident in 
some nonhuman primate species.  For instance, Pope et al. (2015) presented baboons and 
humans with a nonverbal ‘Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy’ (LS-DS) touch screen task.  The 
LS-DS task begins with several sessions of training wherein subjects become proficient in using 
a three-step sequence (Square1→Square2→Triangle), which constitutes the learned strategy 
(LS; see Figure 1.6-1a).  Once subjects consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are 
presented in which subjects can use the LS (See Figure 1.6-1b) or they can use a more direct 
strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1→Square2 and going straight for the Triangle 
(See Figure 1.6-1d).  Pope et al. (2015) found that all 15 baboon subjects immediately switched 
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to the DS when it became available, using it in 99.9% of trials.  By comparison, only four (out of 
53; 7.6%) adult humans used the DS in greater than 5% of trials.   
Numerous studies aimed at identifying the origins of human cognition, including 
cognitive flexibility, have compared monkeys, apes, and humans (Genovesio et al., 2005; 
Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  
Typically, when quantifying flexibility, studies utilize forced-switch paradigms, wherein subjects 
are required to switch strategies (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati, 
2017).  The most basic forced-switch tasks, discrimination reversals such as transfer index and 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task [or Dimensional Card Change Sorting (DCCS) task], reward 
subjects for selecting a certain response and then switch to rewarding a different response (Berg, 
1948; Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo et al., 1996).  In these tasks, monkeys and humans exhibit 
similar difficulties extinguishing a learned, rewarded response (Bonté, 2011; Bonte et al., 2014; 
Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012; Manrique & Call, 2015; Piaget, 1954; Rosati, 2017; 
Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo, 2008).  Yet several differences between monkeys’ and humans’ rule 
following behavior are also apparent.  
 Like humans, monkeys are capable of learning abstract rules (Bonté, 2011; Fagot & 
Bonte, 2010; Genovesio et al., 2005; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Pope et al., 2015; Stoet & 
Snyder, 2008; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).  However, in stark contrast to humans, monkeys 
reportedly do not exhibit overt trial-to-trial switch costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003).1  Defined as 
deficits in response time or accuracy associated with switching solution strategies in consecutive 
trials as opposed to repeating a strategy (Brass et al., 2008), switch costs are attributed to the 
cognitive reconfiguration allowing a new strategy to guide behavior (Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel 
et al., 2009; Meiran, 1996) and are exhibited by both human children and adults (Ionescu, 2012; 
61 
Zelazo, 2008).  Interestingly, these deficits were somewhat reduced if the subject knew the 
switch was coming (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or had more time to prepare for it (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004).  However, humans continued to exhibit switch costs even after 23,000 trials (Stoet 
& Snyder, 2007).  Furthermore, although unencumbered by switch costs, monkeys did show 
deficits on trials which included irrelevant stimulus information, yet humans did not (Stoet & 
Snyder, 2003).  This seems to indicate a trade-off between flexibility and distractibility, perhaps 
driven by species differences in the strength with which rules are encoded (Ghirlanda, Lind, & 
Enquist, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  
It is unclear to what extent apes are capable of flexibly adopting new strategies (Hrubesch 
et al., 2009; Manrique et al., 2013; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009; Van 
Leeuwen et al., 2013).  Apes perseverate similarly to humans in some measures (Davis, 2017; 
Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017 for review); however, chimpanzees do remarkably well in 
inhibiting food consumption when it can be exchanged for a better reward, even after a delay 
(Beran, Rossettie, & Parrish, 2016).  Furthermore, on simple stimulus-response discrimination 
reversal tasks, apes outperformed monkeys in their ability to adjust to the changing contingencies 
(Rumbaugh, 1971).  Yet, evidence regarding their abilities to switch between more abstract rules 
is limited.  In fact, we are aware of a single effort to elucidate abstract response flexibility in 
apes, in which chimpanzees (N = 6) completed a computerized Dimensional Change Card 
Sorting task, a simpler derivative of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & 
Morton, 2012; Kirkham et al., 2003; Manrique & Call, 2015; Zelazo et al., 2003), which requires 
subjects to first categorize stimuli based on one stimulus dimension (e.g., shape) and then switch 
to using another dimension (e.g. size; Moriguchi et al., 2011).  The authors reported that 
chimpanzees’ ability to switch strategies was affected by their previous experience with the 
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familiar strategy.  However, they also noted that subjects passed the pre-switch portion of the 
task, on average, in only 42.9% of sessions.  It is therefore unclear if even the first rule was 
adequately adopted, much less to what extent subjects were affected by cognitive set.   
Several studies report that chimpanzees stick to a learned strategy, even after watching a 
demonstration of a more efficient alternative (Davis, 2017; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008).  
In fact, some chimpanzees were shown to persist with a learned strategy even when the 
alternative was easier (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Price et al., 2009).  Similarly inflexible behavior 
has been documented in a number of baited-box experiments, in which subjects first learn one 
method for obtaining a reward but are then shown a better alternative (Davis, 2017; Davis et al., 
2016; Gruber et al., 2011; Manrique & Call, 2015).  Further, like humans, functional fixedness, 
wherein knowledge regarding an objects’ typical function interferes with using it in an atypical 
manner (Adamson, 1952; Duncker & Lees, 1945), has been suggested to affect apes’ problem 
solving tactics (Gruber, 2016; Hanus et al., 2011).   
Yet, there is also compelling evidence for problem-solving flexibility in apes.  In token 
exchange paradigms, chimpanzees flexibly switched to exchanging an unfamiliar token when it 
became more highly rewarded than a familiar token (Van Leeuwen et al., 2013) and (Davis, 
2017) found that when an alternative solution required relatively simple modifications, 
chimpanzees readily switched strategies, especially when the alternative reaped a better reward.  
These findings are in line with others demonstrating that simple modifications to known 
behaviors are well within apes’ capabilities (Lehner et al., 2011; Yamamoto et al., 2013).  
Given the prevalence of both conservative and flexible behavior, some authors have 
suggested that a range of factors might influence flexibility in apes, such as how strongly the 
learned strategy is encoded, the relative difficulty between the familiar strategy and the 
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alternative, and the reward difference between the two (Davis, 2017; Hopper et al., 2015; 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Van Leeuwen et al., 2013).  In contrast, each strategy on the 
LS-DS is performed using the exact same reach/touch motion and even stimulus locations are 
meaningless, as they change with each trial.  Thus, the LS-DS task elucidates subjects’ proclivity 
to switch strategies when presented with an alternative strategy that only differs from the learned 
strategy in efficiency (# of reaches).  Thus, response-style (conservative vs flexible) on the LS-
DS task is likely indicative of the cognitive representations underlying strategies and the relative 
ease with which they are replaced or altered. 
We suggest several potential influences on the propensity to adopt the shortcut on the LS-
DS task, which may differ across primate species.   First, measured via hierarchical figures tasks, 
old world monkeys have been shown to exhibit a local perceptual bias (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; 
Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002).  In contrast, chimpanzees exhibit both 
global and local biases, potentially mediated by the inter-element distance (Fagot & Tomonaga, 
1999; Hopkins, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002).   Humans, however, exhibit a consistent 
global perceptual bias (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Navon, 1977).  
Considering that attention to local detail might facilitate spotting the shortcut when it is 
available, global/local perceptual biases could affect its use.   
Second, there is some evidence that old world monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans may 
process sequences differently (Beran et al., 2004; Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Fagot & De Lillo, 
2011; Ohshiba, 1997).  The LS-DS task requires subjects to remember the order and location of 
the first two items (Square1 and Square2) and then select the Triangle.  Processing each step of 
the LS sequence as an individual component [ie. (Square1) + (Square2) + (Triangle)] or even just 
processing the Triangle as separable from the Squares [(Square1 + Square2) + (Triangle)], might 
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allow subjects to more readily identify the shortcut (Triangle).  On the other hand, processing the 
LS sequence as a collective whole [ ie. (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle)], might render the DS 
more difficult to disentangle.  
Third, although both monkeys and apes are capable of learning and utilizing abstract 
rules, this often requires extensive training (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Pope et 
al., 2015; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).  Humans, by comparison, have been shown to codify rules 
almost immediately (Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950) and 
readily apply them to novel problems (Sweller et al., 1982).  Thus, the strength with which 
abstract rules are encoded might conceivably influence how flexibly they can be used. 
 
The current study had two aims.  First, we sought to explore chimpanzees’ susceptibility 
to cognitive set on the LS-DS task.  Second, we sought to contextualize these findings by 
comparing chimpanzees’ response patterns to those of baboons and humans, previously reported 
in Pope et al. (2015).  We reasoned that if chimpanzees responded similarly to humans on the 
LS-DS task, then limited abstract response flexibility might be considered an homologous, 
ancestral trait, perhaps even a byproduct of global perceptual biases or ‘collective’ sequential 
processing.  However, if chimpanzees responded similarly to baboons, we might consider 
humans’ susceptibility to cognitive set to be the outcome of a derived human characteristic, 
possibly a byproduct of enhanced rule encoding.  Although far from a complete evolutionary 
framework, the current study aimed to provide the first look at a likely evolutionary trajectory of 
cognitive set within the primate lineage. 
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Subjects 
We tested 10 captive-born chimpanzee subjects [aged 16.6–36.1 years; five females (M = 
26.9 years, SD = 9.0) and five males, (M  = 21.3 years, SD = 3.0)] located at the Yerkes National 
Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia.  
 
3.2.2 Equipment and Materials  
 The LS-DS was programmed using EPrime (version 2.0, Psychology Soft- ware Tools, 
Pittsburgh) and administered using a 19-inch touch monitor (1939L Open-Frame Touchmonitor, 
Elo Touch Solutions) affixed to a metal housing, which was temporarily attached to subjects’ 
home enclosure during testing. Each testing session lasted roughly 20 minutes to avoid fatigue 
and subjects were rewarded with juice or small pieces of fruit or vegetables, depending on their 
preferences or dietary restrictions.  All testing was approved by the Emory University IACUC. 
 
3.2.3 LS-DS Training 
Chimpanzees received four LS-DS Training levels.  To progress to the next training 
level, subjects were required to achieve >80% accuracy twice.   In Training 1 subjects were 
presented with two squares, Square1 and Square2, which flashed red (250 ms each) in sequence.  
To be correct, they then selected Square1 and Square2 in the demonstrated order.  Accuracy was 
assessed after each block of 24 trials.  Next, subjects progressed to Training 1.5, in which trials 
identical to those in Training 1 were randomly interspersed with trials in which four squares 
were shown and one flashed (250 ms each) red; for these, subjects then selected the square that 
flashed from among the four choices.  Training 2 also displayed four squares, except two squares 
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flashed (250 ms each) red in sequence and subjects were required to select Square1 and Square2 
in the correct order, from among the four options.  Training 3 very nearly resembled Training 2, 
except the demonstration squares were displayed for a shorter time (150 ms each) and after a 
correct Square1 → Square2 selection, a blue triangle appeared in one of the two remaining 
locations.  For all Training 3 trials, subjects were rewarded upon touching the blue Triangle.  
Thus, to pass Training 3, subjects needed to be proficient in using the 
Square1→Sqaure2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the learned strategy or LS).   
We encountered several difficulties during training that required procedural 
modifications.  When the Triangle first appeared in Training 3, five of the ten chimpanzee 
subjects struggled to incorporate it into their response (i.e., they completely avoided it).  After 
several sessions wherein subjects were achieving extremely low accuracy scores, we opted to 
briefly modify the program for these subjects, in an effort to prevent them from giving up 
altogether.  For this modification, once a correct Square1 → Square2 selection was entered, the 
Triangle still appeared in one of the two remaining places but all the other squares disappeared, 
such that all that was left on the screen was the Triangle.  Once subjects consistently touched the 
Triangle (M = 26.90; SD = 47.04), they were switched back to the regular version of Training 3.  
Additionally, in some cases, subjects’ motivation appeared to dwindle substantially.  When this 
occurred, we altered their food reward or instated a 5 second (as opposed to the normal 3 second) 
delay following incorrect responses.  For Training 3, even if subjects were accounting for their 
previous selections, the likelihood of being correct in any given trial simply by chance is 1/24 
(Response1 = 1/4, Response2 = 1/3, and Response3 = 1/2).  Therefore, evidenced by 
considerably higher than chance accuracy scores (in one case a subject had achieved above 75% 
accuracy nine times) many subjects grasped the LS, yet failed to reach the >80% criterion twice.  
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After several months, we opted to adjust the Training 3 accuracy requirements such that a subject 
needed to achieve either greater than 80% twice, greater than 75% three times, or greater than 
70% five times in order to progress to the experimental trials.  Potential impacts of these 
alterations are discussed.   
 
3.2.4 LS-DS Experimental Trials 
Immediately after training, subjects completed 96 experimental trials, consisting of 48 
PROBE and 48 BASE.  In PROBE trials, the Triangle appears alongside the Square1 → Square2 
demonstration and remains visible on the response screen (see Fig. 1.6-1b-d).  Subjects can then 
either continue to use the Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the LS) or they can 
simply ignore the demonstration and select the Triangle (i.e., the DS or shortcut).  To provide a 
measure of accidental DS-use within each subject, in BASE trials (which appear identical to 
Training 3) if subjects select the Triangle’s hidden location they are scored and rewarded as if 
they had used the DS.  Subjects randomly received each of the possible 24 configurations 4 times 
(2 PROBE and 2 BASE).  
3.2.5 Data Analysis 
We calculated a “true” measure of DS-use by subtracting each subject’s BASE DS-use 
from PROBE DS-use, thereby accounting for within-subject error (Pope, Fagot, Meguerditchian, 
Washburn, & Hopkins, Submitted).   For all analyses, whenever the data violated the 
assumptions for parametric statistical analyses, we used non-parametric analyses and reported 
the appropriate descriptive statistics.  In accordance with our previous studies, subjects were 
classified as DSers if they used the DS in greater than 5% of PROBE trials (Pope et al., 
Submitted; Pope et al., 2015).  However, we also included progressively more stringent DSer 
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qualification criteria (greater than 25%, greater than 50%, and greater than 70%) to gain a more 
complete understanding of DS-use between species. 
Additionally, we analyzed for switch costs associated with switching between the LS and 
the DS.  First, we looked for deficits in response time (RT) by isolating the time between fixation 
response and first response (RT1) for BASE trials in which subjects repeated (BASE stay) or 
switched (BASE switch) their strategy and for PROBE trials in which subjects repeated (PROBE 
stay) or switched (PROBE switch) their strategy.  All trials that were precluded by an incorrect 
trial and those in which the first response was incorrect were excluded.  Second, we compared 
subjects’ Response 1 accuracies between trials in which the condition repeated or was different.  
For example, a PROBE trial preceded by another PROBE trial was classified as PROBE same, a 
PROBE trial preceded by a BASE trial was classified as PROBE different, a BASE trial 
preceded by another BASE trial was classified as BASE same , and a BASE trial preceded by a 
PROBE trial was classified as BASE different.  Thus, strategy choice was described as 
stay/switch and trial type was described as same/different. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Training  
For chimpanzees, training required an average of 295.8 days (Min = 27; Max = 465).  
Subject completed a Median of 817 (SD = 863.9) Training 1 trials, 2,343 (SD = 1,637.8) 
Training 1.5 trials, 8,771 (SD = 3,810.6) Training 2 trials, and 4,852.5 (SD = 6,548.0) Training 3 
trials.  In total, chimpanzees conducted a Median of 17,960 trials (SD = 9,989.7). 
To better understand the immense number of training trials that chimpanzees needed to 
learn the LS, we analyzed for error patterns during Training 2.  We chose to analyze Training 2 
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errors because, unlike Training 1, subjects selected between all four response options.  Further, 
even by Training 3, Response 1 (Mdn = 69.64%) and Response 2 (Mdn = 66.65%) accuracies 
were significantly lower than Response 3 [Mdn = 94.05%; χ2(2) = 12.60, p = 0.002] indicating 
that subjects’ difficulty learning the LS involved their representation of the Square1→Square2 
portion of the solution, not the Triangle. 
We looked at incorrect trials that were preceded by correct trials.  For each Response 1, 
we noted whether the erroneous selection was a repetition of the previous trial, either the 
previous Response 1 or the previous Response 2.  For example, if subjects had been rewarded in 
the previous trial for a Bottom Left → Top Left response, then we identified whether the 
erroneous response had been either a Bottom Left or Top Left selection.  If driven by chance, we 
would expect subject’s errors to correspond to these squares 33.33% of the time (1 out of the 
three erroneous response options).  However, a one sample T-Test found that, chimpanzees’ 
propensity to erroneously select their previous Response1 did not differ from chance (M = 
31.05%, SD = 10.59).  Additionally, chimpanzees erroneously re-selected their previously 
correct Response 2 significantly less often than expected by chance [M = 22.49%, SD = 3.76; 
t(9) = -6.94, p < .001].   
Next, we identified whether subjects’ errors were, instead, due to mistakenly selecting the 
Square2 location, rather than the Square1 location.  For example, when the demonstration 
depicted Bottom Left → Bottom Right and the erroneous response was Bottom Right.  Indeed, 
chimpanzees committed this ‘reversal’ error-type significantly more often than expected by 
chance (M = 49.75%, SD = 10.10; t(9) = 5.14, p = .001). 
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3.3.2 DS-use 
All chimpanzee (N = 10/10) subjects used the DS in greater than 5% of PROBE trials.  In 
fact, 60% (N = 6/10) used the DS the very first time it was available and 20% (N = 2/10) used it 
every single time it was available. Additionally, chimpanzees employed another, previously 
unreported strategy.  In addition to the LS (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle; Figure 1.6-1b) and DS 
(Triangle; Figure 1.6-1d), the task permits a third strategy wherein subjects seemingly initiate the 
LS by selecting the first square but then switch to the DS by skipping the second square and 
instead selecting the Triangle (Square1 + Triangle; Figure 1.6-1c).  Because it occurred so 
infrequently, this ‘switch strategy’ (SS) was not analyzed separately from the DS in the previous 
studies with baboons and humans (Pope et al., 2015).  However, the current study found that 
chimpanzees used the SS in an average of 12.4% (Max = 35.7%) of trials.   
 
3.3.3 Impact of Strategy on Performance 
To assess the impact of strategy on performance, we investigated average accuracies in 
BASE and PROBE trials.  Recall that LS, SS, and DS responses are each considered correct, 
only varying on their relative efficiencies.  PROBE (Mdn = 95.83, SD = 10.22) accuracy was 
significantly higher than BASE (Mdn = 77.08, SD = 5.01) accuracy (Z= -2.501 , p = .012).  
 
3.3.4 Switch Cost Analysis 
 A repeated measures ANOVA determined that there were no effects of either 
condition (BASE/PROBE) or strategy type (stay/switch) on subjects’ RT1s.  Additionally, a 
related samples Friedman’s test showed no effect of trial type (same /different) on Response 1 
accuracy; however, there was a significant effect of condition [χ2(3, N = 10) = 12.59, p = 0.006].  
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BASE same trials were significantly less accurate than PROBE different and PROBE same, 
although BASE different trials did not differ from any trial type.  Thus, chimpanzees showed no 
switch costs in either RT or accuracy; however, as described above, they did exhibit improved 
accuracy on PROBE compared to BASE trials.  
 
3.4 Comparative Analyses  
Here we aimed to compare chimpanzees’ responses on the LS-DS task to those of 
baboons and humans, which were previously collected and reported in Pope et al. (2015).    
 
3.4.1 Subjects and General Procedure 
Baboon data were collected from 15 socially housed baboons [aged 1.8–9.3 years; six 
males (M = 5.3 years, SD = 2.68) and nine females (M = 5.1 years, SD = 2.36)] located at the 
CNRS Station de Primatologie in Rousset-sur-Arc, France.  The task was administered via ten 
automated learning devices for monkeys (ALDMs; Fagot & Paleressompoulle, 2009) and was 
approved by the local ‘‘Provence Alpes Cote d’Azur’’ ethics committee for experimental animal 
research.   In the previous report, children conducted only 48 trials (Pope et al., 2015).2 
Therefore we focused on the adult human data, which were collected from 53 participants (aged 
18–68 years; 23 males (M = 39.0 years, SD = 13.7) and 30 females (M = 40.8 years, SD = 13.4) 
at a temporary testing booth set up at Zoo Atlanta in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.  Human testing was 
approved by the Zoo Atlanta Research Committee and the Georgia State University Institutional 
Review Board.  
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3.4.2 Analysis 
For all species, analyses were performed on subjects’ first 96 trials, comprised of 48 
PROBE and 48 BASE trials.  For our original assessment of cognitive set between baboons and 
humans (Pope et al., 2015), we calculated DS-use based on the percentage of trials in which 
subjects used the DS in PROBE trials and compared it to BASE DS-use.  However, for the 
current analyses we used the same ‘true’ measure of DS-use described in Section 3.2.5. 
 
3.5 Comparative Results 
 
3.5.1 General Species Differences 
Average accuracy, as shown by a Kruskal-Wallis test, significantly differed between 
chimpanzees (M = 83.8, SD = 6.3) and humans [M = 90.7, SD =9.9; H(2) = 11.89, p = 0.000] but 
not between baboons (M = 88.3, SD = 8.8) and humans or baboons and chimpanzees.  
Additionally, Mann-Whitney tests determined that sex did not influence DS-use for any species 
(baboons: U = 25.5, p = .864; chimpanzees: U = 14.0, p = .841; humans: U = 404.5, p = .213).   
 
3.5.2 Species Differences in Training 
Kruskal-Wallis tests confirmed that across all training levels, baboons and chimpanzees 
completed significantly more trials than humans: Training 1 [H(2) = 53.84, p < 0.001], Training 
2 [H(2) = 70.63, p < 0.001], Training 3 [H(2) = 59.80, p < 0.001], and the total number of 
training trials [H(2) = 52.74, p < 0.001; Table 3.5-1].  Note that chimpanzees completed an extra 
training level, Training 1.5, which is included in the total number of training trials.  Combining 
Training 1.5 with Training 1 did not alter the above finding (H(2) = 53.84, p < 0.001).  These 
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differences should be interpreted cautiously given that the pass criteria differed for each species.3 
We found no significant correlations between the number of training trials (for any level) and 
DS-use for any species:  Training 1: chimpanzees (rs (8) = .231, p = .522), baboons (rs (13) = 
.062, p = .829), humans (rs (51) = -.108, p = .439); Training 2: chimpanzees (rs (8) = .407, p = 
.243), baboons (rs (13) = .313, p = .625), humans (rs (51) = .151, p = .281); Training 3: 
chimpanzees (rs (8) = .164, p = .651), baboons (rs (13) = .224, p = .422), humans (rs (51) = -.051, 
p = .713); Total Training chimpanzees (rs (8) = .438, p = .205), baboons (rs (13) = .095, p = 
.739), humans (rs (51) = -.129, p = .357).  
 
Table 3.1 Median number of training trials for Training 1, Training 1.5, Training 2, 
Training 3 and Total Training for all species.  SD in parentheses. 
  Training 1 Training 1.5 Training 2 Training 3 Total Training 
Baboons  6,084  ---------- 6,108         1,345  14,115 
  (1,947.1) ---------- (2,309.1) (999.5) (4,345.7) 
 
Chimps 817  2,343  8,771  4,852.5  17,960 
  (863.9)  (1,637.8) (3,810.6) (6,548.0) (9,989.7) 
 
Humans 16  ---------- 8  8  32 
  (8.6)  ---------- (10.5)   (7.7)  (20.2) 
 
3.5.3 Error Analyses 
Next, like in Section 3.3.1, we analyzed for error patterns during Training 2. Recall that 
we focused on incorrect trials that were preceded by correct trials.  However, only 6 humans 
(none of which were DSers) committed eligible errors (M = 6.66) and thus, we did not analyze 
humans’ training errors further.  One sample T-Tests found that baboons erroneously reselected 
their previously correct Response 1 (M = 23.55%, SD = 7.76; t(14) = -4.882) and Response 2 (M 
= 14.56%, SD =3.45; t(9) = -21.06, p < .001) significantly less often than expected by chance.  
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Further, similarly to chimpanzees, baboons committed the ‘reversal’ error-type significantly 
more often than expected by chance (M = 49.29%, SD = 12.60; t(9) = 4.91, p < .001).  
 
3.5.4 Cross-species Differences in Shortcut-Use 
A Pearson’s chi square confirmed that the proportion of baboons (100%) and 
chimpanzees (100%) that were classified as DSers differed significantly from humans (7.5%), 
but not from each other [χ2(2, N = 78) = 62.17, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a].   Additionally, the 
proportions of chimpanzees and baboons that used the DS in more than 25% [χ2(2, N = 78) = 
58.02, p < .001] and more than 50% (χ2(2, N = 78) = 51.91, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a) of trials were 
significantly higher than humans, but again did not significantly differ from each other.  In the 
75% DSer classification, all species significantly differed from one another [χ2(2, N = 78) = 
51.09, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a].  
The number of subjects who used the DS the very first time it was available differed 
significantly between all three species: baboons had the highest proportion (100%), followed by 
chimpanzees (60%), and then humans (5.7%) [Fisher’s Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 55.61, p < .001].  
Further, the proportion of baboon (53.3%) and chimpanzee (20%) subjects who used the DS 
every time it was available significantly differed from humans (0%), but not from each another 
[Fisher’s Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 26.65, p < .001] 
The SS was not distinguished from the DS previously (Pope et al., 2015), because 
humans and baboons used it in less than 1% of trials on average (baboons: M = 0.80%; Max = 
6.25%; humans: M = 0.49%; Max = 9.52%).  A Pearson’s chi square confirmed that the 
proportion of chimpanzees classified as SSers (50.0%) was significantly larger than the 
proportion of baboons (6.7%) and humans (1.9%), which did not differ from each other [Fisher’s 
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Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 15.68, p < .001; Table 3.5-2b).  Further, the proportion of chimpanzees 
(30%) who used the SS in more than 25% of trials was significantly higher than humans (0%) 
but baboons (0%) did not differ significantly from either other species [Fisher’s Exact:  χ2(2, N = 
78) = 11.20, p = .002; Table 3.5-2b].  No chimpanzees used the SS in greater than 50% of trials. 
 
Table 3.2 Proportion of each group which used the a) DS or the b) SS in greater than 
5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% of trials. Superscripts identify statistically distinguishable groupings.  
a) DS      
  >5%  >25%  >50%  >75% 
Baboons 100a  100a  100a  93.3a 
Chimpanzees 100a             90.0a             70.0a  30.0b 
Humans  7.5b  7.5 b   7.5 b    3.8c 
 
b) SS      
Baboons     6.7a       0 a,b   
Chimpanzees  50.0b  30.0b   
Humans    1.9 a       0 a  
  
 
3.5.5 Impact of Strategy on Performance 
To assess the impact of strategy on performance, we investigated subjects’ average 
accuracies in BASE and PROBE trials.  Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests showed that, like 
chimpanzees (and described in Section 3.3.3), baboons’ PROBE (Mdn = 97.08, SD = 3.50) 
accuracies were significantly higher than their BASE (Mdn = 79.58, SD = 15.87) accuracies (Z= 
-3.411 , p = .001).  However, for humans, PROBE (Mdn = 91.67, SD = 10.33) accuracy was 
significantly lower than BASE (Mdn = 93.75, SD = 10.03) accuracy (Z= -2.151 , p = .031), 
indicating that although they typically do not use the DS, the presence of the Triangle in PROBE 
trials may be distracting for humans.   
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3.5.6 Switch Cost Analysis 
 We also analyzed baboons’ switch costs, as they were not assessed in the previous report 
(Pope et al., 2015).  For baboons, a related samples Friedman’s test showed no effect of trial type 
(same/different) on Response 1 accuracy.  Although, similarly to chimpanzees, there was a 
significant effect of condition [χ2(3, N = 15) = 30.15, p < 0.001], which (as previously described) 
is indicative of their enhanced accuracy on PROBE compared to BASE trials (Table 3.5-3).  
Unfortunately due to experimenter error, baboon response times were not accurately recorded 
and could not be assessed for switch costs. 
For the humans, only 4 subjects reliably used the DS (i.e., switched strategies); thus, we 
were unable to statistically assess for switch costs in humans.  However, we report a descriptive 
account of the 4 human subjects’ RT and accuracy switch costs (Table 3.5-3).  Note: there was a 
significant difference between chimpanzees’ and humans’ BASE RT1s [Chimp: M = 315.47, SD 
= 81.34; Human: M = 622.24, SD = 164.47; F(1,61) = 32.94, p < .001)], RT2s [Chimp: M = 
779.14, SD = 148.32; Human: M = 227.19, SD = 77.83; F(1,61) = 304.8, p < .001)], RT3s 
[Chimp: M = 846.59, SD = 88.21; Human: M = 509.75, SD =  71.34; F(1,61) = 172.5, p < .001)]. 
Table 3.3 For BASE/PROBE conditions, mean response time (ms) and median accuracy 
(%) for subjects’ Response 1 in stay/switch strategy types and same/different trial types.  SD in 
parentheses. 
Response Time 
  BASE stay BASE switch  PROBE stay PROBE switch 
Baboons        - -               - -                              - -                 - - 
Chimps 305.1 (79.6) 317.8 (153.6)  322.2 (85.9) 329.6 (101.9) 
Humans 485.2 (88.6) 487.0 (111.9)  443.8 (128.2) 508.9 (189.5) 
 
Accuracy 
  BASE same BASE different PROBE same PROBE different 
Baboons 95.8 (2.8) 94.7 (3.9)  100 (1.8) 100 (1.1) 
Chimps 87.2 (8.3) 90.0 (6.0)  95.5 (4.8) 94.9 (6.7) 
Humans 97.8 (4.1) 94.6 (5.2)  95.3 (2.4) 96.3 (3.9) 
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3.6 Discussion 
The interplay between flexible strategy updating and the maintenance of existing solution 
strategies presents an interesting opposition.  On one hand, if an existing representation is too 
concrete and impervious to contextual inputs, then newly relevant information is ignored, 
resulting in a familiar but potentially inefficient response.  On the other hand, if the 
representation is too easily perforated, then response efficiency is impaired via distractability by 
irrelevant or even maladaptive information (Cools, 2008; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Roberts, 
2008).  For example, if a foraging animal is unable to flexibly adapt to shifting environments, 
they might starve; yet if foraging habits are too flexible, a novel and potentially poisonous food 
item might be consumed (Rosati, 2017).  Optimal behavior requires a balance between persistent 
and flexible behavior and should be task-dependent (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Chrysikou et al., 
2013).  
 
3.6.1 Implications for Cognitive Flexibility in Chimpanzees 
In this study we found that chimpanzees exhibited an intermediate susceptibility to 
cognitive set.  On one hand, their shortcut-use resembled baboons,’ in that it was far greater than 
humans’.  However, as evidenced by their enhanced inter-individual variation in strategy 
selection (Figure 3.6-1) as well as their use of the SS, chimpanzees are still influenced by habit-
based responses to some extent.  What might facilitate this semi-flexible response-style and the 
implications for the evolution of cognitive set are now discussed. 
As we described earlier, previous studies report considerable conservatism in 
chimpanzees.  Specifically, compared to naïve individuals, subjects trained to use a certain 
solution are less able to use a better alternative once it is available (Davis, 2017; Hrubesch et al., 
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2009; Manrique & Call, 2015; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009).  However, 
there are several (often necessary) pitfalls of non-computerized tasks, which might suppress 
flexibility.   
 
Figure 3.1 The proportion of each subjects’ PROBE trials in which the DS was used, 
accounting for within subject error. 
 
First, a portion of the social learning studies depicting conservatism in apes may have 
inadvertently negatively reinforced the alternative strategy during training by ‘locking’ it or 
rendering it ineffective (Davis et al., 2016; Manrique & Call, 2015; Price et al., 2009).  This is 
important because if subjects attempt to use the alternative during training (the reason it is 
locked) and are met with failure, subsequent avoidance of the alternative solution could just be a 
product of their own personally unrewarding experience with that strategy (i.e., it did not work).   
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Second, many of these studies rely on a model to demonstrate the more efficient 
alternative (Davis, 2017; Dean et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2011; Hanus et al., 2011; Hrubesch et 
al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009), introducing the possibility that 
conservatism may not be derived from cognitive inflexibility but from a failure to extract the 
relevant information from (or even attend to) the demonstration.  In the LS-DS task, subjects are 
not shown how to enact the shortcut.  DS-use is entirely self-motivated therefore our findings are 
not confounded by social learning ability.   
Finally, many of the tasks which describe conservative behavior in chimpanzees state that 
the behavior is clearly within the species’ repertoire (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) and 
thus, would be readily utilized if subjects were not influenced by a more familiar solution.  
However, what may be present in the species’ repertoire is not necessarily present within the 
individual’s and inexperience with specific manipulations, especially those involving fine motor 
control or tool-use, should not be discounted (Dean et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2011).  The time 
spent learning how to perform the seemingly more efficient alternative, may easily render it less 
so.  By comparison, the LS, DS, and SS strategies enlist motorically identical actions.  Our 
findings clearly demonstrate that, under certain conditions, chimpanzees are capable of flexibly 
switching between abstract response strategies.  However, the extent to which this carries over 
into more naturalistic settings should be elucidated in future endeavors.   
 
3.6.2 Species Differences in Cognitive Flexibility on the LS-DS Task 
By design, the LS-DS task is meant to promote shortcut use in PROBE trials.   
Accordingly, the DS is more desirable than the LS in several ways.  First, the DS does not rely 
on working memory.  Once the Triangle appears it remains on the screen until subjects select a 
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response. In PROBE trials, after the demonstration is over, all that remains on the screen are 
three blank response Squares and the Triangle.  Thus, the DS is more salient and less cognitively 
demanding than the LS.  Furthermore, the Triangle is highly associated with reward.  Every time 
it is selected, throughout Training 3 and the experimental trials (both BASE/PROBE), subjects 
receive a reward.  This is in stark contrast to the squares, which are only directly associated with 
reward before Training 3 and often, if erroneously selected, lead to the incorrect screen, a 
timeout, and no reward.  Indeed, by employing the SS, chimpanzees are effectively overriding an 
initial – perhaps habit-based – LS response in order to select the Triangle.  In fact, subjects (of all 
species) which used the shortcut the very first time it was available (baboons N = 15/15, 
chimpanzees N = 6/10 , humans N = 3/53) clearly recognized the Triangle’s role as a direct path 
to reward.4 
Given the task design, it is not surprising when subjects, of any species, prefer the DS.  
What is remarkable is humans’ robust proclivity for LS-use.  Although chimpanzees’ global 
perceptual biases or ‘collective’ sequential processing could have contributed to SS-use or 
reduced DS-use, they far from prevented chimpanzees from using the shortcut.  In fact, overall, 
chimpanzees responded most similarly to baboons.  We will next explore why humans’ but not 
baboons nor (to a large extent) chimpanzees, are affected by cognitive set in the LS-DS task. 
Thousands more training trials were needed for chimpanzees (Min = 2,784; Max = 
36,966) and baboons (Min = 5,043; Max = 20,060) to learn the LS, compared with humans (Min 
= 24; Max = 152).  We suggest that LS-use may be aided by humans’ enhanced ability to encode 
strategies either through verbal encoding (Ghirlanda et al., 2017), heightened working memory 
(Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; but see: Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007), or chunking strategies (Gobet et 
al., 2001; Kolodny et al., 2015).  In fact, many of the human subjects were able to learn the rule 
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after only 8 trials – a quarter of the total possible configurations – illustrating that, once learned, 
humans are capable of accurately applying the LS to novel situations (Pope et al., Submitted; 
Pope et al., 2015).  On the other hand, chimpanzees and baboons required many encounters with 
the same trial configurations before they began to accurately respond.  Chimpanzees’ and 
baboons’ errors seem to have been driven, to a large extent, by erroneously reversing the order of 
the demonstrated squares (i.e., selecting Square2 first).  This reversal error is in line with recent 
findings which suggest that humans exhibit a pronounced advantage when it comes to sequential 
encoding (Ghirlanda et al., 2017).  Indeed, a less firmly encoded LS might reasonably facilitate 
baboons’ and chimpanzees’ enhanced ability to replace it.   
In line with this assertion, the current study found that chimpanzees, unlike humans 
(Pope et al., Submitted), did not exhibit switch costs on the LS-DS task.  As far as we are aware, 
this is the first study to investigate deficits associated with switching between abstract rules in 
chimpanzees.  Stoet and Snyder (2003) posited that switch costs are a product of firmly encoded 
rules, such that greater cognitive effort is required to suppress the previous strategy and activate 
the current.  Additionally, less entrenched rules have been hypothesized to amplify distractibility 
(Stoet & Snyder, 2008), which for the LS-DS task might further promote the use of the shortcut.   
That being said, chimpanzees, but not baboons, utilized the SS, suggesting that 
chimpanzees were influenced by the habit of LS-responding to a greater extent than baboons.  
We posit that differences in how old world monkeys and apes group the components of the LS 
could have affected their relative abilities to separate the shortcut from the sequence as a whole.  
Although somewhat unclear, there is some reason to think that baboons might identify the 
individual components of a sequence, while chimpanzees might process the sequence as a whole 
(Ohshiba, 1997); however, this is up for some debate (Beran et al., 2004).  Similarly, in a match-
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to-sample task, baboons seemed to encode only the relevant aspects of a stimulus; yet, humans 
encoded irrelevant dimensions as well (Fagot, Kruschke, Depy, & Vauclair, 1998).  Furthermore, 
in a serial recall task, baboons but not humans benefitted from sequence structure (Fagot & De 
Lillo, 2011).  Thus, it seems reasonable to suspect that chimpanzees may exhibit intermediate 
susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task because, unlike humans, they are not verbally 
encoding their solution strategy but also differ from baboons in the way the LS is encoded.   
Future efforts aimed at disentangling these influences might compare cognitive set between 
monkeys and apes utilizing a non-sequential task. 
  
3.6.3 Evolutionary Implications 
Distinct response patterns are observed between baboons, chimpanzees, and human 
adults on the LS-DS task.  We suggest that these may be explained by a trade-off between how 
quickly abstract rules can be learned and the degree to which they can be flexibly used, a process 
potentially governed by differences in strategy encoding.  
In summary, the current study found that, like baboons, chimpanzees used the shortcut 
significantly more often than humans.  However, they did not exhibit switch costs when shifting 
between the LS and the DS.  Furthermore, they sometimes employed a unique solution, wherein 
they switched strategies mid-trial (the SS).  These data suggest that chimpanzees’ experience an 
intermediate susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task.   
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Footnotes 
1 Note that Huguet, Barbet, Belletier, Monteil, and Fagot (2014) did observe RT costs 
when baboons switched between trials which did or did not conflict with their learned strategy; 
however, this was only observed for the longest RTs (bin 5/5) and only when tested in isolation.  
Perhaps indicating that subjects were more distracted by the shift between the trial types.  If 
these costs were associated with a shift in cognitive approach, we would expect them to appear 
within immediate responses, rather than only the slowest response times. 
2 In our original assessment of cognitive set between baboons and humans (Pope et al., 
2015), we calculated DS-use based on the percentage of trials in which subjects used the DS in 
PROBE trials and compared it to BASE DS-use.  In subsequent analyses (including the current 
report and (Pope et al., Submitted)), we opted to calculate a “true” measure of DS-use by 
subtracting subjects’ BASE DS-use from PROBE DS-use.  Additionally, our original analyses 
did not distinguish between SS-use and DS-use, they were both classified as DS responses.  
When we separate these strategies and re-run our analyses on the first 48 trials for each subject, 
the main finding, that baboons used the shortcut significantly more than humans, is preserved 
[χ2(1, N = 104) = 49.63 p <.001].  However, the age-related findings suggesting that children 
(ages 7-10; n = 27; DSers = 18.5%) used the DS more than adolescents (ages 11-18; n = 25; 
DSers = 9.6%) or adults (ages 19-68; n = 52; DSers = 4.0%) were no longer significant [χ2(2, N 
= 104) = 2.995 p = 0.224; note: two cells had expected counts less than 5].   Further, children’s 
SS-use (25.9%) was not significantly different from adolescents’ (12.0%) or adults’ (7.7%).  
This was also true if we combined DS and SS use into a single measure, indicating that 
erroneous DS-use may have driven the originally reported statistical difference in children.  
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3 Baboons were required to achieve 80% or more, twice, assessed after each block of 96 
trials.  Humans were required to achieve 80% or more, assessed after each block of 8 trials.  
Chimpanzees were required to achieve 80% or more, twice, assessed after each block of 24 trials.  
However, because we altered the pass criteria partially through chimpanzees’ training, some of 
the subjects progressed immediately after the decision was made and therefore had already 
completed many more training trials than some of their peers were required to.  
4 Yet, notably, half of the chimpanzee subjects avoided selecting the Triangle when it first 
appeared in Training 3 (one subject even ran away from the touch screen the very first time it 
appeared), only selecting it when a modified version of the task removed all other options.  This 
suggests that chimpanzees’ flexibility on the LS-DS task was reliant upon their familiarity with 
the Triangle.  
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Abstract 
By applying learned rules, humans are able to solve problems with minimal cognitive 
effort.  Yet this sort of habit-based problem solving may readily foster cognitive inflexibility or 
set.  This occurs when an alternative – even more efficient – strategy is masked by a known, 
familiar solution.  Here we sought to explore how cognitive set occludes alternatives, by 
identifying whether better solutions are a) visually overlooked or b) seen but disregarded.  
Subjects’ eye movements were tracked while they conducted the computerized LS-DS task, 
which measures an individual’s ability to depart from a learned strategy (LS) in order to adopt a 
more efficient, direct strategy (DS or the shortcut).  Indeed, we found that subjects fixated on the 
DS prior to responding, indicating that they did not simply overlook the alternative strategy; yet, 
the vast majority (86.2%) did not adopt it, instead continuing to use the LS.  Next, subjects were 
shown a video demonstrating either the DS (Informed) or the familiar LS (Control).  In 
subsequent trials, Informed subjects fixated more on the DS prior to responding, were more 
likely to use the DS after seeing it, and were more likely to be classified as shortcut-users 
(69.0%) than Controls (6.9%).  Thus, unsurprisingly, after learning that a more efficient 
alternative was possible, many subjects were able to break away from their familiar solution.  
That being said, 31.0% of subjects continued to use the learned strategy despite viewing a 
demonstration of the shortcut.  We discuss implications for rule-based problem solving and the 
potential impacts on cognitive flexibility. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Codified solutions enable humans to solve complex problems with minimal cognitive 
effort.  However, once learned, rules may be blindly applied with little consideration for 
alternative strategies.  In 1945, Max Wertheimer noted that children who had recently learned a 
method of finding the area of a parallelogram were unable to solve an identical problem after it 
had been rotated 90.  Subjects either did not try the new problem, stating that they had not 
learned how to solve it, or continued to apply their learned method, albeit unsuccessfully 
(Wertheimer, 1945).   In fact, humans of all ages have exhibited problem-solving deficits 
stemming from over-reliance on familiar strategies or learned rules.  
In another classic example, subjects are presented with a set of arithmetic ‘water jar’ 
problems all solvable by the same, four-step solution; however, the 7th problem can be solved not 
only by the learned solution but also by a more efficient alternative (Luchins, 1942).  Luchins 
(1942; 1950) tested thousands of subjects, of all ages and under various manipulations, and 
found that consistently the majority of subjects did not use the more efficient alternative.  
Termed ‘cognitive set,’ the propensity, for known solutions to occlude alternative - even more 
efficient – strategies, has been demonstrated across a wide variety of tasks (Bilalić et al., 2008; 
Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Lemaire & Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 
1950; Pope et al., Submitted; Pope et al., 2015; Sweller et al., 1982), yet little is known regarding 
the underlying causes. 
One hypothesis is that cognitive set biases visual search during problem solving, such 
that only stimuli relevant to the familiar method are perceived.  In other words, once a strategy is 
adopted, alternatives are simply overlooked.  For example, Bilalić et al. (2008) found that expert 
chess players, after finding one possible move, reported that they were looking for another, yet 
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subjects’ gaze indicated that were continuing to look at the solution they had already found.  In 
Luchins’ task, efforts to increase the saliency of the alternative strategy were met with some 
success (Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; Sweller & Gee, 1978), yet to what extent 
these findings were conflated with other changes, like increased difficulty of the learned strategy, 
are unclear.  
Another hypothesis is that cognitive set may arise from an inability to conceptually 
identify the alternative as a viable solution strategy.  Simply, subjects may not realize that they 
can or should use it.  Knoblich et al. (2001) presented subjects with ‘matchstick’ arithmetic 
problems, in which they were required to alter the problem space (by moving one matchstick) to 
balance equations.  Subjects struggled with problems requiring them to disassemble meaningful 
components (e.g., using Roman numeral X to create V) or alter operators (e.g., using + to create 
= ), which the authors suggested may stem from their prior experience with mathematics.  
Another example comes from the Luchins’ water jar task.  Luchins (1942) found that instructing 
subjects to write “Don’t be blind” increased their use of the more efficient alternative.  This was 
also true when subjects were given an extinction problem that could only be solved by the 
alternative strategy.  However, a shocking number of subjects proclaimed that the extinction 
problem was unsolvable (note: this problem was easily solved by naïve individuals), 
demonstrating the remarkable constraints imposed by the learned rule on adaptive problem 
solving.  
We recently reported similar results using the computerized LS-DS task, a nonverbal 
nonmathematical adaptation of Luchins’ task, which first trains subjects to utilize a three-step 
sequence (Square1→Square2→Triangle) and then presents them with an opportunity to use a 
more efficient shortcut (Triangle; Pope et al., 2015).  Susceptibility to cognitive set is measured 
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by subjects’ ability to depart from their learned strategy (LS) in order to adopt the more direct 
strategy (DS or the shortcut).  Interestingly, baboons and chimpanzees seemed relatively 
unaffected by cognitive set on the LS-DS task, yet less than 10% of American adults were able to 
employ the shortcut in more than 5% of trials (Pope et al., 2015).   
Here, we sought to identify how perceptual and conceptual constraints impact 
susceptibility to cognitive set. By tracking subjects’ gaze while they completed the LS-DS task 
we sought to identify if and to what extent persistent LS-use may be driven by perceptual 
constraints.  In other words, do subjects see the shortcut and just not use it or, do they not even 
see it?  Further, we measured subjects’ shortcut-use following a video demonstration of either 
the LS or the DS to investigate how subjects’ conceptual understanding of the DS as a potential 
solution might influence their ability to use it.  Rule-based strategies provide a framework from 
which many problems may be solved; however rules are only truly useful when flexibly applied.  
The current study aimed to elucidate the factors contributing to cognitive set, in an effort to 
promote efficient selection between learned rules and alternative strategies that co-occur within a 
problem space. 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Subjects  
Data were collected from 58 subjects (52 females and 6 males) recruited from the pool of 
undergraduate students at Georgia State University by posting the study on the SONA 
Experiment Managements System.  Subjects were tested on the Georgia State University campus 
in a room with dimmed lights.  All subjects were above 18 years of age (Max = 37, M = 20.47, 
SD = 4.23).  Fourteen subjects were not included in the analyses as a result of either technical 
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malfunctions (N = 12), their accuracy being below 65% during experimental trials (N = 1; 
62.5%), or an inability to pass the training trials (N = 1). 
 
4.2.2 General Methods 
Subjects were seated approximately 60cm from a 19inch monitor (1280 x 1040 Native 
Resolution; 1915L Desktop Touchmonitor, Elo Touch Solutions).  Using the Eye Tribe Tracker 
(The Eye Tribe) subjects completed a 16-point gaze calibration.  Next, OpenSesame (version 
3.1.1; OpenSesame Experiment Builder; Mathot, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), was launched and 
using the PyGaze plugin (version 0.6.0a16; default settings), subjects’ gaze was calibrated again. 
Next, the feedback screens (and accompanying sounds) indicating correct and incorrect 
responses were demonstrated and subjects were told that they would need to ‘select the shapes to 
figure out the right answer.’ Following this, using the PyGaze drift-correct feature, subjects were 
instructed to look at the fixation cross while pressing the SPACE bar to start each trial.  At the 
beginning of each trial, if subjects’ gaze was not detected as being directed at the fixation cross 
(within a 1.5 threshold), an error sound was elicited and subjects remained on the fixation 
screen until it was.  This ensured that subjects’ gaze started from the same location in every trial 
and that detection remained accurate throughout the testing session.  If, at any point, subjects 
struggled to move past the fixation screen, the experiment was paused and gaze was recalibrated.  
No further instructions were provided and the experimenter remained in an adjacent room (out of 
sight) unless recalibration was required. 
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4.2.3 The LS-DS Task 
A full description of the LS-DS task can be found in Pope et al. (2015); however, briefly: 
the task is comprised of three training levels followed by 96 experimental trials. In Training 1, 
two squares flash red (250ms each) in sequence and subjects must reproduce this demonstration 
by selecting them in the correct order.  In Training 2, two out of four squares flash red (200ms 
each) in sequence and subjects must reproduce this demonstration by selecting the two correct 
squares (now out of four options), in the correct order.  In Training 3, two out of four squares 
flash red (150ms each), however after the subject correctly selects Square1 and Square2 they 
must then select a blue triangle, which appears in one of the remaining locations.  Subjects do 
not progress to the next training level until they achieve 80% accuracy, assessed after each 8 trial 
block.   
After training, BASE and PROBE experimental trials were presented (Figure 1.6-1) and 
gaze data were recorded (sample rate = 30 Hz). For PROBE trials, the blue Triangle appears 
alongside the Square1 → Square2 demonstration and remains visible throughout subjects’ 
response.  Crucially, on PROBE trials, subjects can either continue to use the 
Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence [i.e., the learned strategy (LS)] or they can simply ignore 
the demonstration and select the Triangle [i.e., the direct strategy (DS or shortcut)].  BASE trials 
are identical to Training 3, however if subjects select the Triangle’s ‘hidden’ location their 
response is recorded as if they had used the DS, providing a measure of accidental DS-use for 
each subject.  In summary, the LS-DS task assesses subjects’ propensity to forego their learned 
response and adopt the more efficient shortcut when it is available (PROBE trials), thereby 
measuring susceptibility to cognitive set. 
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Following the first 48 (PRE) experimental trials, consisting of 24 BASE and 24 PROBE 
trials randomly presented, subjects encountered a PAUSE screen.  At which point, they were 
given a questionnaire requesting descriptions of various components of the task.  Once they 
completed the questionnaire (~5-10 minutes), subjects were shown a brief video twice, 
demonstrating either the shortcut (Informed, n = 29) or the learned strategy (Control; n = 29) 
being performed in four consecutive PROBE trials.  Groups were comprised of an equal number 
of males and females but were otherwise randomly assigned.  After the video, subjects 
completed an additional 48 (POST) trials, again consisting of 24 BASE and 24 PROBE trials 
randomly presented, followed by another, identical questionnaire.  Thus, each subject completed 
48 PRE trials, a PRE questionnaire, 48 POST trials, and a POST questionnaire.1 
 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
The percentage of correct trials in which the DS was used was calculated for both BASE 
and PROBE trials.  For each subject, BASE DS-use was subtracted from PROBE DS-use to 
yield a measure of DS-use which accounts for within-subject error.  In accordance with previous 
methodologies, we classified subjects that used the DS in greater than 5% of trials as DSers 
(Pope et al., 2015).  Whenever the data violated the assumptions for parametric statistical 
analyses, non-parametric analyses were used and group medians rather than means were 
reported. 
 
4.2.5 Gaze Analysis 
For each trial, we assessed whether or not subjects looked at the Triangle prior to their 
first response.  This was accomplished by classifying the raw data points from the eye tracker 
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into Top Left, Top Right, Bottom Left, and Bottom Right quadrants, excluding the middle 50 
pixels extending across the screen both vertically and horizontally, which also encompassed the 
central location of the fixation point.  For each subject, the percentage of correct PRE trials in 
which they fixated on the Triangle’s location before responding was calculated and compared 
between BASE and PROBE conditions.  Remember, in BASE trials, the location of the Triangle 
is ‘hidden’ until Square 1 and Square 2 have been correctly selected; thus, this comparison 
controls for the number of times subjects might randomly look at the Triangle’s location on the 
screen.  Note, by only including data points in which subjects fixated, we excluded any potential 
saccades to the Triangle, making this a highly conservative measure. 
 
4.2.6 Questionnaire Analysis 
PRE and POST questionnaires were analyzed for indications that subjects recognized the 
Triangle’s differential presence in PROBE and BASE trials.  Thus, each subject received two 
scores of either noticed (1) or did not notice (0) based on their PRE and POST responses.  Terms 
like “distraction” in reference to the Triangle were categorized as noticing a difference between 
BASE and PROBE trials and were scored as 1.  Additionally, subjects’ PRE and POST 
responses were analyzed for any mention of the Triangle as having either positive or neutral 
importance, compared with the squares.  Subjects were scored based on whether they described 
the Triangle as more important (1) or of equal importance (0).  Responses noting that it was 
“how to progress to the next trial,” “how you knew you were correct,” or “the goal” were 
considered indications of positive importance and were scored as 1.  Thus, for both PRE and 
POST trial blocks, each subject received two scores, noticed/did not notice (1/0) and 
positive/neutral importance (1/0).  The experimenter was blind to video condition during coding 
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however, to ensure that bias did not factor into scoring, 24 (20.69% of the total) scores were re-
coded by a second experimenter who was blind to trial block (PRE/POST) and the subjects’ 
condition (Informed/Control).  A Spearman rank order correlation between the two observers 
revealed that scoring was reliable (rs = .781, p < .001).   
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Effects of Seeing the Triangle 
 First, we investigated whether subjects saw the shortcut prior to their first response on 
PROBE trials.  A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test showed that indeed, subjects fixated on the 
Triangle’s location more often prior to responding to PROBE trials (M = 22.93%, SD = 16.05) 
than BASE trials (M = 12.06%, SD = 8.43; Z = -4.34, p < .001; Figure 4.3-1). Figure 4.3-2 
displays a heatmap of all subjects’ gaze data for the Top Left → Bottom Left → Top Right 
configuration in both BASE and PROBE conditions.      
Next, we explored whether visual search influenced strategy choice.  If seeing the 
Triangle prior to the first response promotes DS-use, we would expect less LS-use following 
Triangle fixations.  We chose to analyze LS-use because it is inversely related to DS-use, but is 
not conflated with whether or not subjects searched for the Triangle in order to select it (i.e., use 
the DS).  We calculated the proportion of PROBE trials in which subjects used the LS after 
fixating on the Triangle (Look LS) or not (No Look LS).  A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
revealed that, for PRE trials, there was no difference between the proportions of LS-use 
depending on whether subjects did (Mdn = 100%; SD = 23.98) or did not (Mdn  = 100%; SD = 
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17.48) see the Triangle (Z = -.051, p = .959), indicating that seeing the Triangle did not influence 
strategy selection for PRE trials. 
 
4.3.2 Impact of Video Information 
For POST trials, we analyzed the impact of the video information on visual search.  A 
Mann-Whitney U test revealed that Informed subjects fixated on the Triangle significantly more 
often (Mdn = 45.83%, SD =5.15) than Controls (Mdn = 12.50%, SD = 9.23; U = 120.0 p < .001; 
see Figure 4.3-1) on PROBE trials.  There was no significant difference between groups on 
BASE trials.   
Further, after looking at the Triangle, Informed subjects (Mdn = 6.27%, SD = 45.40) used 
the LS less often than Controls (Mdn = 100.0%, SD = 36.25; U = 197, p < .001).  Thus, after 
watching a demonstration of the DS, subjects were more likely to fixate on the shortcut and more 
likely to use it after seeing it.  
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Figure 4.1 The percentage of BASE and PROBE trials in which subjects fixated on the 
Triangle in PRE and POST blocks.  Informed and Control subjects viewed the DS and LS video 
demonstrations, respectively. ** p < .001. 
 
Finally, to understand how the video information affected strategy-selection, we analyzed 
whether the proportion of DSers in PRE and POST trials differed between Informed and Control 
subjects.  In other words, did the DS demonstration affect Informed subjects’ strategy choices to 
a meaningful extent?  For PRE trials, a Yates’ continuity-corrected Chi square (two of the 
expected values were smaller than 5) confirmed that there was no difference in the proportion of 
Informed (13.8%) and Control (13.8%) DSers [χ2(1, N = 58) = .000, p = 1.00).  For POST trials 
however, there were significantly more Informed (69.0%) than Control (6.9%) DSers [χ2(1, N = 
58) = 23.73, p < .001; see Table 4.3-1].   
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Figure 4.2  Response 1 gaze data compiled across all subjects during the Top Left 
(Square1), Bottom Left (Square2), Top Right (Triangle) BASE and PROBE trial configurations, 
for PRE and POST trial blocks. 
 
We further explored the consistency of DS-use between groups by applying progressively 
more stringent DSer classification requirements: DS was used in more than 25%, more than 
50%, and more than 75% of trials (Table 4.3-1).  For PRE trials, as with the 5% classification 
criterion, there were no significant differences between groups.  Additionally, only 2 subjects 
used the DS the first time it was available, both of whom went on to be categorized as DSers, 
and no subject used it in every PROBE trial.  In contrast, for POST trials, Chi square analyses 
revealed that there were significantly fewer Control DSers than Informed DSers when the 
criterion was set to more than 25% [χ2(1, N = 58) = 26.95, p < .001], more than 50% [χ2(1, N = 
58) = 24.73, p < .001], and more than 75% of trials, [χ2(1, N = 58) = 20.62, p < .001; Table 4.3-
1].  Further, 14 subjects used the shortcut the first time it was available, 13 of whom had seen the 
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DS-video.  All 14 went on to be classified as DSers and 4 of them used the DS every time it was 
available.   
The task permits a third correct strategy, in which subjects begin to use the LS but then 
switch to the DS (Square1→Triangle).  Subjects rarely used this ‘switch strategy’ in either PRE 
(M = 0.86, SD = 3.56) or POST (M = 1.81, SD =7.93) trials.  However, a few subjects used it in 
more than 5% of PRE (N = 2, Max = 22.73%) and POST (N = 4, Max = 58.33%) PROBE trials. 
 
4.3.3 Impact of Strategy on Performance 
First, we isolated subjects’ first response time (i.e., the time between the end of the 
demonstration and their first response (RT1) for each trial. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
revealed that when the LS was used, subjects took longer to make their first response in PROBE 
(Mdn = 682.50 ms, SD = 190.09) compared to BASE (Mdn = 645.50, SD = 276.74) trials (Z = -
2.139, p = .020).   
We calculated switch costs for subjects who used the DS in greater than 50% of trials.  
We did not analyze PRE trials, as there were only four subjects who used the DS in greater than 
50% of trials.  However, for POST trials, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed that for greater 
than 50% DSers (N = 20) trials in which subjects repeated a strategy (e.g., LS-to-LS or DS-to-
DS; stay trials; M = 614.48 ms, SD = 194.93) were significantly faster than trials in which 
subjects switched strategies [e.g., DS-to-LS or LS-to-DS; switch trials; M = 666.18, SD = 
209.69; F(1,19) = 5.097, p = .036)].  There was no effect of BASE/PROBE condition. 
Additionally, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test confirmed that overall trial times were significantly 
longer when subjects used the LS (Mdn = 1605.90, SD = 430.85) compared to the DS (Mdn = 
637.10, SD = 316.02; Z = -4.782, p < .001). 
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Table 4.1  Proportion of each group that used the DS in greater than 5%, 25%, 50%, and 
75% of trials.  Superscripts denote statistically distinguishable groupings.   
PRE      
  5%  25%  50%  75% 
Control 13.8 a     6.9a  6.9 a       0 a 
Informed 13.8 a     6.9a  6.9a     6.9a 
 
POST      
Control 6.9a       3.4a      3.4a  3.4a 
Informed 69.0 b  69.0 b  65.5b  58.6b 
 
4.3.4 Impact of Conceptual Understanding on Strategy 
Next, potential interactions between subjects’ questionnaire responses and their response 
strategies were assessed. For PRE trials, 46.6% of subjects (N = 27) indicated that they noticed a 
difference between PROBE and BASE trials and 24.1% of subject (N = 14) attributed positive 
importance to the Triangle.  For PRE trials, Yate’s continuity corrected Pearson’s Chi-square 
tests showed that DSer classification was not significantly associated with either ascribing 
enhanced importance to the Triangle [χ2(1, N = 58) = .26, p = .61] nor noticing the difference 
between BASE and PROBE trials [χ2(1, N = 58) = 1.84, p = .18].  Further, 77.8% of subjects 
who noticed the difference between the PROBE and BASE trials and 50.0% of subjects who 
attributed increased importance to the Triangle still did not use the shortcut. 
For POST trials, 37.9% of subjects (N = 22) reported noticing a difference between 
PROBE and BASE trials and 48.3% (N = 28) recognized the Triangle as being more important 
than the squares.  A Yate’s continuity corrected Pearson’s Chi-square test showed that DSer 
classification was significantly associated with ascribing enhanced importance to the Triangle 
[χ2(1, N = 58) = 13.88, p < .001]. That said, 35.7% of subjects who attributed increased 
importance to the Triangle, still went on to use LS.  Furthermore, DS-use was not significantly 
associated with noticing the difference between BASE and PROBE trials. The change between 
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PRE and POST appears to have been driven by Informed subjects, as only 2 Control subjects 
were classified as DSers in POST trials. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In the current study we found that while operating under a cognitive set, subjects did, in 
fact, fixate on the shortcut prior to responding, yet seemingly ignored it.  Consistent with this, in 
PRE trials, 27 out of the 58 subjects reported noticing a difference between PROBE and BASE 
trials and 14 subjects attributed greater importance to the Triangle over the squares; yet only 8 
used the DS.  After viewing a video demonstration of the DS however, more subjects fixated on 
the shortcut and then used it.  In fact, prior to watching the video 13.8% of about-to-be Informed 
subjects used the DS, but this number rose to 69.0% after watching the video.  Additionally, DS-
use correlated with both noticing the difference between PROBE/BASE trials and ascribing 
increased importance to the Triangle but only in POST trials.  
Our first hypothesis suggested that an inability to perceive the alternative strategy might 
have promoted cognitive set; however, this was not supported.  Subjects clearly fixated on the 
shortcut yet subsequently used the LS.  Additionally, when subjects used the LS, they took 
longer to respond to PROBE than BASE trials, further suggesting that the presence of the 
Triangle may have been distracting.  Indeed, 77.8% of subjects who reported noticing the 
difference between BASE and PROBE trials still applied the LS to every trial indiscriminately.  
We conclude that cognitive set on the LS-DS task does not arise from an inability to visually 
perceive the shortcut.   
Our findings are somewhat contradictory to those of Bilalić et al. (2008), who concluded 
that, in chess, subjects became stuck on a known solution, seemingly because they were not 
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looking for alternatives.  However, in chess, presumably the optimal move is no more visually 
salient than the familiar approach.  The LS-DS task is designed to promote shortcut use by 
making the DS highly salient (during PROBE trials, the Triangle remains on the response screen 
amongst the white squares); thus, it is no surprise that subjects fixate on it.  What the current 
study illustrates is that, even when subjects saw the alternative, they stuck to their familiar 
solution.  Discovering the shortcut relied on subjects’ propensity to explore the DS as an option 
after seeing it.  
The current results support our second hypothesis that cognitive set is influenced by the 
ability to consider the alternative as a viable option.  Informed subjects, who were explicitly 
shown that the DS could function as a possible solution, were 10x more likely to be classified as 
DSers than Control subjects, who saw the LS demonstrated.  Thus, not surprisingly, 
understanding that they could use the shortcut greatly increased subjects’ propensity to do so.  
However, even after watching the video, only 4 subjects used the DS every time it was available, 
illustrating subjects’ inability to completely forsake their learned approach. 
 
“When the individual does not adequately deal with problems but views them merely 
from the frame of reference of a habit; when he applies a certain habituated behavior to 
situations which have a better solution or which, in fact, are not even solvable by the just 
working habit; when, in a word, instead of the individual mastering the habit, the habit 
masters the individual – then mechanization is indeed a dangerous thing.” - (Luchins, 
1942, p. 93) 
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Of note, a number of Informed subjects seemed wholly unaffected by the demonstration.  
Initially we piloted the use of extinction trials, wherein only the Triangle was available (i.e., no 
Square1→Square2 demonstration); however, these trials failed to invoke shortcut-use in 
subsequent trials.  Indeed, subjects simply switched back to using the LS when the 
Square1→Square2 demonstration reappeared.  Thus, we opted to directly demonstrate the DS, 
via the video.  We expected that subjects would surely employ the shortcut after watching the 
video showing them how.  Indeed, Informed subjects exhibited a stark increase in DS-use; 
however, 31.0% of subjects (N = 9/29) – even after watching the video demonstrating the 
shortcut, a minimum of 8 times – did not use it.  Further, none of these nine subjects’ POST 
questionnaire scores showed improvement over their PRE scores.  Whether this arose out of an 
inability to extract information from, or simply inattention to, the video is unclear.  Similarly, 
Luchins noted that if he explained the presence of the alternative strategy before the task began, 
subjects readily embraced it.  However, even under these conditions, when the alternative was 
presented even a few trials after when subjects thought it would appear, a number of them did 
not use it (Luchins, 1942).  This clearly highlights the trade-off between exploring other response 
options, which may take time and energy, and exploiting known solutions, which are effective 
but perhaps not the most efficient.   
Like many tasks wherein subjects shift between multiple response strategies (Diamond & 
Kirkham, 2005; Ionescu, 2012; Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel et al., 2009; Pope, Meguerditchian, 
Fagot, & Hopkins, In Prep; Stoet & Snyder, 2008), we noted an increase in the time it took 
subjects to respond when they switched between DS and LS responses.  Chevalier, Blaye, Dufau, 
and Lucenet (2010) tracked subjects’ gaze during a DCCS task and noted that switch costs were 
seemingly related to the time required to identify the newly relevant aspects of the stimulus.  
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Thus, it is possible that conservative LS-use might serve to mitigate the costs associated with 
switching strategies.  Yet, the overall advantage of this approach is dubious, especially 
considering the increased efficiency of using the DS in overall trial times.  Recall that the 
Median DS trial time was approximately 968.8ms faster than the Median LS trial time (See 
Section 4.3.3). 
Interestingly, in PRE trials, 13.8% of Control subjects were classified as DSers; however, 
after watching the video demonstration of the LS, this number dropped to 6.9%.  In other words, 
two DSers switched away from using the DS to embrace the LS as their primary PROBE 
response strategy, after viewing the LS video.  This suggests that they were, in a sense, 
complying with the demonstration.  Similarly, Luchins noted that, for his task, some subjects 
reported that they already knew about the shortcut but used the learned solution because they 
thought they were supposed to (Luchins, 1942, p. 89).  Although we did not distinguish between 
subjects believing that they could not vs should not utilize the DS, future efforts should address 
the possibility that subjects’ proclivity for rule-based responses may be driven by a desire to 
respond appropriately, rather than efficiently.  
We conclude that cognitive set on the LS-DS task is not attributable to an inability to 
perceive the alternative and suggest that subjects’ understanding of the problem space and 
willingness to try alternatives contributes greatly to their ability to break cognitive set.  
Additionally, we suggest that subjects’ experience with rule-based problem solving might 
contribute to cognitive set.  Alternative strategies are not used, because they are not sought.  The 
impact of rote memorization and mechanized rule-use, typical of Western educational 
approaches, on cognitive inflexibility should be clearly elucidated in future endeavors.   
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Footnotes: 
 
1We encountered several difficulties during data collection.  First, occasionally the task 
would not resume following the PRE-questionnaire/video pause.  When this occurred, the 
computer was restarted and a new program was launched which allowed subjects to return to the 
PAUSE screen (skipping Training and PRE trials); however, this process sometimes took several 
minutes.  Therefore, subjects were shown the video once more before progressing to the POST 
trials.  Second, for unknown reasons, the eye tracker stopped recording one subject’s data on the 
last 10 POST trials.  We chose to include this subject (Informed, age = 18, female) in our final 
analyses, which were all performed on proportions of trials (e.g., the proportion of correct trials, 
in which subjects used the DS). Finally, for another subject the computer froze just before the 
PAUSE screen.  Thus, the experiment was restarted and the subject conducted an additional 48 
trials (91 PRE trials total, rather than 48).  Only the specific trials that were not completed in the 
first attempt were included in final PRE trial analyses. 
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Abstract 
Through codified rule-use humans are able to accurately solve many problems; however, 
mechanized strategies can also be costly.  After adopting a solution strategy, humans consistently 
become blind to alternatives – even when those alternatives are more efficient.  This 
predisposition towards inflexibility, or cognitive set, was considered a universal phenomenon in 
humans however, prior to this study, only Western subjects had been tested.  We used the 
nonverbal Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touch screen task in which subjects are 
presented with an opportunity to either use a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel, 
shortcut.  We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited 
enhanced cognitive flexibility on the LS-DS task, thereby challenging the claim that cognitive set 
affects humans universally.  Additionally, we did not find support for the notion that variation in 
local vs global perceptual processing contributes to cognitive flexibility.  We discuss how other 
aspects of cultural variation, namely educational background, might contribute to the observed 
cross-cultural differences in problem solving flexibility. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In 1942, Abraham Luchins asked a group of university students, faculty, and staff to 
solve a set of simple math problems (Luchins, 1942).  He aimed to explore how rule-based 
problem solving limits other, more creative solutions. The task began with several problems 
solvable only by using a four-step rule, which participants quickly mastered. However, after 
these 'learned rule' problems, Luchins added a twist. In addition to the familiar strategy, 
problems seven and eight could also be solved by a more efficient, one-step method – a shortcut.  
Remarkably, when the time came, not a single subject used the shortcut.  Instead, they continued 
to use the learned rule despite its relative inefficiency. This phenomenon - the inability to 
implement an alternative strategy once a learned rule has been adopted - is termed 'cognitive set.'   
Pope et al. (2015) devised a nonverbal, nonmathematical adaptation of Luchins' task in 
order to compare baboons' and humans' susceptibilities to cognitive set (Pope et al., 2015). The 
LS-DS task begins with several levels of training wherein subjects learn to utilize a three-step 
(Square1→Square2→Triangle) sequence, which constitutes the learned strategy (LS; see Figure 
1.6-1b).  Once subjects consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are presented in which 
subjects can use the LS or they can use a direct strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1 
+ Square2 and going straight for the Triangle (See Figure 1.6-1d).  We found that all of the 15 
baboon subjects immediately switched to the DS when it became available and used it in 99.9% 
of trials.  Similar to Luchins’ findings, only 4 out of the 53 (i.e., 7.6%) adult human subjects used 
the DS in more than 5% of trials.  That is to say, adult humans but not baboons were affected by 
cognitive set on the LS-DS task.  
Flexible problem solving is a critical element of navigating dynamic environments; 
hence, its role in cognition has been extensively studied.  Typical cognitive flexibility measures, 
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such as Discrimination Reversal, Transfer Index, and Wisconsin Card Sorting tasks, first allow a 
subject to learn a correct solution method and then require them to abandon and replace it with 
another (Berg, 1948; Harlow, 1949; Rumbaugh, 1971).  Flexibility is then calculated as the 
degree of persistence before the new, correct solution strategy is adopted.  In these and other 
cued task-switching paradigms, in which subjects switch strategies repeatedly, pronounced 
‘switch costs’ have been noted in both children and adults (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005; Ionescu, 
2012; Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel et al., 2009; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  Switch costs are deficits 
in response time or accuracy following a strategy switch and are thought to be associated with 
disengaging with one strategy and initiating another (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Stoet & Snyder, 2007); however they are not exhibited by some nonhuman primates (Stoet & 
Snyder, 2003; however, see Huguet et al. 2014), suggesting that they may be a byproduct of 
human rule-encoding (Stoet & Snyder, 2008). 
Cognitive set tasks, like Luchins’ and the LS-DS task, differ from typical measures of 
cognitive flexibility in that subjects are not required to switch strategies.  Subjects can (and do) 
continue to use the learned strategy and it continues to be rewarded, albeit at a less efficient rate 
than if they are flexible and switch to the alternative.  We argue that this may be more 
representative of flexibility in real life, where problems commonly have multiple solutions from 
which to choose.  Since it’s debut, thousands of subjects have been tested on Luchins' task with 
various manipulations and consistently, 70-100% follow the learned rule (Luchins, 1942; 
Luchins & Luchins, 1950).  Luchins (1942; 1950) and others (McKelvie, 1984) concluded that 
within human problem solving, this propensity toward cognitive set is universal.  However, 
although attempts were made to account for subjects' age, occupation, and education, any 
potential cross-cultural differences in susceptibility to cognitive set were completely neglected.   
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Recently, numerous studies have called into question the ‘universality’ of cognitive 
processes, our understanding of which has been predominantly derived from Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) subjects’ data (Henrich et al., 2010).  These findings 
illustrate cultural differences in cognitive processing based on both visual perception (Caparos, 
Ahmed, et al., 2012; Caparos, Linnell, et al., 2012; Davidoff et al., 2008; de Fockert et al., 2011; 
de Fockert et al., 2007; Fagot, Goldstein, Davidoff, & Pickering, 2006; Ji et al., 2000; Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) and problem conceptualization 
(Abel & Hsu, 1949; Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Chiu, 1972; Clegg & Legare, 2016; Frank et al., 
2008; Ji et al., 2000; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nisbett et al., 2001). Moreover, in typical (and 
arguably less indicative) measures of cognitive flexibility such as the WCST, some cross-cultural 
differences have been found, yet have been attributed to flaws in the task itself rather than 
potential variation in cognitive processes across cultures (Avila, 2013; Coffey et al., 2005; Shan 
et al., 2008).   In fact, our own previous findings noted an effect of age on cognitive flexibility; 
specifically, children 7-10 were more likely to use the shortcut than adolescents (11-18) or adults 
(19-68) in the LS-DS task (Pope et al., 2015; however, see Chapter 3 Footnote 2), a further 
indication that cognitive set does not affect humans uniformly.  
As we have shown before, baboons, which process visual information with a local bias 
(Deruelle & Fagot, 1998) are better able to break cognitive set and use the shortcut than Western 
adults (Pope et al., 2015), who process visual information with a global bias (Navon, 1977).   
This led us to consider that differences in global versus local visual processing between humans 
and baboons might explain their divergent performance in breaking cognitive set.   Namely, 
perhaps humans’ attention to the global similarities between the LS-DS trials might have 
promoted the use of the learned rule (i.e., cognitive set) even when relevant, local details (i.e., 
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the presence of the Triangle) were present that could have lead them to the shortcut (which the 
baboons found and used immediately).  Note, this is in stark contrast to the literature purporting 
that global/local processing biases stem from holistic/analytic processing styles, that result in 
flexible/persistent problem-solving strategies, respectively (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Ji et al., 
2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, 2006; Nisbett et al., 2001).  Granted, there is limited support for 
a causal link between a global mindset and global perceptual processing (Kuhnen & Oyserman, 
2002), however the assertions regarding perceptual processing and problem-solving approach are 
largely unsupported (Davidoff et al., 2008; Peterson & Deary, 2006).  Instead, we suggested that 
a visual inability to discriminate the DS from the sequence as a whole might factor greatly into 
humans inability to utilize the shortcut.  An example of this inadvertent blindness comes from 
previous research showing that after finding a non-ideal solution, chess players reported that they 
were looking for alternatives, yet their eye movements did not stray from the one they had 
already found (Bilalić et al., 2008).  
Alternatively, differences in problem conceptualization might have driven the divergent 
susceptibilities to cognitive set between baboons and humans.  Namely, human subjects may 
have responded according to how they thought they should, based on their previous experience 
with rule-based problem solving.  Undoubtedly, rules-of-thumb and equations offer a 
tremendous advantage when solving many, similar problems.  For this reason, repetitive rule-use 
is a staple of Western education, yet the real-world applications of this problem solving approach 
might reasonably lead to cognitive inflexibility (Star & Seifert, 2006).  Alternative solutions are 
not found because they are not sought.  The LS-DS task does not instruct subjects how to 
respond, they learn through trial and error however, it is possible that previous human subjects 
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(Pope et al., 2015) did not consider the DS a viable option based on their history with repetitive 
rule-use and/or single-solution problems.   
The current study aimed to 1) test the hypothesis that cognitive set is a universal human 
trait, invariant to cultural factors and 2) determine the relative effects of perceptual and 
conceptual influences on susceptibility to cognitive set.   The seminomadic Himba of northern 
Namibia exhibit a strong local perceptual bias compared to Westerners (Davidoff et al., 2008; de 
Fockert et al., 2007). Thus, we investigated the differences in cognitive set between Westerners 
and traditional Himba using the LS-DS task (Pope et al., 2015).  If a global perceptual bias 
governed the previously tested Western humans’ susceptibility to cognitive set, then traditional 
Himba should be better able to use the shortcut than Westerners.  Yet, how could we confidently 
attribute this to their local perceptual processing, rather than broader cultural distinctions 
between traditional Himba and Westerners?  Opportunely, a subpopulation of Himba have 
moved to the small nearby town of Opuwo.  Previous research has shown that traditional Himba 
are less susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion and exhibit greater selective attention/reduced 
distractibility than both Urban Himba and British participants, who responded similarly to one 
another (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; Caparos, Linnell, et al., 2012; de Fockert et al., 2011; 
Linnell et al., 2013).  These differences in perceptual processing between Urban and Traditional 
Himba provide a natural control for external factors such as genetics, religion, language, climate, 
and education.  Thus, if perceptual processing affects shortcut-use, we predicted that urban 
Himba would respond to the LS-DS task in a similar manner as Westerners but different from 
traditional Himba.    
In consideration of the conceptual influences hypothesis, we reasoned that if subjects’ 
conceptualization of the task affects cognitive set, then releasing subjects from potentially 
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constraining presuppositions would enhance shortcut-use.  In Luchins’ task, he achieved a degree 
of success by using the prompt “Don’t be blind” (Luchins, 1942).  However, he also noted that 
some subjects interpreted this as Don’t be blind to the obvious rule.  We decided to give the 
prompt: “Don’t be afraid to try new things” halfway through the LS-DS task, predicting that 
subjects’ shortcut use would increase following the prompt.  Furthermore, any relative 
differences in the prompt’s influence on shortcut-use between Westerners, Traditional Himba, 
and Urban Himba might be indicative of the extent to which they were initially constrained by 
preexisting conceptualizations. 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Subjects   
Data were collected from 54 Western (42 females and 12 males), 54 urban Himba (34 
females and 20 males), and 75 traditional Himba subjects (34 females and 41 males).  All 
subjects were above 18 years of age; however, exact ages were not recorded because Himba do 
not keep an accurate record of their age.  All methods were approved by the Georgia State 
University Institutional Review Board prior to testing.  Western subjects were recruited from the 
pool of undergraduate students at Georgia State University by posting the study on the SONA 
Experiment Managements System, tested on the Georgia State University campus, and received 
one course credit in exchange for their participation. 
Himba subjects were recruited and tested in their villages by a hired guide after initial 
permissions were received from the village leader(s). Testing took place inside a tent or in a 
shaded area.  Himba subjects were classified as ‘Urban’ if they lived within 20km of Opuwo, the 
primary city in the Kunene region and ‘Traditional’ if they lived further than 100km from 
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Opuwo.  We only tested subjects that fell into these two categories.  The number of times each 
subject had been to a city (almost exclusively Opuwo) was recorded for all Himba subjects. 
Urban subjects received 20 Namibian Dollars and Traditional subjects received 1kg maize meal 
and 1kg sugar each. 
 
5.2.2 LS-DS Task 
 The LS-DS task was programmed with OpenSesame software (Mathot et al., 2012) and 
administered via a Lenovo Ideapad FLEX 4 (14”) 2-in-1 touchscreen laptop. All subjects 
received basic instructions on touching the fixation cross to begin each trial and which feedback 
screens/sounds indicated correct vs incorrect responses.  As part of the instructions, all subjects 
were told that they would need to touch the shapes to figure out the correct answer.  However, in 
the Himba’s language (Otjihimba) there is not a direct translation for ‘shapes.’  Thus, Himba 
subjects were shown an illustration of a square and a triangle at that point during the 
instructions.1 
A complete description of the LS-DS task can be found in (Pope et al., 2015); however, 
briefly: the task consists of three training levels and 96 experimental trials.  In Training 1, a 
demonstration shows two squares, which flash red sequentially (250ms each); the subject must 
reproduce the demonstration by selecting the two squares in the correct order.  In Training 2, the 
demonstration shows four squares total, two of which flash red sequentially (200ms each) and 
the subject reproduces the demonstration by selecting the two correct squares (now out of four 
options) in the correct order.  Training 3 is identical to Training 2 however after the subject has 
correctly selected Square1 and Square2 (which are demonstrated for 150 ms each), they must 
then select a blue triangle which appears in one of the remaining locations.   Subjects do not 
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progress to the next training level until they achieve 80% accuracy, measured after each 8 trial 
block.  After training, BASE and PROBE experimental trials are presented (Figure 1.6-1a-d).  In 
PROBE trials, the Triangle appears alongside the Square1 → Square2 demonstration and 
remains visible on the response screen.  Importantly, to be correct subjects can either continue to 
use the Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the LS) or they can simply ignore the 
demonstration and select the Triangle (i.e., the DS or shortcut).   BASE trials look identical to 
Training 3 however if subjects select the Triangle’s hidden location they are marked as having 
used the DS; thereby providing a measure of accidental DS-use within each subject.  In 
summary, subjects initially learn via the training to reproduce a two-square demonstration and 
then touch the Triangle.  Cognitive set is measured by their propensity to forego this learned 
method in order to use a more direct strategy when the Triangle is already present. 
For the current study, after the first 48 PRE trials, the task was paused and the 
experimenter issued the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt.  Subjects then completed an 
additional 48 POST trials.  PRE and POST trial lists consisted of one BASE and one PROBE 
trial for each of the possible 24 configurations; trial order was randomized.    
 
5.2.3 Data Analysis  
The percentage of accurate trials in which subjects used the DS was calculated for both 
BASE and PROBE trials. Each subject’s BASE DS-use was subtracted from PROBE DS-use to 
yield a measure of DS-use that accounts for within-subject error.  In accordance with our 
previous studies, subjects were classified as DSers if they used the DS in more than 5% of trials 
however, we also included progressively more stringent DSer qualification criteria (more than 
25%, more than 50%, and more than 75%) to gain a more complete understanding of DS-use 
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between groups.  Whenever the data violated the assumptions for parametric statistical analyses, 
we used non-parametric analyses and reported group medians rather than means. 
The switch costs associated with using the DS were also analyzed.  Recall that during 
BASE trials, subjects typically only use the LS.  Thus, for DSers who were switching between 
the DS and the LS for PROBE and BASE trials respectively, we expected to see switch costs.  
We isolated the time between the end of the Square1→Square2 demonstration and subjects’ first 
response (RT1) for BASE trials in which subjects repeated (BASE stay) or switched (BASE 
switch) their strategy and for PROBE trials in which subjects repeated (PROBE stay) or switched 
(PROBE switch) their strategy.  All trials that were precluded by an incorrect trial and those in 
which the first response was incorrect were excluded.  Finally, we applied a natural log 
transform to normalize the data.  Because some subjects did not ever use the DS, and thus did not 
switch, we analyzed only those who had used the DS in more than 50% of PRE (n=40) and 
POST (n=50) trials.  Group (Western, Urban, Traditional) did not significantly impact any of the 
analyses. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 DS-Use 
In accordance with our previous studies, subjects were classified as DSers if they used 
the DS in more than 5% of trials.  A Pearson’s chi-square revealed that, in PRE trials, a 
significantly smaller proportion of Westerners were classified as DSers (5.6%; n = 3) than either 
Urban (42.6%; n =23) or Traditional (34.7%; n = 26) Himba participants [χ2(2, N = 183) = 20.65, 
p < .001], whose proportions did not differ from each other (Figure 2).  
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5.3.2 Conceptual Influences on Cognitive Set 
In POST trials, after subjects were told: “Don’t be afraid to try new things,” a Pearson’s 
chi-square analysis revealed that the proportion of DSers significantly increased for Westerners 
(50.0%; n = 27), significantly decreased for Urban Himba (27.8%; n = 15) and did not change 
for Traditional Himba [36.0%; n = 27; χ2(2, N = 183) = 38.989, p <.001].  In other words, the 
prompt effectively increased DS-use for Western, but not Himba, participants (Figure 5.3-1).   
 
 
Figure 5.1 The proportion of DSers within each group for before (PRE) and after (POST) 
receiving the prompt. ** p < .001. 
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5.3.3 Immediacy and Consistency of DS-use 
Significantly more Traditional (25.3%) and Urban (27.8%) Himba used the DS the very 
first time it was available (i.e.,, in PRE trials) compared with Westerners [3.7%; χ2(2, N = 183) = 
12.48, p = .002].  However, following the prompt (i.e., in POST trials), Westerners (24.1%) used 
the first available shortcut as much as Urban (20.4%) or Traditional (33.3%) Himba [χ2(2, N = 
183) = 2.976, p = .226].  We next investigated whether any subjects used the DS in every single 
trial.  In PRE trials, 3.7% of Westerners, 3.7% of Urban, and 9.7% of Traditional Himba used the 
DS every single time it was available and, in POST trials, those numbers increased slightly to 
5.6% of Westerners, 5.6% of Urban, and 18.7% of Traditional Himba.  Notably, of the three 
Westerners classified as DSers in PRE trials, two of them used the DS in every trial that it was 
available and the third used it in 95.3% of trials, illustrating a stark contrast between them and 
Western LSers. 
We decided to expand our understanding of the consistency of DS-use across groups by 
applying progressively more stringent DSer classification requirements: DS was used in more 
than 25%, more than 50%, and more than 75% of trials (Table 5.3-1).  For PRE trials, as with the 
5% classification criterion, there were significantly fewer Western DSers than Traditional or 
Urban Himba DSers when the criterion was set to more than 25% of trials [χ2(2, N = 183) = 
14.57, p = .001], and more than 50% of trials [χ2(2, N = 183) = 13.07, p = .001].  When the 
criterion was set to more than 75% of trials, there were significantly more Traditional Himba 
DSers than Western DSers, but Urban Himba did not significantly differ from either group [χ2(2, 
N = 183) = 9.099, p = .011].  In POST trials, DSer proportions did not significantly differ 
between groups for any of the DSer classification criteria.  
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Table 5.1 Proportion of each group that used the DS in greater than 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% of trials.  
Sub-groups based on the number of city visits are included for Traditional Himba.  Superscripts denote statistically 
distinguishable groupings. 
PRE  >5%  >25%  >50%  >75% 
Traditional 34.7a  33.3a  32.0a  25.3a 
      0-1 visits 39.0a  36.6a  34.1a  26.8a  
      2+ visits 29.4a  29.4a  29.4a  23.5a,b 
Urban  42.6a  29.6a  24.1a  14.8a,b 
Western 5.6b  5.6b  5.6b  5.6b 
POST      
Traditional 36.0a  32.0a  30.7a  26.7a 
      0-1 visits 41.5a  36.6a  36.6a  29.3a 
      2+ visits  29.4a  26.5a  23.5a  23.5a 
Urban  27.8a  22.2a  20.4a  20.4a 
Western 50.0a  42.6a  29.6a  20.4a 
 
 
5.3.4 Influence of Urban Exposure 
In Caparos et al.’s assessment of the differences between Westerners and Urban and 
Traditional Himba’s perceptual processing, they noted that Traditional Himba that had visited 
the city fewer times within their lifetimes categorized more figures based on local, rather than 
global, features (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012); thereby suggesting that that exposure to an urban 
environment corresponds to lasting changes in perceptual processing, biasing global rather than 
local features.  To explore how urban exposure might have impacted our assessment of LS-DS 
performance, we re-grouped the Traditional Himba into those that had visited the city either one 
or fewer (N = 41; M = 0.24; SD = 0.43) or two or more times (N = 34; 16 participants reported 
“many” instead of an exact number, but for the other 18 Traditional Himba subjects, M = 3.06; 
SD = 1.70).  In PRE trials, for the more than 5% DSer classification criterion, a Pearson’s chi 
square analysis again revealed that the proportion of DSers within the Western group was 
significantly less than the Himba groups’ [χ2(3, N = 183) = 21.49, p <.001; Western = 5.6%, 
Urban = 42.6%, Traditional 0-1 = 39.0%, and Traditional 2+ = 29.4%]; however, there was no 
difference in the proportion of DSers between Himba based on location (Urban vs Traditional) or 
120 
the number of urban exposures (Table 5.3-1).  This finding was preserved for the more than 25% 
and more than 50% DSer classification criteria.  However, for the more than 75% DSer 
classification criterion, only Traditional Himba that had been to the city 0 or 1 times were 
statistically distinct [χ2(3, N = 183) = 9.25, p = .026] from Westerners, and both Traditional 
Himba that had been to the city 2+ times and Urban Himba displayed intermediate DS-use (i.e.,, 
the proportions of DSers within these groups did not differ significantly from either of the other 
groups or each other).  Like before, in POST trials, DSer proportions did not differ significantly 
between groups for any of the DSer classification criteria.   
 
5.3.5 Effect of Training 
As noted previously, Western participants were more likely to successfully complete the 
training than Himba, who often took much longer to reach criterion.  A Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
of variance confirmed that Westerners differed from Urban and Traditional Himba (which did 
not differ from each other) in the total number of training trials needed before graduating to the 
experiment [H(2) = 63.48, p < .001; Mean trials (SD): Western = 39.0 (33.44), Urban = 73.2 
(40.12), Traditional = 86.2 (44.98)].  To assess whether increased training affected strategy-use, 
we used Logistic Regressions to analyze the effects of group (Western, Urban, Traditional) and # 
of training trials on DSer classification.  As noted before, group significantly corresponded to 
DSer classification, correctly predicting 71.6% of cases.  However, there were no significant 
effects of training (for any level) on DSer classification.2 
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5.3.6 Effects of Shortcut-Use on Performance 
To explore the impact of strategy on accuracy, subjects’ PROBE trial accuracies were 
compared using a Mann-Whitney U test, which indicated that for PRE trials, DSers (Mdn = 
91.7%) had significantly higher (U = 4,187, p = .015) accuracy scores than LSers (Mdn = 
83.3%).  This was also true for POST trials, DSers (Mdn = 95.8%) had higher accuracy than 
LSers (Mdn = 83.3%; U = 6,202, p <.001).  Next, to investigate the impact of strategy on 
efficiency, we compared subjects’ average trial times for DS and LS responses in PROBE trials.   
A natural logarithm transform was applied to normalize the data.  A paired samples T-test 
revealed that trial times were significantly faster when subjects used the DS (M = 1655.1 ms; SD 
= 1194.0) than when they used the LS (M = 2543.6; SD = 1459.0), validating the enhanced 
efficiency of the DS; t(84)=8.13, p <.001. 
 
5.3.7 Switch Costs 
We also identified the switch costs for subjects who utilized both DS and LS solutions.  
For PRE DSers, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant (F(1,39) = 5.566, p =.023) 
interaction between condition (BASE vs PROBE) and trial type (stay vs switch) on subjects’ 
RT1s.  PROBE stay RT1s (M = 1188.6 ms; SD = 540.2) were significantly faster than PROBE 
switch (M = 1373.4 ms; SD = 816.3), which were faster than both BASE stay (M = 1686.0 ms; 
SD = 961.1) and BASE switch (M = 1587.5 ms; SD =637.1) RT1s, which did not differ from 
each other.  Thus, although DS responses were faster than LS responses, DSers experienced 
switch costs during their LS-to-DS strategy switch.    
For POST trials, again, we found a significant [F(1,49) = 4.56, p = .038] interaction 
between condition (BASE vs PROBE) and trial type (stay vs switch).  Again, PROBE stay RT1s 
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(M = 850.2 ms; SD = 472.3) were significantly faster than PROBE switch (M = 960.7 ms; SD = 
495.3) RT1s, which were faster than both BASE stay (M = 1233.9 ms; SD = 543.6) and BASE 
switch (M = 1261.2 ms; SD =532.8) RT1s, which did not differ from each other.  Thus, the DS 
was, in fact, the more efficient strategy, even in the face of switch costs associated with going 
between LS and DS responses for BASE and PROBE trials, respectively.   
Lastly, we assessed LSers’ RT1s for BASE and PROBE trials.   For PRE trials, BASE 
RT1s (M = 1152.2 ms, SD = 535.1) were significantly faster than PROBE RT1s (M = 1297.7 ms, 
SD = 600.7; t(142)=-10.95, p <.001).  This was also found for POST trials (BASE M = 1148.9 
ms, SD = 440.1; PROBE M = 1202.6 ms, SD = 542.5; t(132)=-2.19, p <.031) suggesting that the 
presence of the Triangle in PROBE trials may have been distracting.  
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Figure 5.2 Mean BASE and PROBE same and switch trials’ RT1s for subjects who used 
the DS in greater than 50% of trials. * < .05.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
The ability to break away from a learned rule and use a shortcut was enhanced in Urban 
and Traditional Himba compared to Westerners, providing the first evidence that cognitive set is 
not a universal human trait. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that differences in global 
vs local perceptual processing affect susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task, based on 
the previously observed differences between Urban and Traditional Himba’s perceptual 
processing (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012) and their predominantly indistinguishable strategy 
selection on the LS-DS task.  Our efforts to promote shortcut-use, by issuing the “Don’t be afraid 
124 
to try new things” prompt, successfully increased the proportion of Western DSers to levels 
equivalent with the Himba.  These findings support the hypothesis that cognitive set is 
influenced by participants’ conceptualization of the problem.  That being said, a large proportion 
of Westerners (50%; n = 27), Urban (72.2%; n = 39), and Traditional (64%; n = 48) Himba 
participants were still affected by cognitive set in POST trials: they did not adopt the shortcut 
even after the prompt.  We discuss this persistence of cognitive set and propose potential causes, 
repercussions, and solutions.  
The Himba’s enhanced DS-use provides a clear contrast to Westerner’s firm LS-use, 
allowing us to glimpse potentially causative environmental factors which might be limiting 
problem solving flexibility in Westerners.  These two culturally distant groups differ in many 
ways, including social structure, physical environment, language, and educational background.  
Although, some of these factors have qualities more likely to influence cognitive flexibility than 
others.   
First, a consequential impact of social structure on shortcut-use seems unlikely when one 
considers that male and female Himba play vastly different social roles, yet we found no sex-
differences in LS vs DS strategy selection (see supplementary data in Appendix B).  Further, the 
social structure hypothesis predicts that interdependent (such as the Himba) more than 
independent peoples (such as Westerners) should utilize more holistic response styles (i.e., 
consider the sequence as a whole (Nisbett et al., 2001); however, we found the opposite.  
Compared to Westerners, the Himba were better able to extract the Triangle from the larger LS 
sequence.   
Second, the possibility that physical environment or visual clutter might play a role in 
susceptibility to cognitive flexibility also seems unlikely, given that we found very little evidence 
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that urban exposure biased individuals’ response strategy, as would be predicted by the visual 
clutter hypothesis. Traditional Himba that had been to the city two or more times and Urban 
Himba did exhibit intermediate DS-use but only when the criterion was set to more than 75% of 
trials.  This is indicative of a potential association between urban exposure and the consistency 
with which subjects evoked the shortcut, rather than their propensity to break cognitive set in the 
first place.3 
Third, language, or verbal encoding, is considered vital to rule-based problem solving 
(Stoet & Snyder, 2008).  Without a word for ‘shapes’ the Himba may have been less equipped to 
verbally encode the LS, resulting in it imposing relatively weaker constraints on problem solving 
compared to Westerners.  This could also explain the comparatively lower number of Himba 
participants who passed the training levels.  We suggest that weaker verbal encoding would be a 
more viable explanation if all of the Himba subjects were less susceptible to cognitive set, given 
that all of the Himba were monolingual in Otjiherero.  Yet, there were fewer DSers than LSers, 
even in Himba subjects.  Further, our finding that Himba and Westerners were equally affected 
by switch costs suggests that the rule is similarly encoded in both populations. That said, the 
possibility that the strength with which the initial habit is codified could influence shortcut-use 
should be explored in future studies. 
Consequently, we are left to focus on the putative impact of educational background (i.e., 
problem solving history) on cognitive set.  Luchins’ discussed the potentially set-inducing 
instructional methods typical of Western education in his initial description of cognitive set 
(Luchins, 1942).  He asserted that, “Methods are needed which will teach the child to stand on 
his own feet, to face the world freely and act through intelligent thinking rather than by blind 
force of habit” (p. 93).  We posit that the blind repetition characteristic of Western education 
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deters subjects from interpreting the DS as a viable solution.  They may never even consider that 
the problem could have multiple solutions, until explicitly told, “Don’t be afraid to try new 
things” which clearly states the possibility of multiple solutions.   
In support of this, following the prompt, 24.1% of Westerners (compared to 3.7% before) 
used the shortcut the very first time it was available.  Additionally, we noted that Urban Himba’s 
shortcut use significantly decreased following the prompt, however considering that in PRE 
trials Urban Himba showed the largest degree of shortcut-use, this might be interpreted as 
adherence to the prompt’s suggestion to try new things.  We argue that, because the prompt did 
not elicit enhanced shortcut use in either Urban or Traditional Himba, they may have already 
been operating without a single-solution assumption.  Instruction has been found to induce set in 
other paradigms (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005) and this susceptibility may even vary across 
cultures (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Clegg & Legare, 2016; Legare & Nielsen, 2015).  A small 
caveat to this interpretation is necessary: although the vast majority of Himba do not partake in 
formal education, a very small portion of both Urban and Traditional Himba attend or have 
briefly attended small schools.  We estimate that very few (<10%) of our subjects had been 
exposed to schooling and posit that any potential influence would have served to suppress DS-
use, not enhance it.4 Nevertheless, future studies directly aimed at addressing the impact of 
educational background and literacy on cognitive flexibility, especially in remote cultures, would 
be sapient.   
In this study we confidently reject the universality of cognitive set by demonstrating a 
remote culture’s enhanced ability to break away from a set strategy to adopt a more efficient 
alternative.  We effectively promoted shorctut-use in a population previously bound to a learned 
rule by altering their conceptual understanding of the task.  Lastly, we proposed that educational 
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background might contribute to the observed cross-cultural differences in cognitive set.  Simply 
put, we may be mechanizing ourselves by approaching multivalent problems with single-strategy 
solutions.   
As with any cognitive process, cognitive set is likely mediated by multiple influences.  
This should certainly be taken into consideration when studying cognitive processes, not only to 
avoid erroneous predictions but also in an effort to understand why certain differences arise. 
What exactly allows some participants but not others to readily switch to the shortcut remains 
opaque but could be vital to enabling the rest of us to intentionally utilize both persistence and 
flexibility in problem solving.  As a final consideration, we highlight the large proportion of 
LSers even during each group’s peak DS-use (Westerners POST: 50.0% LSers; Urban PRE: 
57.4% LSers; Traditional PRE: 64.0% LSers).  What drives this partial, yet pervasive, propensity 
for cognitive set in all groups?  We suggest that the relative trade-offs between exploring 
alternative strategies and exploiting familiar ones may serve to equilibrate response styles in the 
absence of external biases (Ionescu, 2017).  Exploring alternatives can be advantageous when a 
more efficient reward is discovered but it can also be risky by consuming time and resources 
especially when the outcome is unknown (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Hommel & Colzato, 2017).  
Thus, a balance between flexible and persistent response-styles is likely beneficial, an assertion 
that makes Westerners’ proclivity for rule-based problem solving a worrying prospect.  Future 
endeavors might explore other populations’ relative propensities toward cognitive set in an effort 
to understand the balance between flexible and persistent strategy-use across humans, especially 
over multiple contexts. 
This is the first study to explore cross-cultural differences in cognitive set.  Many 
psychological pursuits have made conclusions based on Western participants’ responses and as 
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the spread of Western culture begins to reach even remote cultures such as the Himba (Caparos, 
Ahmed, et al., 2012), a process that may eventually render this type of research impossible, we 
argue that strengthening the current efforts toward understanding cross-cultural cognition is 
invaluable. 
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Footnotes: 
1 Many Himba exhibited great difficulty reproducing the Square1 → Square2 sequence in 
Training levels 1, 2 & 3 than Westerners.  Thus, immediately following the initial instructions 
they were prompted to show the experimenter “Which came first?” then “Which came second?”  
Even with this extra instruction, a large portion of both Urban (55.7%) and Traditional (57.0%) 
Himba that began the LS-DS task did not pass the Training levels (compared to 10% of 
Westerners).  We posit that this difficulty might be due to their lack of corrective eyewear and/or 
the speed of the demonstrations (Min = 150ms).  Alternative explanations and potential 
implications are discussed; however, we reasoned that if increased instruction affected subjects’ 
responses, it would only serve to concretize the LS (Crooks & McNeil, 2009).  
2 The main effect of including Training 3, although not significant [χ2(1, N = 183) = 3.82, 
p = .051], increased the predictive power of the model to 75.4% of cases.  Subjects with more 
Training 3 trials tended to be classified as DSers.  This could be interpreted as indicating that the 
Himba’s increased experience with the Triangle could have contributed to their enhanced ability 
to use the shortcut.  However, none of the 3 Western DSers, had abnormally increased 
experience with Training 3 (mean number of Training 3 trials for Westerners = 8.47), illustrating 
that although differences in rule familiarity could conceivably influence susceptibility to 
cognitive set, a causative role is unsupported.  
3 We also considered that working memory availability might influence shortcut use.  In 
fact, Beilock and DeCaro found that, under stress, humans with less working memory 
availability were more likely to use the shortcut in Luchins’ task than subjects with more 
working memory (Beilock & Decaro, 2007).  In the LS-DS task, the LS requires the subject to 
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recall the demonstration before selecting the Triangle.  Thus, lower working memory availability 
might result in 1) an increased number of training trials before the accuracy criterion is reached 
and 2) increased use of the DS, which does not require any working memory.  Yet previous 
research has shown increased working memory availability in Urban compared with Traditional 
Himba (Linnell et al., 2013).  Thus, if working memory played a causative role in the Himba’s 
difficulty during the training we might have expected to see group differences in the number of 
training trials between Urban and Traditional Himba, but we did not. 
4 Although it has been suggested that exposure to reading/writing could promote global 
processing biases (Davidoff et al., 2008; Dukette & Stiles, 2001), Caparos et al. (2012) found 
that excluding Urban Himba who had been to school did not alter their results, Urban Himba and 
British subjects still exhibited a similarly global perceptual bias compared with Traditional 
Himbas’ more local bias.  
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This research describes differences in susceptibility to cognitive set between primate 
species and across human cultures.  Chapter 2 illustrates baboons’ nearly exhaustive use of the 
shortcut and humans’ considerable preference for the learned strategy.  Chapter 3 depicts 
intermediate shortcut-use in chimpanzees and provides a comparative analysis of cognitive set on 
the LS-DS task across primate species.  Chapter 4 showed that although human subjects saw the 
shortcut, they did not use it until their conceptualization of the problem constraints were altered.  
Chapter 5 found that shortcut-use varied across human cultures and presented further evidence 
that problem conceptualization, rather than visual perception, influences susceptibility to 
cognitive set in humans. 
 
6.2 Species Differences in Shortcut-Use 
Baboons and chimpanzees, but only a minority of humans, used the Triangle when it was 
available as a shortcut (the DS).  Furthermore, chimpanzees were the only species to consistently 
utilize a partial shortcut, characterized by selecting the first Square(1) but then skipping 
Square(2) and selecting the Triangle (the SS).  In the Introduction, I discussed primate behavioral 
flexibility across a range of tasks; however, here I will focus on the LS-DS task and the potential 
factors that might have contributed to the observed species’ differences in shortcut-use.  Keep in 
mind that, in the LS-DS task, the Triangle is highly salient (in PROBE trials), familiar, and has 
an impeccable reward history.  By design, the task promotes the use of the shortcut.  Thus, it is 
not as much surprising when the shortcut is used, as when it is not used. 
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6.2.1 The Frontal Cortex, Cognitive Flexibility, and Language 
First, I will briefly discuss how the likely cortical underpinnings of cognitive set in 
primates might interact with strategy encoding.  There is much evidence that regions of the 
frontal cortex mediate cognitive flexibility in primates (Brass & Von Cramon, 2002; Bunge et 
al., 2005; Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Chrysikou et al., 2013; Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013; Hyafil, 
Summerfield, & Koechlin, 2009; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Qiu et al., 2010; Roberts, 2008; 
Rygula, Walker, Clarke, Robbins, & Roberts, 2010; Sakai, 2008; Zelazo, 2008); note, these are 
by no means the only regions involved in flexible problem solving (Holmes & Cohen, 2014; 
Miller & Buschman, 2008; Stoet & Snyder, 2004).  Within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in 
particular, sensory information from the environment is integrated with previous experience, 
allowing a contextually appropriate response to be selected and relayed to motor areas, where the 
behavior is produced (Bunge & Wallis, 2008; Hoshi, 2008; Miller & Buschman, 2008; Petrides, 
2008).  
Importantly, the PFC has undergone extensive evolutionary changes within the primate 
lineage.  Evidence suggests that the human neocortex is significantly larger and more convoluted 
than expected for our brain size and exhibits a disproportionate increase in white matter 
composition compared to other primates’ (Rilling & Insel, 1999; Schoenemann, Sheehan, & 
Glotzer, 2005).  In fact, although some studies suggest that relative brain size (calculated from 
brain to body size ratio) is similar across apes and humans (Semendeferi, Lu, Schenker, & 
Damasio, 2002), a recent investigation provided strong evidence for non-allometric expansions 
of the prefrontal cortex in apes and humans (Smaers, Gomez-Robles, Parks, & Sherwood, 2017).  
Furthermore, lateralization of neuroanatomical features within the PFC have been observed 
133 
between monkeys, apes, and humans, which, along with cortical expansion, has been suggested 
to underlie species differences in cognition (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Hopkins, 
Misiura, Pope, & Latash, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Sakai, 2008; Schenker et al., 2010; Schoenemann 
et al., 2005; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).   
Of particular note, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) has been found to be 
associated with various types of strategy/rule use in primates (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & von 
Cramon, 2005; Bunge, 2004; Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Bunge & Zelazo, 
2006; Christoff & Keramatian, 2008; Crone et al., 2006; Miller & Buschman, 2008; Petrides, 
2008; Roberts, 2008; Rushworth et al., 2008; Rygula et al., 2010). Additionally, in humans, the 
left VLPFC also houses Broca’s area (Badre & Wagner, 2007), which has long been known to be 
involved in language (Broca, 1861).  This co-localization of rule-encoding and language within 
the VLPFC have led some to consider that humans’ apparently advanced use of abstractions may 
have developed from an enhanced ability to verbally encode rules (Sakai, 2008).   
Although not necessarily a function of neuroanatomical proximity, rule encoding and 
verbal processing are closely linked in humans (Bahlmann, Schubotz, Mueller, Koester, & 
Friederici, 2009; Davidoff & Fagot, 2010; Ellis & Reingold, 2014; Jacques, 2001; Sakai, 2008; 
Zelazo, 2008).  In fact, VLPFC activity diminishes after a rule is learned (Della-Maggiore & 
McIntosh, 2005; Toni, Rowe, Klass, & Passingham, 2002) and, in humans, disrupting inner 
speech leads to significantly longer switch costs (Emerson & Miyake, 2003).  Thus, species that 
do not verbally encode strategies may be at a disadvantage when learning problem solving rules, 
especially as prescribed solutions become more complex or abstract.  Indeed, I propose that 
differences in rule-encoding processes contribute to cognitive set by mediating how easily a rule 
is learned and how readily it can be replaced.   
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6.2.2 Species Differences in Rule Encoding 
6.2.2.1 Sequential Processing 
The LS is a three-step sequence, which requires subjects to identify which Square (1) 
came first, which Square (2) came second, and then select the Triangle.  The ability to separate 
the Triangle from this sequence is paramount to using it as a solution by itself (i.e., the shortcut).  
Thus, presumably, cross-species variation in sequential processing could influence cognitive set.  
Specifically, processing each step of the LS sequence as an individual component [ie. (Square1) 
+ (Square2) + (Triangle)] or even just processing the Triangle as separable from the Squares 
[(Square1 + Square2) + (Triangle)] might allow subjects to more readily identify the shortcut 
(Triangle).  Conversely, processing the LS sequence as a whole construct [ie. (Square1 + 
Square2 + Triangle)] might render the DS more difficult to disentangle.  
There are numerous similarities between humans’ and nonhuman primates’ abilities to 
process sequences (reviewed in Conway & Christiansen, 2001); however, important differences 
have also been reported.  First, humans seem better able to conceptualize hierarchical sequences 
(Conway & Christiansen, 2001; Gobet et al., 2001) and, in contrast with baboons, are better able 
to recall structured sequences (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011).  Second, there is evidence to suggest 
that old world monkeys might solve sequential problems by identifying and selecting each step 
individually, but humans and chimpanzees appeared to identify the entire sequence before 
reproducing it (Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Ohshiba, 1997).  Yet, other reports suggest that both 
monkeys and chimpanzees are affected by a sequence in its entirety (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot & 
De Lillo, 2011).   
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There do appear to be species differences in sequential processing (Conway & 
Christiansen, 2001; Ghirlanda et al., 2017); however, if and to what extent these interact with the 
observed species differences in cognitive set on the LS-DS task is not clear.  Future endeavors 
would benefit from comparing primate species’ abilities to learn and replace a non-sequential 
learned strategy. 
 
6.2.2.2 Rule Representations 
Compared to humans, nonhuman primates require extensive training to acquire abstract 
strategies (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Pope et al., 2015; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).  
Likewise, in the present research, the amount of training that was required to learn the LS 
differed dramatically between nonhuman primates and humans.  From the data in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, the minimum number of training trials required for baboons and chimpanzees were 
5,043 (Max = 20,060) and 2,784 (Max = 36,966), respectively; yet, 25 out of the 53 adult humans 
only conducted the minimum number of training trials: 24 (Max = 152).  When analyzed, it was 
revealed that baboons’ and chimpanzees’ errors during training stemmed, not from inattention to 
the demonstration or from blindly reselecting recently correct squares, but from committing 
‘reversal’ type errors, in which the correct order of Square1 and Square2 was misjudged 
(Chapter 3.3.1).   
It is not unreasonable to suggest that humans adopted the LS more quickly due to their 
ability to verbally encode the LS.  In fact, in humans, words are remembered more easily than 
nonwords but nonwords are more readily deconstructed (Ellis & Reingold, 2014).  Thus, verbally 
identifying the rule may allow humans to remember and access abstract strategies more readily 
than other primates (Fagot et al., 1998; Ghirlanda et al., 2017).  Indeed, perhaps baboons’ and 
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chimpanzees’ inability to verbally encode the LS might have made it more difficult to learn 
initially but subsequently easier to replace.   
 
6.2.2.3 Switching Strategies 
Humans (Chapter 5), but not chimpanzees and baboons (Chapter 3), exhibited switch 
costs on the LS-DS task.  In monkeys, distinct neuronal populations underlie different abstract 
rules within the PFC (Genovesio et al., 2005) and similarly, in humans, the location of rule-
encoding activity in the PFC varies by region depending on which rule is being used (Sakai & 
Passingham, 2003).  Likely, human rule-use includes, not only the distinct neuronal populations 
encoding strategies’ dynamics, but also a verbal description of the rule, at least to some extent.  
Switching strategies might take more time for humans (resulting in switch costs) because their 
current strategy is verbally represented (Emerson & Miyake, 2003).  If, for humans, strategy 
descriptions (e.g., ‘choose the blue objects’ or ‘choose objects shaped like a boat’) accompany 
each rule, then switching might require inhibiting and accessing a greater number of associated 
components of the old and new strategies, respectively.  That said, given chimpanzees’, but not 
baboons’, use of the SS, it seems unlikely that they represent rules in exactly the same way.  
Even in simple discrimination reversal tasks, apes tended to catch on to the new rule faster than 
monkeys, indicating that their grasp of abstract contingencies may be better (Rumbaugh, 1971).  
 
6.2.3 Summary 
In summary, this research found that humans, but not nonhuman primates were affected 
by cognitive set on the LS-DS task.  I posit that these species differences stem from differences 
in rule encoding processes, which may ultimately derive from differences in linguistic processing 
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and/or underlying neural architecture.  Indeed, the cortical machinery associated with abstract 
problem solving is certainly expanded in humans compared to apes, as well as in apes compared 
to monkeys (Rosati, 2017; Semendeferi et al., 2002) and this might go far to explain the 
observed species differences in susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task. 
 
6.3 Human Variation in Shortcut-Use 
Humans demonstrated substantial inter-individual differences in shortcut-use on the LS-
DS task.  In Chapter 2, we noted an age effect on shortcut-use.  In Chapter 4, we found that 
conceptual but not perceptual influences seemed to impact humans’ shortcut-use.  And in 
Chapter 5, we discovered differences in shortcut-use across human cultures.  Thus, clearly, there 
are factors that influence individuals’ propensity toward cognitive set on the LS-DS task.   
 
6.3.1 Developmental 
The current research noted that children utilized the DS in PROBE trials significantly 
more often than adolescents or adults (Chapter 2; Pope et al., 2015).  However, reanalysis using 
the ‘true’ measure of DS-use, in which BASE DS-use is subtracted from PROBE DS-use, this 
trend (children = 18.5% DSers, adolescents = 4% DSers, and adults = 9.6% DSers) was no 
longer significant (See Chapter 3 Footnote 2), suggesting that erroneous DS-use may have been 
driving the age-effects.  It is also possible that this trend was driven by the younger children (3 of 
the 5 ‘true’ DSers within the 7-10 age group were 7 years old) and that children under 7 years 
old might be even better able to utilize the DS; however, further investigation is required. 
Despite somewhat mixed findings regarding human development and cognitive 
flexibility, it has been posited that a juvenile period of plasticity may be favorable (even selected 
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for) because it might encourage, or simply allow, a chance for more exploratory learning 
(Gopnik et al., 2015; Griffin, 2016; Ionescu, 2017; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009).  In fact, 
Ionescu (2017) posited that when learning a behavioral strategy, humans engage in an initial 
exploratory period, followed by a period of stability, followed by another period of flexibility.  It 
is plausible that this so-called ‘variability-stability-flexibility’ pattern underlies human 
differences, even beyond developmental differences, in one’s propensity to adopt the shortcut on 
the LS-DS task. 
 
6.3.2 Working memory 
In Chapter 2, we suggested that working memory availability might influence 
susceptibility to cognitive set.  Specifically, we posited that baboons’ and children’s enhanced 
propensities to use the shortcut might stem from their limited working memory availability 
compared to adults (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Miles et al., 1996; Thomason et al., 2009), such that 
the LS is inherently more difficult (as it requires remembering the locations of Square1 and 
Square2) making the DS more attractive by comparison (see Beilock & Decaro, 2007).  
However, the data from Chapter 5 do not support this contention; although Traditional and 
Urban Himba differ in their working memory capacities (Linnell et al., 2013), we did not find a 
consistent difference in their DS-use.  Furthermore, preliminary findings from a modified LS-DS 
task hint that, when the LS working memory requirements are alleviated, humans may actually 
utilize the DS more, while capuchins and rhesus macaques exhibit DS-use similar to that of 
baboons (Watzek & Pope, Unpublished).  Thus, although certainly not concrete, the available 
data do not suggest that higher working memory availability – in and of itself – promotes 
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inflexibility on the LS-DS task.  However, future investigations might also consider increasing 
cognitive load during testing to examine this possibility further. 
 
6.3.3 The Influence of Problem Conceptualization on Cognitive Set 
Chapters 4 and 5 made use of interventions, midway through testing, aimed at altering 
subjects’ conceptualization of the problem.  In Chapter 4, we showed half the participants a 
video that demonstrated the DS (Min = 8 times) and in Chapter 5, we told them “Don’t be afraid 
to try new things.”  Increased shortcut-use was observed following both manipulations, 
indicating that understanding that the shortcut was a viable strategy, effectively enabled subjects 
to use it.  This is not surprising.  Essentially, Chapter 4 taught subjects how to use the shortcut 
and Chapter 5 clearly implies the possibility of multiple solutions.  However we observed two 
outcomes that were unexpected. 
  First, after viewing the DS demonstration (Chapter 4), five times as many subjects were 
classified as DSers; however 31% still did not use the shortcut.  Simply put, a subset of subjects 
watched a video that showed the task being solved via the shortcut – and still did not use it, 
thereby demonstrating the strength of set in some individuals.  Seemingly, subjects were so 
convinced that they had already identified the solution, they did not bother attending to the 
demonstration.  This is frighteningly reminiscent of confirmation bias, wherein incoming 
information is inadvertently modulated to fit preconceived conceptions (Bilalić et al., 2008; Doll, 
Hutchison, & Frank, 2011).  Indeed, this lack of exploratory behavior goes far towards 
explaining why certain subjects are able to break cognitive set.   
The second unexpected finding is reported in Chapter 5.  Following the “don’t be afraid 
to try new things” prompt, nearly nine times more Westerners used the shortcut; yet, Himba 
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participants’ shortcut-use did not increase.  One possibility is that something was lost in the 
translation of the prompt.  However, this is unlikely given that Urban Himba’s DS-use 
significantly decreased in POST trials.  It seems that, because many Himba were already using 
the shortcut, adhering to the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt meant Use a different 
strategy, resulting in decreased DS-use.  Furthermore, we observed a similar response in Chapter 
4 when, after Control subjects viewed the video demonstration of the LS, the number of DSers 
dropped from 13.8% to 6.9%.  Similarly, it appears as if they were conforming to the 
demonstration, or what they thought they should do.  
 
6.3.4 Summary 
Humans’ were better able to break away from their cognitive set when their conceptual 
understanding of the task changed.  However, in some cases, not even a demonstration of the DS 
was able to alter subjects’ conceptualization of the LS as the solution.  I suggest that cognitive 
set is, to some extent, a byproduct of codified rule-use such that strategic representations, once 
formed, might be difficult to replace.  That said, there is substantial inter-individual variability in 
both initial susceptibility to cognitive set and the propensity to break it in humans. 
 
6.4 Broader Implications 
Altering subjects’ conceptualization of the problem effectively alters their ability to break 
cognitive set; however, what pre-existing conceptualizations might allow some subjects to be 
less affected by cognitive set to begin with is unclear.  The following sections present several 
speculative hypotheses on this topic, as well as thoughts for future directions. 
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6.4.1 Cultural Influences 
Throughout this research, remarkably few Western subjects were classified as DSers, 
prior to intervention (See Table 6.3-1).  However, in stark contrast, 38% of the remote Himba 
adults adopted the shortcut within their first 48 trials.  As Chapters 4 and 5 showed, perceptual 
influences do not appear to impact shortcut-use on the LS-DS.  Thus, I will not discuss the 
known cultural differences in perceptual processing.  Instead, I will focus on cultural differences 
that might impact problem conceptualization. 
 
Table 6.1 The proportions of human populations classified as DSers.  
   Nationality  N   %DSers 
Chapter 2/3:   American  53  7.5% 
          Pilot:  French   14  7.1% 
   Chapter 4:  American  58  13.8% 
   Chapter 5:  American  54  5.6% 
   Namibian  129  38.0% 
 
Westerners and Himba participants differ in many ways, including social structure, 
physical environment, language, and educational background.  Here, we will focus on the 
potential influence of language and educational background.  Note that, although group 
differences in genetic predispositions biasing problem-solving approach toward either 
persistence or flexibility are certainly possible (Hommel & Colzato, 2017), I find this an unlikely 
explanation given the extremely diverse population of Western students sampled: out of 904 
students active on Georgia State University’s SONA system (as of November 2nd, 2017), 17% 
identify as Asian, 50% identify as Black/African American, 23% identify as White/Caucasian, 
and 10% identified as more than one race. 
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6.4.2 The Impact of Language on Cognitive Set 
As discussed briefly in Section 6.2.1, for humans, language provides the scaffolding upon 
which abstract constructs are compiled into problem-solving strategies (Emerson & Miyake, 
2003; Lipton & Eichenbaum, 2008).  Humans are capable of performing novel actions, even a 
complex series of actions, in the complete absence of demonstration and without resorting to trial 
and error, simply by following a set of verbal or written instructions (reviewed by Stoet & 
Snyder, 2008).  This cognitive hack allows a large number of people to benefit from the 
knowledge of a few (e.g., textbooks).  However, the close association between language and rule 
use means that differences in linguistic encoding might easily interact with strategy-use (Jacques, 
2001).   
Recall the assertion that the observed differences in susceptibility to cognitive set across 
primate species might stem from differences in rule-encoding, potentially underlain by the ability 
to verbally encode abstract rules (discussed in Section 6.2.2.2).  The Himba do not have a direct 
translation for the word ‘shapes.’  Thus, their ability to encode the LS might have suffered to 
some extent and conceivably influenced their susceptibility to cognitive set.  Indeed, Himba 
participants had much more difficulty passing the training levels and the ones that did, required 
significantly more training trials (M = 79.7) than Western participants (M = 39; Section 5.3.5). 
That being said, all Himba participants were monolingual in Otjihimba; yet we observed 
substantial inter-individual variation in susceptibility to cognitive set and there was no 
interaction between the number of training trials and DS-use in humans.  Furthermore, consider 
that all of the human populations tested required thousands fewer training trials than the 
nonhuman subjects and the majority of each group exhibited a preference for the LS.  
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Thus, it seems reasonable that humans possess roughly equivalent abilities to encode 
rules; although, certainly, formally educated participants might be more practiced in this regard.  
Indeed, enhanced rule encoding, perhaps stemming from linguistic processes, might promote the 
initial development of cognitive set in humans but this appears to have played a secondary role in 
the observed inter-individual differences in humans’ abilities to break cognitive set.  Specifically, 
as evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, subjects’ conceptualization of the task appears to greatly 
influence their abilities to use the shortcut.  
 
6.4.3 Potential Impact of Educational Background 
Western education relies, in large part, on rote memorization of prescribed solution 
strategies to boost efficiency and long-term retention (Fehr, 1953; Henderson & Pingry, 1953; 
Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005).  However, this approach might well be ineffective (Rohrer 
& Taylor, 2006) and/or promote inflexibility (Sweller, 1983).  I have discussed this possibility 
throughout the text (Sections: 1.5.1; 1.6.4; 2.1; 4.1; 4.4; 5.1; 5.4); however, the current research 
only hints at the possibility that educational practices might contribute to set.  That being said, I 
would like to briefly delve into the potential implications and practicalities. 
First, it is also possible that exposure to formal education promotes the interpretation of 
the experimental setup as a test of sorts, such that a fear of failure prevents exploration (Luchins, 
1942).  This goes a long way to explain why the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt 
effectively reduced cognitive set in Western but not Himba participants (Section 5.3.2).  An 
interesting manipulation might be to manipulate the reward values of correct (increase in reward) 
and incorrect (neutral vs decrease in reward) responses.   
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It is important to note in this discussion that, undoubtedly, mechanized rule-use has its 
benefits: it lightens cognitive load and allows many different problems to be solved via the same 
strategy (Christoff & Keramatian, 2008; Sweller, 1980; Sweller et al., 1982).  Furthermore, a 
recent meta-analysis reported that one year of education corresponds to an approximate increase 
of 1-5 IQ points (Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2017).  It would be impractical to completely forego 
problem sets as educational tools to learn specific problem solving methods; however, a 
seemingly common frustration among educators is that children do not know how to “learn for 
themselves” (Schwartz et al., 2005).  How do we balance “Exploit!” and “Explore!” in the 
learning environment?  A better understanding of how, exactly, cognitive flexibility is influenced 
by educational styles and to what extent this might intersect with personality traits would be a 
worthy pursuit for future endeavors.  In particular, comparing Western and non-Western children 
who either do or do not partake in formal education (e.g., public, private), in a longitudinal study, 
would go far to elucidate the impacts of education on cognitive flexibility.  
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Strategy selection can, and arguably should (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014), be biased by 
situational factors (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Kolodny et al., 2015).  Effective strategies should 
be maintained within both individual and group repertoires such that, when another solution 
method becomes necessary or available, it can be capitalized upon (Reader, 2016).  On a 
proximate level, we might expect individuals with better faculty over explorative/exploitative 
strategies to exhibit higher fitness, especially in dynamic environments (Carr et al., 2016; 
Holmes & Cohen, 2014; Reader, 2003).  
Humans exhibit a remarkable proclivity for invention; yet time and again, engage in 
mechanized problem solving (Adamson, 1952; Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; 
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Lemaire & Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950).  How can humans’ 
sporadic yet conclusively innovative behavior be reconciled with their known predilection for 
habit?  I submit that explorative/exploitative tendencies exist in equilibrium within individuals 
such that the relative risks and rewards are optimized.  Furthermore, I would speculatively 
propose that typical Western educational practices may impair human cognitive flexibility, by 
heavily rewarding habit-based solutions.  
Although learned responses or habit-based behavior is not always detrimental, defaulting 
toward exploitative rather than explorative behavior doubtlessly contributes to inefficient 
responses.  In this research we observed striking species differences in susceptibility to cognitive 
set between baboons, chimpanzees, and humans. This research also found evidence against the 
contention that perceptual influences impact shortcut-use on the LS-DS task.  However, problem 
conceptualization was shown to impact subjects’ abilities to break cognitive set.  Furthermore, 
this is the first research to document cross-cultural differences in cognitive set in humans.  I 
speculatively suggest that formal education might contribute to problem solving inflexibility; 
however future research is necessary to substantiate this claim. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
 
 
 
Supplemental Fig 2.1.  Pilot data was collected on 32 humans (ages 6-51), including 5 
children (mean age = 6.4, SD=.55), 8 adolescents (mean age = 14.13, SD=.35), and 14 adults 
(mean age 36.36, SD= 10.02).  Methods were highly similar to those previously described; 
however, children were given 500ms demonstration slides during testing.   Additionally, the first 
10 adults were only given 48 testing trials.  After a subject noted that she “figured it out at the 
very end,” the trial numbers were doubled.  Once participants had completed all trials, they 
were asked if they had thought about touching the Triangle directly and their responses were 
recorded.  Our results showed that 1 out of 14 (7.14%) adults, 1 out of 8 (12.5%) adolescents 
and 2 out of 5 (40%) children would be classified as DSers.  This is consistent with our later 
findings. 
  
162 
Appendix B - Chapter 5 Supplementary Data 
 
Group differences in accuracy and response times 
Western subjects’ overall accuracy in experimental trials was significantly higher than 
Urban, and Traditional Himba subjects,’ as revealed by a Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of 
variance  (H(2) = 54.74, p < .001; Ms: Western = 91.5%, Urban = 77.9%, Traditional = 79.2%).  
Additionally, a loglinear analysis revealed no effect of sex on DS-use in any group for either 
PRE [χ2(1, N= 183 = 0.87, p = .351; Female DSers = 23.6%; Male DSers = 35.6%] or POST 
[χ2(1, N = 183 = 1.49, p = .223; Female DSers = 35.5%; Male DSers = 41.1%] trials. 
We assessed general differences in response times between groups by isolating the time 
between the end of the Square1→Square2 demonstration and subjects’ first response (RT1), 
between first and second response (RT2) and between second and third response (RT3) for 
BASE trials in which they used the LS.  Data were normalized using a natural logarithmic 
transform and outliers were excluded (N = 6 Westerners, 1 Urban, 8 Traditional).  A mixed 
design ANOVA indicated a significant interaction  (F(4,330) = 19.78, p < .000) between 
response (RT1, RT2, RT3) and group (Western, Urban, Traditional).  RT1 was slower than RT3, 
which was slower than RT2, for all groups.  Further, Westerners’ were significantly faster than 
Urban Himba, who in turn were significantly faster than traditional Himba for RT1 (Westerners: 
M = 722.6 ms; SD = 176.9; Urban: M = 1259.6 ms; SD = 438.6; Traditional: M = 1463.9 ms; SD 
= 482.3) and RT2  (Westerners: M = 218.1 ms; SD = 107.2; Urban: M = 405.7 ms; SD = 266.1; 
Traditional: M = 520.9 ms; SD = 225.5).  For RT3, Westerners were significantly faster than 
Urban and Traditional Himba, who did not differ from each other  (Westerners: M = 653.9 ms; 
SD = 115.5; Urban: M = 929.1 ms; SD = 193.9; Traditional: M = 980.5 ms; SD = 320.4).  
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An intermediate strategy 
During analysis, we discovered that some subjects used an intermediate strategy, in 
which they selected Square1 and then the Triangle, skipping Square2 (Figure 1.6-1c). That is to 
say, they began to use the LS but then switched to the DS, invoking a ‘switch strategy’ (SS).  
Using the same greater than 5% classification criteria to identify SSers, we found a significantly 
higher proportion of SSers within the Traditional Himba (20.0%) than the Urban Himba (3.7%) 
however, the proportion of Westerners (5.6%) did not differ from either group, in PRE trials 
[χ2(1, N = 183) = 10.837, p = .004].  Yet, in POST trials SSer proportions of Traditional (16%), 
Urban (7.4%), and Westerners (9.3%) were not statistically distinct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
